On Feb 6, 6:39 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 7:12 AM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > An agent in possession of free will is able to perform an action that was
> > possible to predict by nobody but the agent itself.
> There are a number of things wrong with this:
> 1) In theory there is no reason to think that the agent would be better at
> predicting its own actions than a outsider, and indeed its easy to imagine
> circumstances where the exact opposite is true.

In terms of the paper, that would be a kind of oracular (as in Oracle
Machine)  knowledge.
But then why wouldn;t agents have knowledge of each others FW

> 2) In practice the subjective meaning of the word "free" would seem to be
> incompatible with the ability to predict that you would do X tomorrow for
> certain and nothing can change that fact, its certain, it's just the way
> things are, you're on a path to X and there is no way to get off, you're
> stuck. In other words "freedom" and "no choice" don't fit. If you want a
> definition try the opposite:

That doesn't quite follow. Your action can be free as far as the
worlds in concerned, but known to you. Suppose you sat in a room
deciding the the nexgt days actions on the roll of a die. You would
no what you were going to do tomorrow, but not one else would have
observed the die rolls.

>  "Free will is the INABILITY to always predict our own actions even if a
> outsider can make such a prediction";
>  That's the only definition of free will that isn't gibberish or circular
> but unfortunately nobody except me uses it.

I can see why.

> 3) If you can always predict your actions then you must be deterministic
> and have had a reason for doing so, because otherwise it was random and if
> you can predict randomness then its not random. And if you did it for a
> reason it's deterministic. I mean, if you weren't deterministic you
> couldn't determine what you would do next.

Doing things for reasons is compatible with indeterminism.

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