On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> But then why wouldn;t agents have knowledge of each others FW functions.
I can't answer that question because I don't know what "FW functions" are,
and forget functions I don't even know what you mean by "FW".
> Your action can be free as far as the outside worlds in concerned, but
> known to you.
If I always knew what I was going to do I sure wouldn't feel very free. But
consider the opposite situation, your future actions were known by the
outside world but not to you. You are walking down a road and see a fork in
the road a half mile ahead, both lead to your destination however the left
path is shorter but the right path is more beautiful; which path do you
take? You think about it, you haven't decided, but a outsider can observe
all the neurons in your brain and as the outsider's mind works much faster
than yours he calculates that by the time you will reach the fork you will
decide to go right. Meanwhile you haven't finished the calculation and you
still don't know if you will go left or right, you're still thinking about
it. By the time you reach the fork you find yourself walking down the
right path and conclude you decided of your own free will to go right. The
fact that an outsider knew what I was going to do does not diminish the
feeling of being free as a bird one bit because I did not know what I would
do until I did it.
To have any hope of free will making any sense you've got to turn around
your definition by 180 degrees.
> Suppose you sat in a room deciding the the nexgt days actions on the roll
> of a die. You would
> no what you were going to do tomorrow, but not one else would have
> observed the die rolls.
Then there was no reason for your decision it was random. That's perfectly
logical but is it really what you mean by free will?
>> "Free will is the INABILITY to always predict our own actions even if a
>> outsider can make such a prediction"; That's the only definition of free
>> will that isn't gibberish or circular but unfortunately nobody except me
>> uses it.
> I can see why.
Then I wish you could do me the great favor of explaining why to me.
> Doing things for reasons is compatible with indeterminism.
I see, doing something for a reason is compatible with doing something for
no reason so there is no difference between determinism and indeterminism.
No I take that back, I don't see.
John K Clark
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