On Feb 7, 5:54 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 6, 2012   <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > But then why wouldn;t agents have knowledge of each others FW functions.
> I can't answer that question because I don't know what "FW functions" are,
> and forget functions I don't even know what you mean by "FW".

I was referring to the paper linked in the first post.

> > Your action can be free as far as the outside worlds in concerned, but
> > known to you.
> If I always knew what I was going to do I sure wouldn't feel very free.

I didn't say "always known", I said know.

> But
> consider the opposite situation, your future actions were known by the
> outside world but not to you. You are walking down a road and see a fork in
> the road a half mile ahead, both lead to your destination however the left
> path is shorter but the right path is more beautiful; which path do you
> take? You think about it, you haven't decided, but a outsider can observe
> all the neurons in your brain and as the outsider's mind works much faster
> than yours he calculates that by the time you will reach the fork you will
> decide to go right. Meanwhile you haven't finished the calculation and you
> still don't know if you will go left or right, you're still thinking about
> it. By the time you reach the fork you find yourself walking  down the
> right path and conclude you decided of your own free will to go right.

Nope. Since it is predictable, it is deterministic, since it is
it is no free.

> The
> fact that an outsider knew what I was going to do does not diminish the
> feeling of being free

Feeling free is not being free. That was bait and switch.

>as a bird one bit because I did not know what I would
> do until I did it.

> To have any hope of free will making any sense you've got to turn around
> your definition by 180 degrees.

You are confusing makign sense with agreeing with your prejudices.

> > Suppose you sat in a room deciding the the nexgt days actions on the roll
> > of a die. You would
> > no what you were going to do tomorrow, but not one else would have
> > observed the die rolls.
> Then there was no reason for your decision it was random.

Actions and reasons for actions can be chosen in pairs. Indeterminism
is compatible with doing things for reasons because reasons are
final causes (ends), whereas indeterminism only means lack
of efficient causes.

>That's perfectly
> logical but is it really what you mean by free will?
> >>  "Free will is the INABILITY to always predict our own actions even if a
> >> outsider can make such a prediction"; That's the only definition of free
> >> will that isn't gibberish or circular but unfortunately nobody except me
> >> uses it.
>  > I can see why.
> Then I wish you could do me the great favor of explaining why to me.

If an outsider can make such a prediction, then my actions are
determined, then they are not free.

> > Doing things for reasons is compatible with indeterminism.
> I see, doing something for a reason is compatible with doing something for
> no reason

indeterminism means no (efficient) cause, not no reason.

Causes are not reasons.

> so there is no difference between determinism and indeterminism.
> No I take that back, I don't see.
>   John K Clark

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