On 2/6/2012 3:50 PM, acw wrote:
I'm not so sure to term ``body'' is as meaningful if we consider the extremes which seem possible in COMP. After a digital substitution, a body could very well be some software running somewhere, on any kind of substrate, with an arbitrary time-frame/ordering (as long as 1p coherent), it could even run directly on some abstract machine which is not part of our universe (such as some machine emulating another machine which is contained in the UD) - the only thing that the mind would have in common is that some program is being instantiated somewhere, somehow. In this more extreme form, I'm not sure I can see any difference between a substrate that has the label 'physical' and some UD running in abstract Platonia. If you can show why the 'physical' version would be required or how can someone even tell the difference between someone living in a 'physical' world vs someone living in a purely mathematical (Platonic) world which sees the world from within said structure in Platonia and calls it 'physical'. It seems that 'physical' is very much what we call the structure in which we exist, but that's indexical, and if you claim that only one such structure exists (such as this universe), then you think COMP is false (that is, no digital substitution exists) or that arithmetic is inconsistent (which we cannot really know, but we can hope)?


Physics is already extremely abstract and mathematical, so it is really not a big step to suppose that the fundamental ontology is mathematics or computation as Bruno, Tegmark, and others have speculated. The big step is between supposing that somethings happen and some don't versus everything (in some sense) happens. To say there must be substrate, some 'ur-stuff', is really just to say that some things have existence (the ur-stuff) and some don't.

Brent

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