On 4 February 2012 14:38, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> Does my claim that our primitive ground must be neutral with respect to > any properties make any sense? It like the zero of arithmetic from which we > can extricate any set of positive and negative quantities in pairs such that > their sum is equal to zero. What I see in Bruno's interpretation of COMP is > that it permits for the primitive to have a set of properties (numbers and + > and *) to the exclusion of its complementary opposites. Since this is a > violation of neutrality, thus I see a fatal flaw in Bruno's Ideal monist > interpretation. I think it may make some intuitive sense, but I don't quite see what role it could play in a theory, in the technical sense Bruno proposes. For example, Bruno sometimes refers to the metaphor of the One - from Plotinus. Sometimes in my mind's eye I think of the symmetry of the One as somehow breaking into an infinity of "computational" self-relations, individuated instances of consciousness then emerging from that complexity as spatio-temporally-distinguishable aspects of the differentiated self-intimacy thus engendered. The seamless symmetry of the One - the solus ipse, if you like - might indeed serve here as a sort of primitive neutral background, any further properties emerging only as a consequence of the subsequent breaking of that primal symmetry. But this is merely an intuitive attempt to grasp the ungraspable, not a theory, in the sense of something that has any practical consequences (nothing being so practical as a good theory). I'd certainly be interested if you have anything more substantial to propose. David > On 2/4/2012 8:58 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 4 February 2012 12:22, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> No, I am not. I bet that comp is TRUE, but I don't see COMP as requiring >>> that the physical world is supervening on numbers (up to isomorphisms) as >>> primitives. >>> >>> >>> So you have to explicitly show what is not valid in the UDA1-8. You miss >>> something, let us try to find out what. >>> >>> >>> I am not missing a thing, Bruno. You are missing something that is >>> obvious to the rest of us. >>> >>> >>> If someone else can confirm this, and put some light on what Stephen is >>> saying, I would be pleased. >> >> Bruno, I used to think that you were indeed missing "something that is >> obvious to the rest of us". I don't think so any longer, because I >> understand now that you are presenting a theory and your arguments >> consequently derive strictly from the axioms and assumptions of that >> theory. I don't pretend to understand all aspects of that theory of >> course, but through discussion and the contrast of ideas I have come a >> bit closer than when I started. >> >> I don't know if it will help at all for me to state here my >> understanding of what might motivate the theory in the first place, >> but I'll try. Firstly, as you have so often said, the >> informational/computational theory of mind (CTM) is more or less the >> default assumption in science. Indeed this conclusion seems almost >> unavoidable given that brain research seems to imply, more or less >> unambiguously, the correlation of mental states with relations, >> rather than relata. However, CTM in its uncritically-assumed form >> continues to be combined with the additional assumption of an >> Aristotelian primitively-physical state of affairs. This leads >> directly either to denialism of the first-person, or alternatively to >> some ill-defined species of property dualism. These consequences by >> themselves might well lead us to reject such primitive-physicalism as >> incoherent, even without an explicit reductio ad absurdum of the >> unambiguous association of conscious states with "physical >> computation". Either way, in order to retain CTM, one is led to >> contemplate some form of neutral monism. >> >> The question of what form such a "neutral" theory should take now >> arises. Since the theory is explicitly *computational*, the axioms >> and assumptions of such a theory should obviously be restricted to the >> absolute minimum necessary to construct a "computational universe" (in >> the traditional sense of "universe") or rather to indicate how such a >> universe would necessarily construct itself, given those axioms and >> assumptions. The basic assumption is of a first-order combinatorial >> system, of which numbers are the most widely-understood example. >> Given the arithmetical nature of such a universe, construction and >> differentiability of composite entities must necessarily derive from >> arithmetical assumptions, which permits the natural emergence of >> higher-order structural integration via the internal logic of the >> system. Of particular note is the emergence in this way of >> self-referential entities, which form the logical basis of >> person-hood. >> >> Since the reality of first-person localisation is not denied in this >> theory (indeed the theory positively seeks to rationalise it), the >> system is not posited as having merely third-personal status, but as >> possessing a first-person self-referential point-of-view which is >> associated with consciousness. Perhaps it is this aspect of the >> theory which is the most tricky, as it cuts across a variety of >> different intuitions about consciousness and its relation to the >> phenomena it reveals. For rather than positing a primitively-physical >> universe which "instantiates" conscious states, the theory must >> reverse the relation and posit conscious states that "instantiate" >> physical phenomena. In so doing, it exposes itself to empirical >> refutation, since those phenomena must be, at least, consistent with >> ordinary observation (although they also predict, in the limit, >> observations of high improbability). >> >> It is this last issue of instantiation which seems to be one of main >> bones of contention between Stephen and yourself, though I'm not sure >> why this is the case. From my own perspective, unsophisticated though >> it may be, it seems reasonable that the emergence of "truly physical" >> phenomena should indeed be the result of "personal instantiation" in >> the conjunction of consciousness and computation. After all, when do >> questions as to what is "truly physical" emerge, other than in the >> context of what is "truly experiential"? The rest is calculation. >> >> David >> >> > Dear David, > > Does my claim that our primitive ground must be neutral with respect to > any properties make any sense? It like the zero of arithmetic from which we > can extricate any set of positive and negative quantities in pairs such that > their sum is equal to zero. What I see in Bruno's interpretation of COMP is > that it permits for the primitive to have a set of properties (numbers and + > and *) to the exclusion of its complementary opposites. Since this is a > violation of neutrality, thus I see a fatal flaw in Bruno's Ideal monist > interpretation. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
