On 2/6/2012 5:37 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/7/2012 00:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/6/2012 3:50 PM, acw wrote:
I'm not so sure to term ``body'' is as meaningful if we consider the
extremes which seem possible in COMP. After a digital substitution, a
body could very well be some software running somewhere, on any kind
of substrate, with an arbitrary time-frame/ordering (as long as 1p
coherent), it could even run directly on some abstract machine which
is not part of our universe (such as some machine emulating another
machine which is contained in the UD) - the only thing that the mind
would have in common is that some program is being instantiated
somewhere, somehow. In this more extreme form, I'm not sure I can see
any difference between a substrate that has the label 'physical' and
some UD running in abstract Platonia. If you can show why the
'physical' version would be required or how can someone even tell the
difference between someone living in a 'physical' world vs someone
living in a purely mathematical (Platonic) world which sees the world
from within said structure in Platonia and calls it 'physical'. It
seems that 'physical' is very much what we call the structure in which
we exist, but that's indexical, and if you claim that only one such
structure exists (such as this universe), then you think COMP is false
(that is, no digital substitution exists) or that arithmetic is
inconsistent (which we cannot really know, but we can hope)?
Physics is already extremely abstract and mathematical, so it is really
not a big step to suppose that the fundamental ontology is mathematics
or computation as Bruno, Tegmark, and others have speculated. The big
step is between supposing that somethings happen and some don't versus
everything (in some sense) happens. To say there must be substrate, some
'ur-stuff', is really just to say that some things have existence (the
ur-stuff) and some don't.
What do you mean by 'ur-stuff'? Some structure which is more privileged than others with
Not structure, just 'existence'.
In my opinion, the claim that some things (for example, some computations) don't happen
is incredibly strong. It makes sense for someone who has only lived in one universe to
say that any other universe doesn't exist because his classical rationality (such as
Russell's teapot, the requirement for a burden of proof) says that we can't really claim
existence for things we don't have direct evidence for. On the other hand, Occam's razor
makes us favor the simplest possible theories. A theory which explicitly has to deny
some structures or computations from existing is much more complex and stronger (and
thus will be favored less by Occam or its formalizations).
But Occam's razor is just a rule-of-thumb. A Russell Standish points out, in the simplest
possible theory nothing exists.
COMP as derived from UDA/MGA already places great constraints on what the ontology has
to be given the assumption that our brains do admit a digital substitution and such an
act is survivable.
Does it? I thought it entailed infinitely many different universes with physics limited
only by the constraint that they be locally computable.
Any theory which claims the UD's existence, but limits the laws of physics to only a
single instance of some string theory, with only one history and one universe and so on
is incredibly strong/very complex, thus shouldn't be favored (by Occam). It also leads
to many other questions such as: why this mathematical structure is granted existence,
but the others are not? and the conflict between mechanism and materialism as shown in
the MGA. To me it seems like privileging the indexicals, which seems like a popular
conservative materialist position, although I do wonder why it is that popular - it just
favors one "magic" over the other (this structure, my structure is "special", all the
others aren't), thus I'm not so sure it's the most rational choice possible, despite
that being its aim.
Except it favors the 'magic' we see and use over 'magic' that is inaccessible.
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