On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 8:53 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
> On 2/14/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > > The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of > talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his > hand that it implicitly requires a computation to be performed to "find" > it. > > > Because UDA+MGA shows that even if a "real" primary physical universe > exists, it cannot explain anything related to what I can feel to observe > from my 1p view. > Obviously, the appearance of a universe makes it natural to believe that a > simple explanation is that such a universe exists, but this has been shown > to not work at all, once we assume we are Turing emulable. So f you are > right, then there must be flaw in UDA+MGA, but each time we ask you to > point where it is, you come up with philosophical reason to discard comp > (without always saying it). > > > Hi Bruno, > > The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence > of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts > that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world > does not exist. > How many times do we have to tell you that's not true? > Why is that a problem? Because without a physical world, it is impossible > for that theory to have any properties. You want to get around this problem > by postulating that the entities of UDA+MGA can and does have a particular > set of properties merely because they exist. OK, but how does the existence > of an entity define its properties? > > > > > I do not blame him as this problem has been glossed over for hundred of > years in math and thus we have to play with nonsense like the Axiom of > Choice (or Zorn's Lemma) to "prove" that a solution exists, never-mind > trying to actually find the solution. This so called 'proof" come at a very > steep price, it allows for all kinds of > paradox<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banach-Tarski_paradox> > . > > > This is unclear. Comp is axiom-of-choice independent. Even arithmetical > truth is entirely axiom of choice independent. ZF and ZF + AC proves > exactly the same arithmetical truth. > > > "COMP is Axiom of Choice independent" ... Does this means that COMP is > independent of any particular version of AC or does it means that the truth > of a statement is just the existence of the statement as an abstract entity > in an isolated way? I am just trying to be consistent with what I > understand of UDA+MGA. UDA+MGA, as far as I can tell, proposes that the > physical world does not have an existence independent of our experiences > and since our experiences can be represented exactly as relations between > numbers, that all that exists is numbers. Correct? > If this is correct, then my questions turn on what exactly are numbers > and how do they acquire properties. 1 is a 1, a 2 is a 2, and 3 is a 3. But > what is it that defines what a 1 or a 2 or a 3 is? We could think of this > as a set of different patterns of pixels on our computer monitors, of marks > on paper, or a chalkboard, or apples, bananas, or trees. But this avoids > the question of "what is it that ultimately gives 1 its one-ness?". > Alternatively, we can think of these symbols as physical representations of > sets or classes of objects, but then we have to define what that means. The > easiest way to do that is to point at objects in the world and make noises > with our mouth or, if we are mute, to make signs with our hands and/or > grimaces with our faces. > Obviously, all of this is taking a 3p or objective point of view of > objects, symbols, etc. but as we know, this is a conceit as we can only > guess and bet that what we observe is "real" in that it is not just a > figment of our imagination that vanishes when we stop thinking of it. I am > being intentionally absurd to illustrate a problem that I see. If we are > going to claim that the physical world does not exist then we have to be > consistent with that claim and cannot use any concepts that assumes the > properties of a physical world. My claim is that UDA+MGA violates this > requirement by using concepts that only have a meaning because of their > relation to physical processes and yet claiming that those very processes > do not exist. > > > > A possible solution to this problem, proposed by many even back as > far as Heraclitus, is to avoid the requirement of a solution at the > beginning. Just let the universe compute its least action configuration as > it evolves in time, > > > This does not work, unless you define the physical reality by > arithmetic, but this would be confusing. It seems clearer and cleare that > your "existence" axiom is the postulate that there is a physical primary > reality. But then comp is wrong. > > > What I see as wrong about COMP is how you are interpreting it. You are > taking its implied meaning too far. I claim that there is a limit on its > soundness as a theory or explanation of ontological nature, a soundness > that vanishes when it is taken to imply that its communicability becomes > impossible - a situation which inevitably occurs when one interprets COMP > as a claim that the physical world does not exist. > > > At least Craig is coherent on this. he want some primitive matter, and > he abandons comp. His theory is still unclear, but the overall shape make > sense, despite it explains nothing (given that he assume also a primitive > sense, and a primitive symmetry). > > Bruno > > > I do not want primitive matter, as this would put us into the > situation that the material monist are in, with the epiphenomenal nature of > consciousness. I just want abstract representations and physical object on > the same level. I think that we can agree that the physical world cannot be > primitive in the ontological sense, but can you not see that > representations cannot be primitive either if only becuase to claim that, > for instance, that only numbers are primitive eliminates the possibility > that one number has a particular set of properties that makes it somehow > different from another number. > > Also, you have been using the word "neutral" to mean "indifferent" in > a way that is similar to "I am indifferent to whether cows prefer chocolate > ice cream over vanilla ice cream". I mean neutral to mean "not having any > bias for some set of properties over any other". These two meaning are very > similar but the latter is more general than the former because the latter > is not considering the entity that might have a particular set of > properties (which implies a choice of properties and thus my comments about > the axiom of choice) while the former is taking the case of indifference > about some particular state of affairs given from a particular point of > view. It is a 1p versus a 3p difference. No? > At issue is the question of how does the definiteness of the > properties of an object, be it abstract - like the concept of a number - or > concrete - like the keyboard that I am typing on, come to be what it is. > You seem to claim that properties are defined by the mere existence of an > object. I am not understanding how you think that such is possible. We can > make claims that A exists and that A is A, but what is A independent of any > claims we might make of it? > > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
