On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 1:31 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
> On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > [SPK] >> >> The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence >> of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts >> that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world >> does not exist. >> > > How many times do we have to tell you that's not true? > > > Hi Joseph, > > Please be specific. What is "not true" about the sentence I wrote > above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read: > > " 8) Yes, but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical > universe? Up to this > stage, w*e can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding > reasoning steps, by > postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ and is too > little in the sense of not being > able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it, so > that our usual physical > predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated > ‘‘little’’ computational > histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and > disgraceful. *It can also be > quite weakened by some acceptation of some conceptual version of > Ockham’s Razor, and > obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to accept > comp+ (in which > case the UDA just show the necessity of the detour in psychology, > and the general shape of > physics as averages on consistent 1-histories). But logically, > there is still a place for both > physicalism and comp, once we made that move. Actually the 8th present > step will explain > that such a move is nevertheless without purpose.* This will make the > notion of concrete and > existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.* * It > will follow that a much > weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that not > only physics has > been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that > ‘‘matter’’ has been > ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the > object study of fundamental > machine psychology. *All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is > that comp forbids to > associate inner experiences with the physical processing related > to the computations > corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. The physical > ‘‘supervenience thesis’’ of the > materialist philosophers of mind cannot be maintained, and inner > experiences can only be > associated with type of computation. > Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine > state] at space-time > (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time > (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of > computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which > is accepted as existing > independently of our selves with arithmetical realism)." > > If this is not a statement that "the physical world does not exist" > and, instead, that all that exists is "abstract machine", I will eat my > hat. > > I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al allows > for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties but I > have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the elimination > of the properties of the physical world demands the elimination of the > "existence" of the physical world. My claim is that we can recover > appearances by decoupling existence from property definiteness, but that > idea is either not being understood or is being rejected out of hand. > > What Quentin said. If* *anyone actually denied the existence of a physical reality in any sense, that would indeed be grounds not just for correcting them, but for ignoring them entirely. Is your post some kind of meta-level commentary on the need for precise language?? > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.