On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 1:31 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

>  On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote:
>
>  [SPK]
>>
>>     The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence
>> of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts
>> that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world
>> does not exist.
>>
>
> How many times do we have to tell you that's not true?
>
>
> Hi Joseph,
>
>     Please be specific. What is "not true" about the sentence I wrote
> above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read:
>
> "  8) Yes, but what  if we  don’t  grant  a concrete  robust  physical
> universe? Up  to  this
> stage,  w*e  can  still  escape  the conclusion of  the  seven preceding
> reasoning  steps, by
> postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ and is too
> little in the sense of not being
> able  to generate  the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of  it, so
> that our usual physical
> predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated
> ‘‘little’’ computational
> histories.   Such  a move  can be considered  as being ad hoc  and
> disgraceful.  *It  can  also be
> quite weakened by  some acceptation of  some conceptual  version of
> Ockham’s Razor,  and
> obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to accept
> comp+ (in which
> case  the UDA  just show  the necessity of  the detour  in psychology,
> and  the general shape of
> physics  as  averages  on  consistent  1-histories). But logically,
> there  is still  a  place  for  both
> physicalism and  comp, once we made  that move. Actually  the 8th present
> step will  explain
> that such a move  is nevertheless without purpose.* This will make  the
> notion of concrete and
> existing universe completely devoid of  any  explicative  power.* * It
> will  follow  that  a much
> weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that not
> only physics has
> been  epistemologically  reduced  to  machine  psychology, but that
> ‘‘matter’’ has  been
> ontologically  reduced  to ‘‘mind’’ where mind  is defined  as  the
> object  study of fundamental
> machine psychology. *All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is
> that comp forbids to
> associate  inner  experiences  with  the  physical  processing  related
> to  the computations
> corresponding  (with comp)  to  those experiences. The physical
> ‘‘supervenience  thesis’’ of  the
> materialist  philosophers  of mind  cannot  be maintained,  and  inner
> experiences  can only be
> associated with type of computation.
> Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine
> state] at space-time
> (x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at  space-time
> (x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
> computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia  which
> is  accepted  as  existing
> independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism)."
>
>     If this is not a statement that "the physical world does not exist"
> and, instead, that all that exists is "abstract machine", I will eat my
> hat.
>
>     I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al allows
> for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties but I
> have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the elimination
> of the properties of the physical world demands the elimination of the
> "existence" of the physical world. My claim is that we can recover
> appearances by decoupling existence from property definiteness, but that
> idea is either not being understood or is being rejected out of hand.
>
>
What Quentin said.

If* *anyone actually denied the existence of a physical reality in any
sense, that would indeed be grounds not just for correcting them, but for
ignoring them entirely. Is your post some kind of meta-level commentary on
the need for precise language??


> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
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-- 
Joseph Knight

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