2012/2/14 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>

>  On 2/14/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
>     The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of
> talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his
> hand that it implicitly requires a computation to be performed to "find"
> it.
>  Because UDA+MGA shows that even if a "real" primary physical universe
> exists, it cannot explain anything related to what I can feel to observe
> from my 1p view.
> Obviously, the appearance of a universe makes it natural to believe that a
> simple explanation is that such a universe exists, but this has been shown
> to not work at all, once we assume we are Turing emulable. So f you are
> right, then there must be flaw in UDA+MGA, but each time we ask you to
> point where it is, you come up with philosophical reason to discard comp
> (without always saying it).
> Hi Bruno,
>     The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence
> of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts
> that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world
> does not exist.

It does not prove that the physical world does not exist... it proves that
a *primitive* material world is irrelevant to predict your next moment, the
current physics of the world. Whether there is a primitive material world
or not cannot change your expectation of your next moment, rendering this
primitive material world devoid of explanatory power.

> Why is that a problem? Because without a physical world, it is impossible
> for that theory to have any properties. You want to get around this problem
> by postulating that the entities of UDA+MGA can and does have a particular
> set of properties merely because they exist. OK, but how does the existence
> of an entity define its properties?
>  I do not blame him as this problem has been glossed over for hundred of
> years in math and thus we have to play with nonsense like the Axiom of
> Choice (or Zorn's Lemma) to "prove" that a solution exists, never-mind
> trying to actually find the solution. This so called 'proof" come at a very
> steep price, it allows for all kinds of 
> paradox<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banach-Tarski_paradox>
> .
>  This is unclear. Comp is axiom-of-choice independent. Even arithmetical
> truth is entirely axiom of choice independent. ZF and ZF + AC proves
> exactly the same arithmetical truth.
>     "COMP is Axiom of Choice independent" ... Does this means that COMP is
> independent of any particular version of AC or does it means that the truth
> of a statement is just the existence of the statement as an abstract entity
> in an isolated way? I am just trying to be consistent with what I
> understand of UDA+MGA. UDA+MGA, as far as I can tell, proposes that the
> physical world does not have an existence independent of our experiences
> and since our experiences can be represented exactly as relations between
> numbers, that all that exists is numbers. Correct?
>     If this is correct, then my questions turn on what exactly are numbers
> and how do they acquire properties. 1 is a 1, a 2 is a 2, and 3 is a 3. But
> what is it that defines what a 1 or a 2 or a 3 is? We could think of this
> as a set of different patterns of pixels on our computer monitors, of marks
> on paper, or a chalkboard, or apples, bananas, or trees. But this avoids
> the question of "what is it that ultimately gives 1 its one-ness?".
> Alternatively, we can think of these symbols as physical representations of
> sets or classes of objects, but then we have to define what that means. The
> easiest way to do that is to point at objects in the world and make noises
> with our mouth or, if we are mute, to make signs with our hands and/or
> grimaces with our faces.
>     Obviously, all of this is taking a 3p or objective point of view of
> objects, symbols, etc. but as we know, this is a conceit as we can only
> guess and bet that what we observe is "real" in that it is not just a
> figment of our imagination that vanishes when we stop thinking of it. I am
> being intentionally absurd to illustrate a problem that I see. If we are
> going to claim that the physical world does not exist then we have to be
> consistent with that claim and cannot use any concepts that assumes the
> properties of a physical world. My claim is that UDA+MGA violates this
> requirement by using concepts that only have a meaning because of their
> relation to physical processes and yet claiming that those very processes
> do not exist.
>      A possible solution to this problem, proposed by many even back as
> far as Heraclitus, is to avoid the requirement of a solution at the
> beginning. Just let the universe compute its least action configuration as
> it evolves in time,
>  This does not work, unless you define the physical reality by
> arithmetic, but this would be confusing. It seems clearer and cleare that
> your "existence" axiom is the postulate that there is a physical primary
> reality. But then comp is wrong.
>     What I see as wrong about COMP is how you are interpreting it. You are
> taking its implied meaning too far. I claim that there is a limit on its
> soundness as a theory or explanation of ontological nature, a soundness
> that vanishes when it is taken to imply that its communicability becomes
> impossible - a situation which inevitably occurs when one interprets COMP
> as a claim that the physical world does not exist.
>  At least Craig is coherent on this. he want some primitive matter, and
> he abandons comp. His theory is still unclear, but the overall shape make
> sense, despite it explains nothing (given that he assume also a primitive
> sense, and a primitive symmetry).
>  Bruno
>     I do not want primitive matter, as this would put us into the
> situation that the material monist are in, with the epiphenomenal nature of
> consciousness. I just want abstract representations and physical object on
> the same level. I think that we can agree that the physical world cannot be
> primitive in the ontological sense, but can you not see that
> representations cannot be primitive either if only becuase to claim that,
> for instance, that only numbers are primitive eliminates the possibility
> that one number has a particular set of properties that makes it somehow
> different from another number.
>     Also, you have been using the word "neutral" to mean "indifferent" in
> a way that is similar to "I am indifferent to whether cows prefer chocolate
> ice cream over vanilla ice cream".  I mean neutral to mean "not having any
> bias for some set of properties over any other". These two meaning are very
> similar but the latter is more general than the former because the latter
> is not considering the entity that might have a particular set of
> properties (which implies a choice of properties and thus my comments about
> the axiom of choice) while the former is taking the case of indifference
> about some particular state of affairs given from a particular point of
> view. It is a 1p versus a 3p difference. No?
>     At issue is the question of how does the definiteness of the
> properties of an object, be it abstract - like the concept of a number - or
> concrete - like the keyboard that I am typing on, come to be what it is.
> You seem to claim that properties are defined by the mere existence of an
> object. I am not understanding how you think that such is possible. We can
> make claims that A exists and that A is A, but what is A independent of any
> claims we might make of it?
> Onward!
> Stephen
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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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