2012/2/14 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
> On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote:
>> The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence
>> of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts
>> that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world
>> does not exist.
> How many times do we have to tell you that's not true?
> Hi Joseph,
> Please be specific. What is "not true" about the sentence I wrote
> above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read:
> " 8) Yes, but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical
> universe? Up to this
> stage, w*e can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding
> reasoning steps, by
> postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ *
He talks about a primary physical universe... an "ontological" physical
universe, just below he uses the word "concrete" showing that really was
what he meant... hence your statement is false, because he does not say the
physical universe does not exist... and just using your eyes shows that
such a statement is absurd.
> *and is too little in the sense of not being
> able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it, so
> that our usual physical
> predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated
> ‘‘little’’ computational
> histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and
> disgraceful. *It can also be
> quite weakened by some acceptation of some conceptual version of
> Ockham’s Razor, and
> obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to accept
> comp+ (in which
> case the UDA just show the necessity of the detour in psychology,
> and the general shape of
> physics as averages on consistent 1-histories). But logically,
> there is still a place for both
> physicalism and comp, once we made that move. Actually the 8th present
> step will explain
> that such a move is nevertheless without purpose.* This will make the
> notion of concrete and
> existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.* * It
> will follow that a much
> weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that not
> only physics has
> been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that
> ‘‘matter’’ has been
> ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the
> object study of fundamental
> machine psychology. *All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is
> that comp forbids to
> associate inner experiences with the physical processing related
> to the computations
> corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. The physical
> ‘‘supervenience thesis’’ of the
> materialist philosophers of mind cannot be maintained, and inner
> experiences can only be
> associated with type of computation.
> Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine
> state] at space-time
> (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time
> (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of
> computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which
> is accepted as existing
> independently of our selves with arithmetical realism)."
> If this is not a statement that "the physical world does not exist"
> and, instead, that all that exists is "abstract machine", I will eat my
> I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al allows
> for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties but I
> have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the elimination
> of the properties of the physical world demands the elimination of the
> "existence" of the physical world. My claim is that we can recover
> appearances by decoupling existence from property definiteness, but that
> idea is either not being understood or is being rejected out of hand.
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> For more options, visit this group at
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at