On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote:

        The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the
    existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a
    theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly
    proving that the physical world does not exist.

How many times do we have to tell you that's not true?

Hi Joseph,

Please be specific. What is "not true" about the sentence I wrote above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read:

" 8) Yes, but what if we don't grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up to this stage, w_e can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoning steps, by postulating that a ''physical universe'' really ''exists'' and is too little in the sense of not being able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it, so that our usual physical predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated ''little'' computational histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and disgraceful. _It can also be quite weakened by some acceptation of some conceptual version of Ockham's Razor, and obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to accept comp+ (in which case the UDA just show the necessity of the detour in psychology, and the general shape of physics as averages on consistent 1-histories). But logically, there is still a place for both physicalism and comp, once we made that move. Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose._This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power._ _It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham's razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ''matter'' has been ontologically reduced to ''mind'' where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. _All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is that comp forbids to associate inner experiences with the physical processing related to the computations corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. The physical ''supervenience thesis'' of the materialist philosophers of mind cannot be maintained, and inner experiences can only be
associated with type of computation.
Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing
independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism)."

If this is not a statement that "the physical world does not exist" and, instead, that all that exists is "abstract machine", I will eat my hat.

I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al allows for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties but I have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the elimination of the properties of the physical world demands the elimination of the "existence" of the physical world. My claim is that we can recover appearances by decoupling existence from property definiteness, but that idea is either not being understood or is being rejected out of hand.



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