2012/2/16 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
> On 2/16/2012 1:16 PM, acw wrote:
> On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote:
> On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote:
> On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all
> kinds of computational errors such as schizophrenia, dismorphia,
> etc. We
> intentionally lie... The list of computationally erroneous behavior of
> the brain is almost endless. How does this occur given COMP? But I
> digress. Explaining "physical reality" is to explain the properties
> it has as opposed to those that it does not, UDA does not do that. It
> even presupposes things that are simply not possible in the physical
> world, such as teleportation and computations generating knowledge
> without the use of resources. Even a Reversible computer requires
> to compute and memory is a physical quantity.
> The notion of teleportation used in UDA is nothing magical or
> requiring new physics. The experiments in the UDA can be read as after
> someone said "yes" to the doctor and became a SIM(Substrate
> Independent Mind), thus after the substitution, they can know one of
> their godel numbers/programs (assuming correct observation). This
> essentially means that said program state can be transmitted and
> ran/instantiated anywhere you want and with any delay or order or
> form. A "teleportation" from A to B would merely require the SIM to
> stop itself in A, have another program transmit it to B(for example
> through the Internet or some other communication channel) and have
> someone run it in B, for example on a general purpose
> Turing-equivalent computer or more likely a special-purpose digital
> brain (for better performance within our physics) with access to an
> environment(or more, such as VRs). For all intents and purposes this
> isn't any different from me writing a program and you downloading it
> and running it on your own hardware. For UDA 1-5 this works trivially.
> For UDA 6, it also works, with changes in software. UDA 7 does make a
> stronger assumption: the sufficiently robust universe, however one
> doesn't really assume strong physical continuity by now (by 1-6), so I
> don't see UD even has to be coherently ran all at once and in a
> continuous manner (for example a running like that in "Permutation
> City" would work just well, "in the dust"). If you do consider some
> other 'everything' theories like Tegmark's or Schmidhuber, they also
> grant you an UD (and I would venture to say that your neutral
> Existence might also grant you such robust universes). UDA 8 you seem
> to disagree with, but I don't see what explanatory power could any
> primitively physical structure grant you: all possible digitalised
> observers and their continuations already have to be in the UD, thus
> you cannot use primitive physics for prediction. Thus the only claim
> that one could make for saving primitive physics would be that it
> allows for consciousness to manifest (for example by implementing the
> body). UDA 8 and MGA show that such a claim is specious and
> unnecessary. You seem to disagree with it, although its not clear to
> me as to why or how. You seem to claim that physical reality isn't
> primary (COMP agrees, it emerges from arithmetical/computational
> truth), although don't agree with the way it emerges in COMP or its
> nature(?)? Does that mean that you don't think that all possible
> observers are contained in the UD? To be frank, I'm still rather
> confused at what point your theory becomes incompatible or predicts
> different things than COMP (given the standard assumptions used in the
> Dear ACW,
> Please rethink exactly what teleportation requires to be possible. It is
> not any different from the ability to copy information.
> Yes, COMP assumes that there is a subst. level, which means that stuff
> below the subst. level may vary (or even look like noise, due to
> 1p-indeterminacy, we tend to think of this, in our universe, as the
> quantum foam and the like). A doctor (which is included in the
> assumption, but if it weren't...) only need be able to copy/emulate
> either exactly at the right subst. level or slightly below it (copying
> at a higher level may entail memory loss or functionality loss or
> worse). What this effectively means is that you don't need to be able
> to read the full quantum state (which is not possible), but just
> quasi-classical states, which we can do and which should be either at
> subst. level or below. (If the subst. level was below, COMP would be
> practically false, as we do assume that the observer's universal
> number is at least partially stable at the subst. level). No violation
> of the no-cloning theorem here. And aside from that we can
> copy/transmit quasi-classical information pretty well.
> Hi ACW,
> There is a problem with this way of thinking in that it assumes that all
> of the properties of objects are inherent in the objects themselves and
> have no relation or dependence on anything else. This is is wrong. We
> know from our study of QM and the experiments that have been done, that
> the properties of objects are definite because of interdependence and
> interconnections (via entanglement) between all things within our event
> horizon. You seem to be laboring under the classical Newtonian view. To
> have a consistent and real idea of teleportation one has to consider,
> for example, the requirements of quantum teleportation
> The assumption in COMP is that a subst. level exists, it's the main
> assumption! What does that practically mean? That you can eventually
> implement the brain (or a partial version of it) in a (modified)
> TM-equivalent machine (by CTT). It does not deny the quantum reality,
> merely says that the brain's functionality required for consciousness is
> classical (and turing-emulable). Although, I suppose some versions
> including oracles should be possible, and a weakening of COMP into simple
> functionalism may also be possible.
> Hi ACW,
> I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's English
> papers and participated in these discussions, at least. You do not need to
> keep repeating the same lines. ;-)
> The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the existence
> of the equivalent machine and from there the argument follows. If you think
> such a doctor can never exist, yet that there still is an equivalent
> turing-emulable implementation that is possible *in principle*, I just
> direct you at www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htmwhich
> merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which is given to
> you if MWI happens to be true).
> Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements of
> thermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptions that
> might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the idea of a random
> Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences of lottery winnings to
> code words that one wants to speak. The main problem is that one has no
> control at all over which numbers will pop up, so one has to substitute a
> scheme to select numbers after they have "rolled into the basket".
> This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signals are
> embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.
> If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then you
> consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM being false
> (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don't know that, and
> probably never will 100%, unless we're willing to someday say "yes" to such
> a computationalist doctor and find out for ourselves).
> All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility that
> the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It would be
> helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is capable of what we
> are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty well convinced that it cannot
Well at least, you state now that you think comp is simply false... so it's
just trolling about it, when you just reject the premices...
> based on all that I have studied of QM and its implications. For example,
> one has to consider the implications of the
> Gleason <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/#1> Theorems -
> since we hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!
> All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence has
> occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical world to obtain,
> or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see discussion that assume the
> physical world to be completely classical therefore it assumes a model of
> Reality that is not true.
> The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of
> infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either way, one
> option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect or just accidentally
> correct, while the other just assumes that there is no subst. level.
> No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you are
> presenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the idea of
> primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted to discuss ideas
> and not straw men with me.
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