2012/2/16 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> > On 2/16/2012 1:16 PM, acw wrote: > > On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote: > > On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote: > > On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote: > > On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote: > > On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote: > > [SPK] > Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all > kinds of computational errors such as schizophrenia, dismorphia, > etc. We > intentionally lie... The list of computationally erroneous behavior of > the brain is almost endless. How does this occur given COMP? But I > digress. Explaining "physical reality" is to explain the properties > that > it has as opposed to those that it does not, UDA does not do that. It > even presupposes things that are simply not possible in the physical > world, such as teleportation and computations generating knowledge > without the use of resources. Even a Reversible computer requires > memory > to compute and memory is a physical quantity. > > The notion of teleportation used in UDA is nothing magical or > requiring new physics. The experiments in the UDA can be read as after > someone said "yes" to the doctor and became a SIM(Substrate > Independent Mind), thus after the substitution, they can know one of > their godel numbers/programs (assuming correct observation). This > essentially means that said program state can be transmitted and > ran/instantiated anywhere you want and with any delay or order or > form. A "teleportation" from A to B would merely require the SIM to > stop itself in A, have another program transmit it to B(for example > through the Internet or some other communication channel) and have > someone run it in B, for example on a general purpose > Turing-equivalent computer or more likely a special-purpose digital > brain (for better performance within our physics) with access to an > environment(or more, such as VRs). For all intents and purposes this > isn't any different from me writing a program and you downloading it > and running it on your own hardware. For UDA 1-5 this works trivially. > For UDA 6, it also works, with changes in software. UDA 7 does make a > stronger assumption: the sufficiently robust universe, however one > doesn't really assume strong physical continuity by now (by 1-6), so I > don't see UD even has to be coherently ran all at once and in a > continuous manner (for example a running like that in "Permutation > City" would work just well, "in the dust"). If you do consider some > other 'everything' theories like Tegmark's or Schmidhuber, they also > grant you an UD (and I would venture to say that your neutral > Existence might also grant you such robust universes). UDA 8 you seem > to disagree with, but I don't see what explanatory power could any > primitively physical structure grant you: all possible digitalised > observers and their continuations already have to be in the UD, thus > you cannot use primitive physics for prediction. Thus the only claim > that one could make for saving primitive physics would be that it > allows for consciousness to manifest (for example by implementing the > body). UDA 8 and MGA show that such a claim is specious and > unnecessary. You seem to disagree with it, although its not clear to > me as to why or how. You seem to claim that physical reality isn't > primary (COMP agrees, it emerges from arithmetical/computational > truth), although don't agree with the way it emerges in COMP or its > nature(?)? Does that mean that you don't think that all possible > observers are contained in the UD? To be frank, I'm still rather > confused at what point your theory becomes incompatible or predicts > different things than COMP (given the standard assumptions used in the > UDA). > > Dear ACW, > > > Please rethink exactly what teleportation requires to be possible. It is > not any different from the ability to copy information. > > Yes, COMP assumes that there is a subst. level, which means that stuff > below the subst. level may vary (or even look like noise, due to > 1p-indeterminacy, we tend to think of this, in our universe, as the > quantum foam and the like). A doctor (which is included in the > assumption, but if it weren't...) only need be able to copy/emulate > either exactly at the right subst. level or slightly below it (copying > at a higher level may entail memory loss or functionality loss or > worse). What this effectively means is that you don't need to be able > to read the full quantum state (which is not possible), but just > quasi-classical states, which we can do and which should be either at > subst. level or below. (If the subst. level was below, COMP would be > practically false, as we do assume that the observer's universal > number is at least partially stable at the subst. level). No violation > of the no-cloning theorem here. And aside from that we can > copy/transmit quasi-classical information pretty well. > > > Hi ACW, > > There is a problem with this way of thinking in that it assumes that all > of the properties of objects are inherent in the objects themselves and > have no relation or dependence on anything else. This is is wrong. We > know from our study of QM and the experiments that have been done, that > the properties of objects are definite because of interdependence and > interconnections (via entanglement) between all things within our event > horizon. You seem to be laboring under the classical Newtonian view. To > have a consistent and real idea of teleportation one has to consider, > for example, the requirements of quantum teleportation > <http://www.tech-faq.com/quantum-teleportation.html><http://www.tech-faq.com/quantum-teleportation.html>. > > > The assumption in COMP is that a subst. level exists, it's the main > assumption! What does that practically mean? That you can eventually > implement the brain (or a partial version of it) in a (modified) > TM-equivalent machine (by CTT). It does not deny the quantum reality, > merely says that the brain's functionality required for consciousness is > classical (and turing-emulable). Although, I suppose some versions > including oracles should be possible, and a weakening of COMP into simple > functionalism may also be possible. > > > Hi ACW, > > I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's English > papers and participated in these discussions, at least. You do not need to > keep repeating the same lines. ;-) > > > The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the existence > of the equivalent machine and from there the argument follows. If you think > such a doctor can never exist, yet that there still is an equivalent > turing-emulable implementation that is possible *in principle*, I just > direct you at www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htmwhich > merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which is given to > you if MWI happens to be true). > > > Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements of > thermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptions that > might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the idea of a random > Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences of lottery winnings to > code words that one wants to speak. The main problem is that one has no > control at all over which numbers will pop up, so one has to substitute a > scheme to select numbers after they have "rolled into the basket". > This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signals are > embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle. > > > > If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then you > consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM being false > (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don't know that, and > probably never will 100%, unless we're willing to someday say "yes" to such > a computationalist doctor and find out for ourselves). > > > > All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility that > the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It would be > helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is capable of what we > are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty well convinced that it cannot >
Well at least, you state now that you think comp is simply false... so it's just trolling about it, when you just reject the premices... > based on all that I have studied of QM and its implications. For example, > one has to consider the implications of the > Kochen-Specker<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/>and > Gleason <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/#1> Theorems - > since we hold mathematical theorems in such high regard! > > All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence has > occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical world to obtain, > or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see discussion that assume the > physical world to be completely classical therefore it assumes a model of > Reality that is not true. > > > The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of > infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either way, one > option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect or just accidentally > correct, while the other just assumes that there is no subst. level. > > > No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you are > presenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the idea of > primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted to discuss ideas > and not straw men with me. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.