On 2/17/2012 12:00 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/16/2012 7:27 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/16/2012 7:09 PM, acw wrote:Do you understand at all the stuff about material and idea monismthat Ihave mentioned previously? We are exploring the implications of a verysophisticate form of Ideal Monism that I am very much interestedin, asit has, among other wonderful things, an unassailable proof that material monism is WRONG. What I am trying to discuss is how this is agood thing but the ontological theory as a whole that it isembedded inhas a problem that is being either a) misunderstood, b) ignored orboth.To be fair, I still have trouble understanding your objections toUDA 8/MGA, and this discussion has been going on for quite some timenow, maybe I'm just incapable of seeing the subtle distinction thatyou're trying to draw. Bruno postulates arithmetic or combinators,but if you want a different ontological foundation, you canformulate it and see how it fits within COMP (in case you assume it)and how that changes predictions and/or explanations.Hi ACW,## Advertising

My objection to UDA 8/MGA is that it assumes something that is isdeeply problematic. There is a difference between Computationaluniversality, in the sense of any given recursively enumerablealgorithm is universal if it does not depend for its functionalproperties on a particular physical implementation of it, and theideas that Recursively Enumerable Algorithms (REA) have propertiesand "run" completely independent of the possibility of implementationin physical hardware.My proof is mathematical but may be very poorly explained becauseI have a very hard time translating my thoughts into words and forthis I apologize. I am hoping that you can see past the words and"grok" the meaning.I am identifying the invariant aspect of a REA with a fixed pointin a manifold of transformations where the "points" that make up themanifold represent the physical systems capable of implementing theREA and then applying Brouwer's Fixed point theorem:How can Brouwer's fixed point theorem be applied computers of REAs,they don't form a manifold.

Hi Brent,

`This is where my inability to express this idea in English puts me`

`in a very unpleasant situation. Honestly, you might as well count as`

`just wrong. I'll accept that. But I will bet that I'm right. :-) I just`

`don't know how to explain my idea any better at the moment. I will`

`predict one thing, there will be a paper published within the year that`

`will cover this idea by someone with the right skills. I will just be`

`happy to have come to understand it on my own.`

here is an example for Wiki. In the plane <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brouwer_fixed-point_theorem> "Every continuous <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous_function_%28topology%29> function /f/ from a closed <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closed_set> disk <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_%28mathematics%29> to itself has at least one fixed point."Think about this: Does the fixed point continue to exist if thecollection of points making up that closed disc or the continuoustransformations that are the functions where to vanish? Answer: No.The same way a computation is no longer a computation in the sense ofuniversality when there is no "universe" for it.The point is that unless it is possible for a physical system toimplement a REA, there is no such thing as an REA.That's the crux of the disagreement. Bruno says 2 exists because it'sthe successor of the successor of zero. I think it exists as aconcept because we invented it, along with counting (c.f. "The Originof Reason" by William S. Cooper). But I'm willing to take it'sexistence, along with the rest of arithmetic, as an hypothesis just tosee where it leads.

`You do realize that this gives a definition of "existence" that is`

`very different from that that almost all philosophers use. That's OK,`

`Bruno is not a philosopher although he does pretend to be one very well. :-)`

Onward! Stephen

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