On Feb 20, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: >
> > How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial > > simulation or not. > > I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that > we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person > point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to > verifiable (empirically) constraints. > > With comp we are in a complex "matrix" whose existence is deducible > from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible > from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *. Of course, Platonism/AR cannot be deduced mathematically: it is ontology. > > Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism > > without the notion of computational realism? > > Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the > incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including > physicalism. There is no such incompatibility. It is mutual redundancy, not mutual contradiction. What BM calls incompatibility actually hinges on Occams Razor, and O's R cuts both ways: AR/Platonism is redundant given materialism. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
