On Feb 20, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
> > simulation or not.
> I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that
> we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person
> point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to
> verifiable (empirically) constraints.
> With comp we are in a complex "matrix" whose existence is deducible
> from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible
> from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.

Of course, Platonism/AR cannot be deduced mathematically: it is

> > Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
> > without the notion of computational realism?
> Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the
> incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including
> physicalism.

There is no such incompatibility. It is mutual redundancy, not  mutual
contradiction. What BM calls incompatibility actually
hinges on Occams Razor, and O's R cuts both ways: AR/Platonism is
given materialism.

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