On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
Why would Gods be supernatural?
Why would bachelors be married?
That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim
that
the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines
from
being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk
terminology.
It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
MWI.
I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
control means "god" or "supernaural">
You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would
have to
admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make
changes
to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your
universe
and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?
You are natural.
How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
simulation or not.
I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that
we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person
point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to
verifiable (empirically) constraints.
With comp we are in a complex "matrix" whose existence is deducible
from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible
from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.
Bruno
You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.
No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
Pegasus, and that is all that is required.
If comp is true, then when we create
AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and
reprogram
their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we
be to
them other than Gods?
But we are natural so they would be wrong.
They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.
So? Is appearance reality?
That is what comp says.
Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.
Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
without the notion of computational realism?
Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the
incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including
physicalism. This shows just the gap between computer scientist,
philosopher of mind, and physicists, together with the usual
authoritative dogma in the field.
The simulation is reality as far as the
simulatees are concerned.
And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
real reality.
It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
their reality.
Not really. Peter is right, here. The physical reality is not a
simulation, unless we discover that it violate the material modal
logical (arithmetically based) hypostases.
Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.
You miss the first person indeterminacy. From the first person
perspective, viewed in the theory from some third person point of
view, the subject 'belongs' to an infinite set of computations, which
ask for compromise between the little numbers and the big numbers.
You seem to be arguing
appearance=reality on the premise that
opinion=truth.
Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
is in fact a logical program.
Hmm... reality will be the result of the indeterminacy. We can bet,
thanks to QM, and quasi-already comp, on a first person sharable
winning computation sheaf.
Appearances may not reflect the truest level
of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
representation of the simulation's function.
Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality
It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.
Comp confront each machine with reality, all the "time". But then
there is the reality of lies, and this has to be taken into account,
but with comp, there is a sense to say that the reality cannot lie to
you. Just extract comp from arithmetic, and compare it with your local
reality. Roughly speaking, if it differ, it means that you are not at
stage 0 of the comp reality, you are relatively failed, but this you
can be aware of. Comp makes the physically real more real, and more
solid, and we can test if the degree of relativity of the simulation,
and up to now, the "non primitive" stage zero seems to obey to the
matraila hypostases, that is, not refuting comp, or the fact that
hereby we are at the stage zero.
It doesn't
matter who you call 'natural'.
It matters a great deal what you call anything.
It would if the word natural had some relevant meaning, but even in
food labeling, that term is notoriously vague. Natural means
anything
that exists. Natural plastic comes from natural petrochemicals.
If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard
your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim
might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better.
Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
*their* Gods.
yes, but that would not mean a lot if those are Harry Potter
universes, or white rabbits histories. The physics is the sum on all
histories, with comp, but structured by the constraints of the logic
of self-reference.
"Did say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
poisonous".
Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no
place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that
you
would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's
view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious
agents than living organisms.
What we are arguing about is the supernatural.
No. What you are arguing about is the supernatural. What I am arguing
about are gods (entities with absolute superiority or omnipotence over
the subordinate entities who inhabit the simulations they create) and
their inevitability in MWI.
The question is their relative proportion, how would you define them,
etc.
Comp makes the physical reality unique and necessary, and multiversal.
You
do not rescue the supernatural by rendering the natural
meaningless.
Why not? Besides, as I keep saying, I am not trying to rescue the
supernatural, I am pointing out that God is not supernatural at all,
it is an accurate description of the relationship between the
programmer and the programmed.
If comp is correct that god does not exist, because he don't program,
he let the (universal) entities free.
Now who is arguing a special case for
natively evolved consciousness?
I don't know. Who?
You.
No, you have misunderstood.
If you could prove that statement, you would have tried.
"The Goa'uld are false gods!" -- Stargate, passim.
If I am a simulation, and a programmer watches 'me' and can
intervene
and change my program and the program of my universe at will,
then to
me they are a true God, and I would be well advised to pray to
them.
"To me"= appearance =/= reality
No. To me = my reality.
The causes and conditions upon which my
existence supervenes. If my programmer can make a Bengal tiger
appear
or disappear in my living room, then he is God in reality.
No he isn;t, because reality is where the sim is running and there
he is just a programmer.
Why do you think the programmer's reality is any more real? Maybe he
is a program running in another sim. Comp is the very idea that it
would be impossible to tell the difference.
It is the contrary. You miss, or forget to take into account the first
person indeterminacy. It is crucial to get the genuine comp big picture.
The bottom line is that in
the sim reality, anyone who programs the sim is God.
metprogramming is the science of writing program writing programs,
mathematically you can enumerate them by phi_phi_i, those are still
program though. What about programs testing transformation of
themselves Phi_i = eval T(i)?
God is not a programmer. But you might say that it is responsible for
the existence of the programs or the relative universal numbers.
This is
what comp says.
What do you mean by "comp".
Computationalism. Digital functionalism. CTM. UDA. All of it. All are
predicated on the idea that experience is generated by arithmetic,
That is true, but is predicated in a weak sense. It is not obvious
that if we can survive with a physical approximation of a digital
universal machine, then physics is emerging in the universal mind
looking at itself, when the universal machine introspect itself, as
she does already from the tiny sigma_1 part of the very big
arithmetical truth. And the result, from the point of view of the UM,
is that she see something vastly bigger than Arithmetical truth, in
fact.
and
therefore no arithmetically generated experience can be seen through
with certainty by the machines/programs within the simulation.
That's remains correct, because we have to bet on comp, and this we
can never be certain of.
Computationalism says that we have no way of
knowing that has not happened yet and MWI (and Tegmark's Level 3
classification) demands that this is inevitable in some
universes.
In a scenario of infinite universes, how can any possibility
be said
to be supernatural?
There is a supernatural/natual distinction in MWI based
multiverses.
If it is not supernatural for us to build a Turing machine and
control
the content of it's 'tape', then it cannot, cannot, can-not be
supernatural for that UM to have its world be controlled by us.
So? I never said that could no be apparently omnopotent
control of a VM. I said it doesn't fit the defintition
of supernatural.
That's why I say in MWI + Comp + Anthropic principle, there would
inevitably be an infinite number of universes in which simulations
exist with citizens to whom God is real and natural.
"to whom God is real" is just an opinion. If the sim was created
by a human prog. with BO and dandruff, their opinion is wrong.
You are conflating the levels (as Bruno always tells me). The
simulation has no access to extra-simulatory information,
Why? The UD dovetails on the reals, and on all relatively computable
use of those reals. That plays for them extra-simulatory information,
like the WM self-duplication gives already one bit of information,
from the first person points of view.
it is a
complete sub-universe. It's logic is the whole truth which the
inhabitants can only believe in or disbelieve to the extent which the
simulation allows them that capacity.
That exists also in the UD, but either the simulation is physically
correct, and then the inhabitants are in all coorect simulation, and
so it changes nothing, or the simulation is physically incorrect (as
it should be given that the comp primary matter is not Turing
emulable), if you gives them enough time, and play honest with them,
they will conclude that their are in a relative simulation.
This is because it is not the same to be in all simulation (the
physical reality), and being failed by some local universal machine.
You cannot fail a UM on physics, because physics is in their head. So
they can compare.
If the programmer wants all of
his avatars to believe with all their hearts that there is a cosmic
muffin controlling their universe, she has only to set the cosmic
muffin belief subroutine = true for all her subjects.
It will not work if the avatars are Löbian machine. You will have to
brainwashed them, and forbid the course of logic to them.
If MWI is a complete theory of the universe, their opinions
is wrong too.
Opinions can be right or wrong but the reality is that a programmer
has omnipotent power over the conditions within the program. She may
be a programmer, but she can make her simulation subjects think or
experience whatever she wants them to. She may think of herself as
their goddess, but she can appear to them as anything or nothing. Her
power over them remains true and factually real.
There are few chance we can program intelligence that way. It is more
like letting free the creatures, and being patient, very patient.
Experts will develop more quickly, but hey are not the paragon of
intelligence ...
There would also
be infinite MWI UM sub-universes where God is supernatural, sub-
universes where Gods are aliens, pirates, beercans, Pokemon, etc.
There can;t be any supernatural entities in a physics-based
multiverse.
I'm not talking about the physics-based multiverse level, I'm talking
about the computational (read what I wrote again please) "UM sub-
universes". MWI alone does not make gods inevitable but MWI+ Comp
does.
Comp implies MWI. (not deciding if we should talk about dreams or
worlds or relative states, ...)
Add the anthropic principle levels any objections about
probability. This seems iron clad and straightforward to me.
You missed the 1-indeterminacy.
As
long as the top level programmer is natural and resides in a top
level
MWI universe, there can be no limit to their omnipotence over
their
programs in comp. To claim supernatural distinctions within an
emulation is to turn the programs into zombies, is it not?
There is a conceptual distinction between the natural and the
supernatural in MWI and computaitonl multiverses, and
such that the extension of the concept "superntatural"
could likely be empty.
I agree, supernatural is an empty concept in comp.
No, that is not at all an equivlaent claim. There may
be no extension of "magnetic monopole", but it is a meaningful
concept.
Supernatural can be meaningful if you want it to be, but in comp all
it means is meta-programmatic or meta-simulation. It has no mystical
charge. It is not what is impossible by the logic of the MWI universe,
only what is impossible by the programmed logic of the UM-Sub
Universes. Your argument is based on confusing the levels. If I force
you to stay within the logic of comp, you have no argument. To get out
of the logic of comp, you need something like 'sense', which is my
claim all along. Usually I am the one arguing reality, but now that it
is turned around, you can see how the constraint of comp is
tautological, or you could if you could get passed the idea that I
have to be wrong.
That why I said it
from the start. Computational simulations can define anything as
being
natural or supernatural.
And they may or may not be right. Opionion does not
trump truth.
The opinion of the programmer *is* truth to the programmed.
No it is not. Unless the programmer tells the truth to the machine,
but even him does not know that, and can commincate only belief (like
the belief that zero has no predecessor).
That's
what makes them God.
That's what would make them charlatan. If they hide to the machine
that they communcate only a belief. Nature has programmed us to make
that error all the time, except in dreams (when we wake up).
The 'nature' of the simulation is fabricated
arithmetically.
Is it? Show me. Every sim I have ever seen was
running on silicon.
Huh? You could run it on vacuum tubes if you want. Or a stadium full
of people holding up colored cards. A cartoon is a simulation. A
puppet show is a simulation.
We always talk of exact simulation. We use often the term emulation.
comp, that is digitality makes the notion sensefull.
You are the one who claimed that Gods are supernatural
in the first place:
"> > > Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds
with
all
kinds of Gods.
QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's classification? "
See? I say MWI could have all kinds of Gods (in their simulated sub-
universes), and you object on the grounds that it would mean
something
'supernatural'. Not supernatural, artificial.
It would mean somethig supernatural because that is the
way "god" is defined.
That is the way you define "god". That is both an argument from
authority and a straw man. Please note:
QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural
occurs in any
universe. Are you familiar with Tegmark's
classification?
Why would Gods be supernatural?
Why would bachelors be married?
This is your argument, not mine. My whole point is that God becomes
natural, and inevitable under MWI + Comp.
I repeat: comp implies MWI. Exactly? We don't know what that means on
both sides.
That God has to be
supernatural is your opinion. The reality is that God need only be
meta-programmatic from the perspective inside a simulation. I don't
know that I can make it much clearer.
Once upon a time the gods needs to pass exams in Goddessnes.
That time god was asked two questions, and was told tha get the choice
between the two questions. Only one answer should be given. the
question was rather traditional:
1) can you create a problem that you cannot solve?
2) can you create a god more powerful than you.
You might have artificial something-or-others,
but we should invent a new word for them.
We can invent as many words for it as we want, but none will be any
more or less appropriate than God. Call it Administrator if you want.
The functionality is the same.
Hmm... OK, but it might be a little more complex, with the comp hyp at
least.
They become
the second class citizens that I am criticized for suggesting.
Our idea of quantum could simply be the virtual
quantum of the simulation furnished to us by our
programmers...who
appear to us as arithmetic Gods because they wish to.
Appearance =/= reality.
I agree, but comp does not. In comp, reality is only deep
appearance.
Oh good grief. In comp, reality is the lab where the simulation is
running.
I agree, but comp would say that you are confusing levels. Comp says
that reality is within the computations.
What version of comp? The actual sceintific CToM, or Bruno's
metaphysical weirdness?
I don't think it matters. Any form of comp + MWI = inevitable all
powerful (relative to some simulation) Administrators.
Yes. It the same comp. I repeat a last time, comp implies a MWI of
arithmetic, and it should be equal to the MWI of the universal wave,
in some limiting sense from the points of view of the normal (average)
UMs in deep computational histories.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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