On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 22 Feb 2012, at 15:49, Terren Suydam wrote: >> Hey Bruno, >> >> I seem to remember reading a while back that you were saying that the >> 1p consciousness arises necessarily from the many paths in the UD. I'm >> glad to clear up my misunderstanding. > > > OK. What happens, if there is no flaw in the UDA-MGA, is that your futures > can only be determined by the statistics bearing on all computations going > through your state. > > The 1p nature of that consciousness will rely on the logic of (machine) > knowledge (or other modalities), which put some structure on the set of > accessible computational states. > > Sorry for being unclear, and for the many misspellings, and other > grammatical tenses atrocities. > > The problem is also related to the difficulty of the subject, which is > necessarily counter-intuitive (in the comp theory), so that we have some > trouble in using the natural language, which relies on natural "intuitive > prejudices". > > In fact I can understand why it might look like I was saying that the 1p > needs the many computations. The reality is that one is enough, but the > others computations, 1-p undistinguishable, are there to, and even for a > slight interval of consciousness, we must take into account that we are in > all of them, for the correct statistics. So the 1p is attached to an > infinity of computation, once you "attach" it to just one computation.
Indeed, it is very counter intuitive and full of subtleties. I have been lurking for a few years now and I am finding that only by engaging with you and others on the list do I begin to comprehend the subtleties. >> >> However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a single >> continuation given the determinism of the sim. How could a >> counterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a >> "concrete" example? > > > You should really find this by yourself, honestly. It is the only way to be > really convinced. Normally this follows from the reasoning. > Please ask if you don't find your "error". > Oh! I see Quentin found it. > > Your mistake consists in believing that when you simulate your friend Mary > in the deterministic sim, completely closed, as you say, you have succeeded > to prevent Mary, from her own pov, to "escape" your simulation. Her > 1-indeterminacy remains unchanged, and bears on the many computations, > existing by the + and * laws, or in the UD. > > The counterfactuals, and the indeterminacy comes from the existence of an > infinity of computations generating Mary's state. Your deterministic sim can > be runned a million times, it will not change Mary's indeterminacy, > relatively to the infinities of diverging (infinite) computations going > through her 1-state. > > You might also reason like that. The consciousness of Mary is only in > Platonia. We have abandoned the idea that consciousness is related to any > singular physical activity. Here was the "aha!" moment. I get it now. Thanks to you and Quentin. Even though I am well aware of the consequences of MGA, I was focusing on the "physical activity" of the simulation because "I" was running it. The fascinating thing for me is, if instead of a scan of Mary, we run an AGI that embodies a cognitive architecture that satisfies a theory of consciousness (the kind of theory that explains why a particular UM is conscious) so that if we assume the theory, it entails that the AGI is conscious. The AGI will therefore have 1p indeterminacy even if the sim is deterministic, for the same reason Mary does, because there are an infinity of divergent computational paths that go through the AGI's 1p state in any given moment. Trippy! > Her consciousness and other 1p-attributes > depends only on her arithmetical relative state, relatively to the infinity > of UMs running her in Platonia. In that sense, all the Mary you interact > with are zombie, but this is just due to the trivial fact that you can > interact only with Mary's body or local 3p description. This I disagree with (or don't understand) because if we acknowledge that as you said "even just one emulation can be said involving consciousness" then interacting with even a "single" Mary is an interaction with her "soul" in platonia. I think the admission of any zombie in any context (assuming comp) is a refutation of comp. Terren > Once you grasp that > you too are in Platonia, there is no more zombie because bodies become only > local interface between "soul" in Platonia. But intuition fails us, and > that's why we need the math and the computer science. > > The indeterminacy might be too big, and the comp counterfactuals might be > too large, but that remains to be proved, and would be a refutation of comp > (CTM, mechanism). > > Let me comment your last paragraphs (the entire post is below for ease) > > >> In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD* >> and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailed >> by the quantum number generator "brings Mary along", so to speak. > > > > That's partially correct. But as Quentin said, you have no means to isolate > Mary in the scenario you want. You propose a logically impossible though > experiment. Mary belongs already to an infinity of computations. > Even if you run a program dovetailing your friend on the reals, assuming a > robust universes you will not change much the measure, because those states > will not be distinguishable by Mary. You have to bifurcate them enough, if I > can say, and that will be equivalent to an UD. > > >> So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a >> zombie. > > > Let us say that she is as much conscious in one scenario, and the other. But > her consciousness is in Platonia, and the physical embodiments is a complex > structure made by the consciousness and infinities of UMs. > > > >> The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to >> insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level. > > > So this does not necessarily follow. > But with Everett, we might have evidences that the level is determined by > the Heisenberg uncertainty relations. > There are higher level, where you can survive, but with consciousness > changes, though. > > > >> >> If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p >> indeterminacy. > > > I would say consciousness, with comp, implies 1p indeterminacy. It requires > it logically, in the sense that if you have consciousness then you have the > 1p indeterminacy. Your Mary enclosed in the deterministic local sim, is > deterministic only for you, she is really, that is her 1-pov, distributed in > the UD*. I use the same reasoning to explain that with comp, we cannot > enclose people in simulation. Either the simulation is comp-physically > correct, but then it simulates locally what the UD does in the limit, and > like Mary, it makes no sense to say that they are only in the simulation, or > the simulation is not comp-physically correct, and the simulated people will > figure out at some moment. > > Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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