On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21 Feb 2012, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote: > >> But is it really either-or? Isn't it likely there are different kinds and >> degrees of consciousness. I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about >> this. On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious, >> but then he says it depends on the program they are executing. > > > Imagine that I am duplicated in W and M. I would say that the guy in M and > the guy in W are equally conscious, and that both are me, although they will > feel very different and have different content of consciousness. > In that sense I would say that all Löbian machines are equally conscious. Of > course the Löbian humans have very different experience than the jumping > spider, and even more different than Peano Arithmetic. > > As I said in another post today, I am not sure why Terren thinks that that > the first person indeterminacy is needed for consciousness. First person > indeterminacy is implied by the self-multiplication (in the UD, say), as a > consequence of comp, but is not presented as something needed for the > existence of consciousness. Mary is conscious in both scenario. But comp > implies, as Quentin said, that she cannot escape the indeterminacy of its > many continuations in the UD. It is hoped that the QM indeterminacy is just > the reflect of the comp indeterminacy, so that QM confirms comp. The Everett > mutiplication of populations of machines in QM would also be an empirical > reason to assess that comp does not lead to solipsism (which I would take as > a refutation of comp, if that happen to be the case). The apparition of a > quantum logic in the material hypostases is a reassuring step in that > direction. > > Bruno
Hey Bruno, I seem to remember reading a while back that you were saying that the 1p consciousness arises necessarily from the many paths in the UD. I'm glad to clear up my misunderstanding. However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a single continuation given the determinism of the sim. How could a counterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a "concrete" example? (I got both your replies btw) Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
