On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 21 Feb 2012, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote:
>> But is it really either-or?  Isn't it likely there are different kinds and
>> degrees of consciousness.  I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about
>> this.  On the one hand he says all Lobian machines are (equally?) conscious,
>> but then he says it depends on the program they are executing.
> Imagine that I am duplicated in W and M. I would say that the guy in M and
> the guy in W are equally conscious, and that both are me, although they will
> feel very different and have different content of consciousness.
> In that sense I would say that all Löbian machines are equally conscious. Of
> course the Löbian humans have very different experience than the jumping
> spider, and even more different than Peano Arithmetic.
> As I said in another post today, I am not sure why Terren thinks that that
> the first person indeterminacy is needed for consciousness. First person
> indeterminacy is implied by the self-multiplication (in the UD, say), as a
> consequence of comp, but is not presented as something needed for the
> existence of consciousness. Mary is conscious in both scenario. But comp
> implies, as Quentin said, that she cannot escape the indeterminacy of its
> many continuations in the UD. It is hoped that the QM indeterminacy is just
> the reflect of the comp indeterminacy, so that QM confirms comp. The Everett
> mutiplication of populations of machines in QM would also be an empirical
> reason to assess that comp does not lead to solipsism (which I would take as
> a refutation of comp, if that happen to be the case). The apparition of a
> quantum logic in the material hypostases is a reassuring step in that
> direction.
> Bruno

Hey Bruno,

I seem to remember reading a while back that you were saying that the
1p consciousness arises necessarily from the many paths in the UD. I'm
glad to clear up my misunderstanding.

However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a single
continuation given the determinism of the sim. How could a
counterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a
"concrete" example?

(I got both your replies btw)


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