On Feb 23, 9:26 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > I understand that is how you think of it, but I am pointing out your > > unconscious bias. You take consciousness for granted from the start. > > Because it is... I don't know/care for you, but I'm conscious... the > existence of consciousness from my own POV, is not a discussion.
The whole thought experiment has to do specifically with testing the existence of consciousness and POV. If we were being honest about the scenario, we would rely only on known comp truths to arrive at the answer. It's cheating to smuggle in human introspection in a test of the nature of human introspection. Let us think only in terms of 'true, doctor'. If comp is valid, there should be no difference between 'true' and 'yes'. > > > It may seem innocent, but in this case what it does it preclude the > > subjective thesis from being considered fundamental. It's a straw man > > Read what is a straw man... a straw man is taking the opponent argument and > deforming it to means other things which are obvious to disprove. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man "a superficially similar yet unequivalent proposition (the "straw man")" I think that yes doctor makes a straw man of the non-comp position. It argues that we have to choose whether or not we believe in comp, when the non-comp position might be that with comp, we cannot choose to believe in anything in the first place. > > > > > > > > > > > of the possibility of unconsciousness. > > > > >> If you've said yes, then this > > > >> of course entails that you believe that 'free choice' and 'personal > > > >> value' (or the subjective experience of them) can be products of a > > > >> computer program, so there's no contradiction. > > > > > Right, so why ask the question? Why not just ask 'do you believe a > > > > computer program can be happy'? > > > > A machine could think (Strong AI thesis) does not entail comp (that we > > > are machine). > > > I understand that, but we are talking about comp. The thought > > experiment focuses on the brain replacement, but the argument is > > already lost in the initial conditions which presuppose the ability to > > care or tell the difference and have free will to choose. > > But I have that ability and don't care to discuss it further. I'm > conscious, I'm sorry you're not. But you aren't in the thought experiment. > > > > > > > > > > > It's subtle, > > but so is the question of consciousness. Nothing whatsoever can be > > left unchallenged, including the capacity to leave something > > unchallenged. > > > > The fact that a computer program can be happy does not logically > > > entail that we are ourself computer program. may be angels and Gods > > > (non machine) can be happy too. To sum up: > > > > COMP implies STRONG-AI > > > > but > > > > STRONG-AI does not imply COMP. > > > I understand, but Yes Doctor considers whether STRONG-AI is likely to > > be functionally identical and fully interchangeable with human > > consciousness. It may not say that we are machine, but it says that > > machines can be us > > It says machines could be conscious as we are without us being machine. > > ==> strong ai. That's what I said. That makes machines more flexible than organically conscious beings. They can be machines or like us, but we can't fully be machines so we are less than machines. > > Comp says that we are machine, this entails strong-ai, because if we are > machine, as we are conscious, then of course machine can be conscious... > But if you knew machine could be conscious, that doesn't mean the humans > would be machines... we could be more than that. More than that in what way? Different maybe, but Strong AI by definition makes machines more than us, because we cannot compete with machines at being mechanical but they can compete as equals with us in every other way. > > > - which is really even stronger, since we can only > > be ourselves but machines apparently can be anything. > > No read upper. No read upper. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > When it is posed as a logical > > > > consequence instead of a decision, it implicitly privileges the > > > > passive voice. We are invited to believe that we have chosen to agree > > > > to comp because there is a logical argument for it rather than an > > > > arbitrary preference committed to in advance. It is persuasion by > > > > rhetoric, not by science. > > > > Nobody tries to advocate comp. We assume it. So if we get a > > > contradiction we can abandon it. But we find only weirdness, even > > > testable weirdness. > > > I understand the reason for that though. Comp itself is the rabbit > > hole of empiricism. Once you allow it the initial assumption, it can > > only support itself. > > Then you could never show a contradiction for any hypothesis that you > consider true... and that's simply false, hence you cannot be correct. You are doing exactly what I just said. You assume initially that all truths are bound by Aristotelian logic. You cannot contradict any hypothesis that says you aren't a zombie, hence you are a zombie. My whole point is that consciousness is not like any other subject. You cannot stand aloof from it and point to it's parts in a power point. It is the elephant in every room. > > > Comp has no ability to contradict itself, > > You say so. Is it not true? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
