On Sat, Feb 25, 2012 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 24 Feb 2012, at 21:51, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>> On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 2:27 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>> On 2/24/2012 10:26 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>> I certainly will. In the meantime, do you have an example from Damasio
>>>> (or any other source) that could shed light on the pain/pleasure
>>>> phenomenon?
>>>> Terren
>>>> http://www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/damasioreview.html
>>> I think emotions represent something above and beyond the more
>>> fundamental feelings of pleasure and pain. Fear, for example, is
>>> explainable using Damasio's framework as such, and I can translate it
>>> to the way I am asking the question as above:
>>> Question: What kind of organization arose during the evolutionary
>>> process that led directly to the subjective experience of fear?
>>> Answer: A cognitive architecture in which internal body states are
>>> modeled and integrated using the same representational apparatus that
>>> models the external world, so that one's adaptive responses
>>> (fight/flight/freeze) to threatening stimuli become integrated into
>>> the organism's cognitive state of affairs.  In short, fear is what it
>>> feels like to have a fear response (as manifest in the body by various
>>> hormonal responses) to some real or imagined stimuli.
>>> You can substitute any emotion for fear, so long as you can identify
>>> the way that emotion manifests in the body/brain in terms of hormonal
>>> or other mechanisms. But when it comes to pain and pleasure, I don't
>>> think that it is necessary to have such an advanced cognitive
>>> architecture, I think. So on a more fundamental level, the question
>>> remains:
>>> What kind of organization arose during the evolutionary process that
>>> led directly to the subjective experience of pain and pleasure?
>>> Or put another way, what kind of mechanism feels pleasurable or
>>> painful from the inside?
>>> Presumably the answer to this question occurred earlier in the
>>> evolutionary process than the emergence of fear, surprise, hunger, and
>>> so on.
>>> Terren
>> To go a little further with this, take sexual orgasm. What is
>> happening during orgasm that makes it so pleasurable?
>> Presumably there are special circuits in the brain that get activated,
>> which correlate to the flush of orgasmic pleasure. But what is special
>> about those circuits?  From a 3p perspective, how is one brain circuit
>> differentiated from another?  It can't be as simple as the
>> neurotransmitters involved; what would make one neurotransmitter be
>> causative of pain and another of pleasure?  It's shape?  That seems
>> absurd.
>> It seems that the consequence of that neural circuit firing would have
>> to achieve some kind of systemic effect that is characterized... how?
>> Pain is just as mysterious. It's not as simple as "what it feels like
>> for a system to become damaged". Phantom limbs, for example, are often
>> excruciatingly painful. Pain is clearly in the mind. What cognitive
>> mechanism could you characterize as feeling painful from the inside?
>> Failure to account for this in mechanistic terms, for me, is a direct
>> threat to the legitimacy of mechanism.
> Failure to account for this in *any* 3p sense would be a direct threat to
> the legitimacy of science.
> I am not sure only mechanism is in difficulty here, unless you have a reason
> to believe that "infinities" could explain the pain quale.
> On the contrary mechanism explains that there is an unavoidable clash
> between the 1p view and the 3p view. The 1p view (Bp & p, say) is the same
> as the 3p view (Bp), but this is only "known" by the divine intellect (G*).
> It cannot be known by the correct machine itself. So mechanism (or weaker)
> *can* explain why the 1p seems non mechanical, and in some sense is not
> 1p-mechanical, which explains why we feel something like a dualism. This
> dualism really exist epistemologically, even if the divine intellect (G*)
> knows that is an illusion. It is a real self-referentially correct
> "illusion".
> Bruno

Hi Bruno,

I'm with you... See my response to acw... I need to think some more on
it. Thanks for your replies.


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