On Feb 25, 11:05 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Feb 24, 11:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 24, 7:40 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Which only underscores how different consciousness is from
> > computation. We can't share the exact same software, but computers
> > can. We can't re-run our experiences, but computers can. By default
> > humans cannot help but generate their own unique software, but the
> > reverse is true with computers. We have to work to write each update
> > to the code, which is then distributed uniformly to every (nearly)
> > identical client machine.
>
> AIs can generate their own software. That is the point of AI.

They don't have to generate their own software though, we have to tell
them to do that and specify exactly how we want them to do it.

>
> > > > By default,
> > > > everything that a computer does is mechanistic. We have to go out of
> > > > our way to generate sophisticated algorithms to emulate naturalistic
> > > > human patterns.
>
> > > which could mean humans transcend computation, or
> > > could mean humans are more complex than current computers
>
> > Complexity is the deus ex anima of comp. There is no reason to imagine
> > that a complex arrangement of dumb marbles adds up to be something
> > which experiences the universe in some synergistic way.
>
> THat;s a more plausible reason for doubting CT0M.
>
> > > >Human development proves just the contrary. We start
> > > > out wild and willful and become more mechanistic through
> > > > domestication.
>
> > > You think mechanisms can't be random or unpredictable?
>
> > That's not the same thing as wild and willful.
>
> Isn't it? Is there any hard evidence of that?

There can't be hard evidence of anything having to do with
consciousness. Consciousness has to be experienced first hand.

>
> >There is agency there.
> > Intentional exuberance that can be domesticated. Babies are noisy
> > alright, but they aren't noise. Randomness and unpredictability is
> > mere noise.
> > > > > Altenatively, they might
> > > > > just be illogical...even if we are computers. It is a subtle
> > > > > fallacy to say that computers run on logic: they run on rules.
>
> > > > Yes! This is why they have a trivial intelligence and no true
> > > > understanding.
>
> > > Or current ones are too simple
>
> > Again - complexity is not the magic.
>
> Again..you can;t infer to all computers from the limitations
> of some computers.

But complexity shows no sign of making a difference. Watson or Deep
Blue are no more aware of anything outside the scope of their
programming than a pocket calculator. You could run them for a
thousand years and they won't ever learn the meaning of the word 'I'.

>
> > > > Rule followers are dumb.
>
> > > You have no evidence that humans are not following
> > > complex rules.
>
> > We are following rules too, but we also break them.
>
> Rule-breaking might be based on rules. Adolescents are
> predictably rebellious.

You could just as easily say that rule making might be based on
voluntary agreement. Adolescent rebellion varies from culture to
culture, time to time, and individual to individual. For those who do
rebel, it doesn't make their rebellion any less willful. They rebel
because they feel that they want to, not because they don't know what
they are going to do next.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > >Logic is a form of
> > > > intelligence which we use to write these rules that write more rules.
> > > > The more rules you have, the better the machine, but no amount of
> > > > rules make the machine more (or less) logical. Humans vary widely in
> > > > their preference for logic, emotion, pragmatism, leadership, etc.
> > > > Computers don't vary at all in their approach. It is all the same rule
> > > > follower only with different rules.
>
> > > > > They have no guarantee to be rational. If the rules are
> > > > > wrong, you have bugs. Humans are known to have
> > > > > any number of cognitive bugs. The "jumping" thing
> > > > > could be implemented by real or pseudo randomness, too.
>
> > > > > > Because of 1, it is assumed that the thought experiment universe
> > > > > > includes the subjective experience of personal value - that the
> > > > > > patient has a stake, or 'money to bet'.
>
> > > > > What's the problem ? the experience (quale) or the value?
>
> > > > The significance of the quale.
>
> > > You mean apparent significance. But apparent significance *is* a
> > > quale.
>
> > Apparent is redundant. All qualia are apparent. Significance is a meta
> > quale (appears more apparent - a 'signal' or 'sign').
>
> Apparent significance, you mean.

There isn't any other kind. It's a quale. Apparent blue is blue.

>
> > > > > Do you know the value to be real?
>
> > > > I know it to be subjective.
>
> > > Great. So it's an opinion. How does that stop the mechanistic-
> > > physicalistic show?
>
> > Mechanism is the opinion of things that are not us.
>
> Says who?

Multisense Realism. That's how I think perceptual inertia works. When
something is unlike you, the perception is that it is impersonal. The
more impersonal it is, the more mechanical it appears.

>
> > > > > Do you think a computer
> > > > > could not be deluded about value?
>
> > > > I think a computer can't be anything but turned off and on.
>
> > > Well, you;'re wrong. It takes more than one bit (on/off) to
> > > describe computation.
>
> > you forgot the 'turning'.
>
> That does't help.

Computation is the way that we turn bits off and on so that other bits
are turned off and on.

>
> > > > > > Because of 2, it is assumed
> > > > > > that libertarian free will exists in the scenario
>
> > > > > I don't see that FW of a specifically libertarian aort is posited
> > > > > in the scenario. It just assumes you can make a choice in
> > > > > some sense.
>
> > > > It assumes that choice is up to you and not determined by
> > > > computations.
>
> > > Nope. It just assumes you can make some sort of choice.
>
> > A voluntary choice.
>
> Some sort of "voluntary"

Any sort is all you need.

Craig

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