On Feb 23, 9:14 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 23, 3:25 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 22, 7:42 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > Has someone already mentioned this?
>
> > > I woke up in the middle of the night with this, so it might not make
> > > sense...or...
>
> > > The idea of saying yes to the doctor presumes that we, in the thought
> > > experiment, bring to the thought experiment universe:
>
> > > 1. our sense of own significance (we have to be able to care about
> > > ourselves and our fate in the first place)
>
> > I can't see why you would think that is incompatible with CTM
>
> It is not posed as a question of 'Do you believe that CTM includes X',
> but rather, 'using X, do you believe that there is any reason to doubt
> that Y(X) is X.'

I don't see what you mean.

>  > > 2. our perceptual capacity to jump to conclusions without logic (we
> > > have to be able feel what it seems like rather than know what it
> > > simply is.)
>
> > Whereas that seems to be based on a mistake. It might be
> > that our conclusions ARE based on logic, just logic that
> > we are consciously unaware of.
>
> That's a good point but it could just as easily be based on
> subconscious idiopathic preferences.

that's "could" for you!

> The patterns of human beings in
> guessing and betting vary from person to person whereas one of the
> hallmarks of computation is to get the same results.

given the same software. But human software is formed
by life experince and genetics, both of which vary from
individual to individual

> By default,
> everything that a computer does is mechanistic. We have to go out of
> our way to generate sophisticated algorithms to emulate naturalistic
> human patterns.

which could mean humans transcend computation, or
could mean humans are more complex than current computers


>Human development proves just the contrary. We start
> out wild and willful and become more mechanistic through
> domestication.

You think mechanisms can't be random or unpredictable?

> > Altenatively, they might
> > just be illogical...even if we are computers. It is a subtle
> > fallacy to say that computers run on logic: they run on rules.
>
> Yes! This is why they have a trivial intelligence and no true
> understanding.

Or current ones are too simple

> Rule followers are dumb.

You have no evidence that humans are not following
complex rules.

>Logic is a form of
> intelligence which we use to write these rules that write more rules.
> The more rules you have, the better the machine, but no amount of
> rules make the machine more (or less) logical. Humans vary widely in
> their preference for logic, emotion, pragmatism, leadership, etc.
> Computers don't vary at all in their approach. It is all the same rule
> follower only with different rules.
>
> > They have no guarantee to be rational. If the rules are
> > wrong, you have bugs. Humans are known to have
> > any number of cognitive bugs. The "jumping" thing
> > could be implemented by real or pseudo randomness, too.
>
> > > Because of 1, it is assumed that the thought experiment universe
> > > includes the subjective experience of personal value - that the
> > > patient has a stake, or 'money to bet'.
>
> > What's the problem ? the experience (quale) or the value?
>
> The significance of the quale.

You mean apparent significance. But apparent significance *is* a
quale.

> > Do you know the value to be real?
>
> I know it to be subjective.

Great. So it's an opinion. How does that stop the mechanistic-
physicalistic show?

> > Do you think a computer
> > could not be deluded about value?
>
> I think a computer can't be anything but turned off and on.

Well, you;'re wrong. It takes more than one bit (on/off) to
describe computation.

> > > Because of 2, it is assumed
> > > that libertarian free will exists in the scenario
>
> > I don't see that FW of a specifically libertarian aort is posited
> > in the scenario. It just assumes you can make a choice in
> > some sense.
>
> It assumes that choice is up to you and not determined by
> computations.

Nope. It just assumes you can make some sort of choice.

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