On 29 Feb 2012, at 23:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 29, 1:30 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 5:42 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative
phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock
know what time it is.

A clock has no self-referential ability.

How do you know?

By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a
universal machine.

Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference.

That's what I said, and it makes my point.

The difference between a clock knowing what time it is, Google knowing
what you mean when you search for it, and an AI bot knowing how to
have a conversation with someone is a matter of degree. If comp claims
that certain kinds of processes have 1p experiences associated with
them it has to explain why that should be the case.

Because they have the ability to refer to themselves and understand the difference between 1p, 3p, the mind-body problem, etc. That some numbers have the ability to refer to themselves is proved in computer science textbook.
A clock lacks it. A computer has it.

By comp it
should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of
the clock.


If the Chinese Room is intelligent, then why not gears?

The chinese room is not intelligent. The person which supervene on the some computation done by the chinese room might be intelligent.

By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a
universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't
expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by
comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just
because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they
know it yet.

Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby
Level confusion.

A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it
is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation
though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is
arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines
evolving in the first place?

They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to universal
numbers. Relative "Evolution" exists in higher level description of
those relation.
Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp, plausibly.
Genetics is already digital relatively to QM.

My question though was how many watches does it take to make an
intelligent watch?

Difficult question. One hundred might be enough, but a good engineers might be able to optimize it. I would not be so much astonished that one clock is enough, to implement a very simple (and inefficacious) universal system, but then you have to rearrange all the parts of that clock.

It doesn't really make sense to me if comp were
true that there would be anything other than QM.


Why go through the
formality of genetics or cells? What would possibly be the point? If
silicon makes just as good of a person as do living mammal cells, why
not just make people out of quantum to begin with?

Nature does that, but it takes time. If you have a brain disease, your answer is like a doctor who would tell you, just wait life appears on some planet and with some luck it will do your brain. But my interest in comp is not in the practice, but in the conceptual revolution it brings.

A machine which can only add, cannot be universal.
A machine which can only multiply cannot be universal.
But a machine which can add and multiply is universal.

A calculator can add and multiply. Will it know what time it is if I
connect it to a clock?

Too much ambiguity, but a priori: yes. Actually it does not need a clock. + and * can simulate the clock. Clock is a part of all computers, explicitly or implicitly.

The machine is a whole, its function belongs to none of its parts.
When the components are unrelated, the machine does not work. The
machine works well when its components are well assembled, be it
artificially, naturally, virtually or arithmetically (that does not
matter, and can't matter).

The machine isn't a whole though. Any number of parts can be replaced
without irreversibly killing the machine.

Like us. There is no one construct in the human body which lasts for more than seven years. Brains have much shorter material identity. Only bones change more slowly, but are still replaced quasi completely in seven years, according to biologists.

All know theories in biology are known to be reducible to QM, which is Turing emulable. So your theory/opinion is that all known theories are

They aren't false, they are only catastrophically incomplete. Neither
biology nor QM has any opinion on a purpose for awareness or living
organisms to exist.

That does not entail that QM structures or biological structure cannot be aware, or bear local notion of persons.

You have to lower the comp level in the infinitely low, and
introduce special infinities, not 1p machine recoverable to make comp

No, you can just reject the entire presumption that computation by
itself has causal efficacy.

But it has causal efficacy, even with zombie, which can decide and act on the environment like us.

Computation to me is clearly an
epiphenomenon of experienced events, not the other way around.

Computation are well defined object in arithmetic. You cannot redefine standard notion to suit your point. Or you can conclude whatever you want at the start.

It is
like saying applause creates the opera.

This is
another variation on the Chinese Room. The pig can walk around at
30,000 feet and we can ask it questions about the view from up
but the pig has not, in fact learned to fly or become a bird.
has the plane, for that matter.

Your analogy is confusing. I would say that the pig in the plane does
fly, but this is out of the topic.

It could be said that the pig is flying, but not that he has *learned
to fly* (and especially not learned to fly like a bird - which would
be the direct analogy for a computer simulating human consciousness).

That why the flying analogy does not work. Consciousness concerns
something unprovable for everone concerned, except oneself.

No analogy can work any better because nothing else in the universe is
unprovable for everyone except oneself except consciousness.


May I ask you a question? Is a human with an artificial heart still a

Of course. A person with a wooden leg is still human as well. A person
with a wooden head is not a person though.

OK. So the problem is circumscribe to the brain. Someone can have an artificial body, but not an artificial brain.
Could someone survive with an artificial cerebral stem?



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