On Feb 29, 1:30 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > >>> On Feb 28, 5:42 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >>>>> There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to qualitative > >>>>> phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock > >>>>> doesn't > >>>>> know what time it is. > > >>>> A clock has no self-referential ability. > > >>> How do you know? > > >> By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement self- > >> reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity than a > >> universal machine. > > > Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference. > > That's what I said, and it makes my point.
The difference between a clock knowing what time it is, Google knowing what you mean when you search for it, and an AI bot knowing how to have a conversation with someone is a matter of degree. If comp claims that certain kinds of processes have 1p experiences associated with them it has to explain why that should be the case. > > > By comp it > > should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears of > > the clock. > > ? If the Chinese Room is intelligent, then why not gears? > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a > >>> universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we can't > >>> expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet, but by > >>> comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is just > >>> because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that they > >>> know it yet. > > >> Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby > >> clock. > >> Level confusion. > > > A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches does > > it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what time it > > is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation > > though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at all is > > arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines > > evolving in the first place? > > They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to universal > numbers. Relative "Evolution" exists in higher level description of > those relation. > Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp, plausibly. > Genetics is already digital relatively to QM. My question though was how many watches does it take to make an intelligent watch? It doesn't really make sense to me if comp were true that there would be anything other than QM. Why go through the formality of genetics or cells? What would possibly be the point? If silicon makes just as good of a person as do living mammal cells, why not just make people out of quantum to begin with? > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>> You reason like that: no animals can fly, because pigs cannot fly. > > >>> You mistake my common sense reductio for shortsighted prejudice. I > >>> would say that your reasoning is that if we take a pig on a plane, > >>> we > >>> can't rule out the possibility that it has become a bird. > > >> No. You were saying that computer cannot think, because clock cannot > >> thing. > > > And I'm right. > > A brain can think because it's made of living cells > > which diverged from an organic syzygy in a single moment. A computer > > or clock cannot think because they are assembled artificially from > > unrelated components, none of which have the qualities of an organic > > molecule or living cell. > > You reason like this. > A little clock cannot think. > To attach something which does not think, to something which cannot > think, can still not think. > So all assembly of clocks cannot think. > > But such an induction will not work, if you substitute "think" by "is > Turing universal", or "has self-referential abilities", etc. That reframes the question though so that comp theory is taken for granted and natural phenomenology is put on the defensive. Suddenly we are proving what we already assume rather than probing experiential truth. > > A machine which can only add, cannot be universal. > A machine which can only multiply cannot be universal. > But a machine which can add and multiply is universal. A calculator can add and multiply. Will it know what time it is if I connect it to a clock? > > The machine is a whole, its function belongs to none of its parts. > When the components are unrelated, the machine does not work. The > machine works well when its components are well assembled, be it > artificially, naturally, virtually or arithmetically (that does not > matter, and can't matter). The machine isn't a whole though. Any number of parts can be replaced without irreversibly killing the machine. > > All know theories in biology are known to be reducible to QM, which is > Turing emulable. So your theory/opinion is that all known theories are > false. They aren't false, they are only catastrophically incomplete. Neither biology nor QM has any opinion on a purpose for awareness or living organisms to exist. > You have to lower the comp level in the infinitely low, and > introduce special infinities, not 1p machine recoverable to make comp > false. No, you can just reject the entire presumption that computation by itself has causal efficacy. Computation to me is clearly an epiphenomenon of experienced events, not the other way around. It is like saying applause creates the opera. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> This is > >>> another variation on the Chinese Room. The pig can walk around at > >>> 30,000 feet and we can ask it questions about the view from up > >>> there, > >>> but the pig has not, in fact learned to fly or become a bird. > >>> Neither > >>> has the plane, for that matter. > > >> Your analogy is confusing. I would say that the pig in the plane does > >> fly, but this is out of the topic. > > > It could be said that the pig is flying, but not that he has *learned > > to fly* (and especially not learned to fly like a bird - which would > > be the direct analogy for a computer simulating human consciousness). > > That why the flying analogy does not work. Consciousness concerns > something unprovable for everone concerned, except oneself. No analogy can work any better because nothing else in the universe is unprovable for everyone except oneself except consciousness. > > May I ask you a question? Is a human with an artificial heart still a > human? Of course. A person with a wooden leg is still human as well. A person with a wooden head is not a person though. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.