John K Clark, you argue with a lot of sense. I never managed to deepen my
teeth low enough into Bruno's texts to put out a professional argument,
just paraphrased my own thoughts if I 'thought' them to be different.
Let me insert into your post my remarks in BOLD ITALICS.
General remark: I discard "thought-experiments" as artifacts constructed to
press a point otherwise insensible. Q-transfers I disregard because in the
instant of such (thought-of) transfer the copy lives a different life from
the original circumstances and so is NOT comparable. I consider it a good
game.
I am agnostic, meaning IN MY BELIEF the world ('everything', 'totality') is
some infinite(!) complexity of what? we CANNOT KNOW from the 'universe'
among many and different(!) others - as we think only within the
'model-world' "WE" made up of topical concepts/processes we already know of
(different today from 1000AD or 2500BC etc.) so the 'rest of the world' -
influencing the model content is unknowable. I consider ALL WE CAN SPEAK
ABOUT as figments of the human mind - including numbers and arithmetic -
within our HUMAN logic - not necessarily the only one that gives.
The 'infinite complexity' may not include topics and processes like
our model does, it may have (changing?) relations of aspects in some
'higher' dynamics.
That ignorance makes our conventional scientific results only "almost"
good.
Even the 'universal number' is human idea (sorry, Bruno).
With my early-age brainwashing into natural sciences I 'believe' in
constant change so 'ontology' seems like an artifact of a snapshot.
Epistemology, however, continually adds to our (misunderstood?)
knowledge-base (see the above dates as examples) adjusted by everybody's
PERSONALIZED genetic tool (brain?) and accumulated personal experiential
material. Accordingly no two people have identical image for the 'world'. I
call that after Colin Hales our "mini-solipsism".
I am ready for "I dunno" - or: "I am wrong".
John Mikes
On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 4:08 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> > The question is "If I throw a coin, what is the probability that I see
>> it becoming a flying pig". In front of the UD, that question is not
>> trivial.
>>
>
> In this thought experiment the meaning of the word "I" is not obvious and
> in fact the entire point of the exercise is supposed to be to make clear
> exactly what "I" means, and yet you throw out the word as if the meaning is
> already clear.
>
*My returning question is also "who is "I" or "SELF"? I also DENY the
validity of a probability, absolutely dependent upon the boundaries of the
system to be observed (just as a statistical 'truth'). *
> In one sense there is zero probability because if you became a flying pig
> you would not be Bruno Marchal anymore. And in some sense there is zero
> probability the Helsinki man will be the Moscow man because the Moscow
> experiences is what transformed the Helsinki man into the Moscow man so
> that although he may remembers being him he is not the Helsinki man
> anymore. So the answer to the question "If I change what is the probability
> I will remain the same?" is zero. And that's why I think this first person
> indeterminacy stuff is just silly.
>
> *I agree: There is ONLY first person. If somebody else communicates
> anything it is accepted in the sense of my general remark as MY "1st p."
> understanding (incl. sciences, books, belief systems etc.) *
>
* It has no comparative to make it indeterministic.*
> > Comp is just "I can survive with a digital brain". It is about me, my
>> consciousness, my body
>>
>
> Fine, but then how does that square with your comment "Comp makes
> arithmetic a theory of everything". Consciousness is not everything.
>
> > comp makes matter into an appearance in the mind of universal numbers
>> only.
>>
>
> Comp can certainly make a mind that through virtual reality can experience
> matter that does not in fact exist, but even if the rock the mind feels
> like he is holding does not exist other matter does in the form of the
> computer that is simulating the rock, and the mind too. You claim you have
> proven that a computer made of matter is not necessary to do a simulation
> like this but I'll be damned if I can see where you did this. In
> Aristotle's metaphysics the potential and the actual are somehow one, but
> is this really true? I don't know.
> *Whenever I can, I do not go back to the 'oldies' who were wise but of a
> much smaller inventory of (rightly or wrongly) observed natural phenomena
> (indeed: the (math based?) explenation of such). *
>
*You sound as having a clear definition about 'consciousness'. I feel it
is a process and have a hard time to separate it from 'life' in a much
wider view than the C-based(?) bio ignorance of conventional science. *
*(Everything that changes has a 'life' (even without Metabolism-Repair)*
*if 'responding' to known or unknown relations). *
>
>
> > OK. So you see that there is a 1p- indetermination.
>>
>
> I don't even think "1p- indetermination" has a clear meaning except "if
> you change then you are not the same"; well yes I can see that, it's true
> but not very profound.
>
> > the question does not bear on where he will be, but on where he will
>> feels to be.
>>
>
> If I receive sense inputs from Washington I will feel like I'm in
> Washington if I receive sights and sounds from Moscow I will feel like I'm
> in Moscow. You may ask "why are you the Moscow man and not the Washington
> man?", and my answer is because I received inputs from Moscow not
> Washington. So a legitimate question and a proper use of probabilities
> would be "What is the probability I will receive sights and sound from
> Moscow but not Washington?". Unlike your question this one is perfectly
> clear and is well suited for statistical analysis, but I don't see what
> deep philosophical insights can be gained from it.
>
> > he know that he will be in W and in M, but he knows that whatever he
>> will feel to be, it will be in only one place, because he knows that he
>> will not feel to be in two place at once.
>>
>
> Even that is not a given. This is virtual reality after all, it's the
> point of your dovetail machine, so there is no reason you couldn't have the
> White House in the middle of the Kremlin and the Washington Monument right
> next to St. Basil's Cathedral.
> *Or in the clouds above Sao Paolo <G>*
>
> > he is aware that he cannot predict which one among the many "he" he will
>> feel to be.
>>
>
> That is true ONLY if he does not know if he will receive signals from
> Washington or Moscow, if he knew that, and there is no reason in theory he
> could not, then he could make such a prediction.
>
>
> > That is the 1-indeterminacy, which is crucial for the rest of the
>> reasoning.
>>
>
> I know it's crucial, and so if that fails, and it does, then the entire
> proof falls apart. Don't misunderstand me, I'm not saying your conclusions
> about numbers are wrong and in fact my hunch is that they are probably
> right or close to it, but I don't think you've proved it and I'm certain
> this 1p indeterminate stuff is a dead end.
>
>
> > There is no difficulty. Just the discovery of how to explain a objective
>> account of a feeling of subjective indeterminacy in the mechanist
>> framework.
>>
>
> The explanation is not difficult, you never know what's coming next.
> Forest Gump had a similar explanation that was every bit as deep, "Life is
> like a box of chocolates...you never know what you're gonna get".
>
>
> >> Non-comp may not be contradictory but all the human practitioners
>>> of non-comp most certainly are, every single one, no exceptions.
>>>
>>
>> > Many are, but why all, and why necessarily?
>>
>
> All non-comp fans say that knowing what someone or something does is not
> enough to determine if it is conscious, you need to know HOW they do what
> they do; and yet* until very recently* nobody had the slightest idea how
> the brain worked and yet they still firmly believed that their fellow human
> beings were conscious when they acted as if they were, that is to say when
> they were not sleeping or dead. Even today 99.9% of the human population
> thinks that how the brain works is so unimportant that they have not
> bothered to learn the first thing about it and are no more informed on the
> subject than a medieval alchemist, and yet they still insist that how the
> brain does what it does is far more important than what it does. This is
> inconsistent,massively inconsistent.
> *Tou wrote: * ...until very recently ...*does that mean NOW it is known?
> I questioned latest theories (astrocites etc.) and they still abide within
> physical data - no topical hints (hard problem). There are 'foggy' remarks
> that 'could be responsible' - I request hard facts. None here. *
>
*I agree with your disagreement. *
>
> >> A God needs to be a person, a infinite person perhaps, a superhero
>>> of superheroes, but a person.
>>>
>>
>> > Not at all. This is a Abrahamic axiom. There are other theories.
>>
>
> It's not a axiom and it's not a theory it's just the way human beings use
> the word "God" in the English language. If you want to talk about something
> that is responsible for our existence but is not a person then that's fine,
> I do it all the time myself, but when I do so I don't use the word "God"
> because I believe the purpose of language is communication and thus I
> believe that a language known only to me is of no use to anyone. There are
> about 900,000 words in the English language and I'm sure you can find at
> least one of them that describes Arithmetic better than "God", however as I
> said before, many people are willing to abandon the idea of God but for
> reasons I don't understand they are unwilling to abandon the word "God".
>
> >> Arithmetic is not a person, super or otherwise.
>>>
>>
>> > Arithmetical truth? How can you be sure.
>>
>
> Do I really need to be sure to conclude that referring to arithmetic as
> God is unlikely to produce optimal communication fidelity?
>
>
> > non-plausible does not mean contradictory.
>>
>
> True, but it's the next best thing.
>
>
> > With different statistical weight, at least for the experience which can
>> be distinguished in the future. If not comp predict white noise for all
>> experience, given that the UD generates them all.
>>
>
> So let's say that every 10^-43 seconds (the Planck Time) my life branches
> in two (or any finite number), nevertheless when the thing called "I" looks
> back even after many years have passed he sees a continuous path. There are
> a enormous number of other things that call themselves John K Clark, some
> of them very similar to the thing that is writing this Email and others
> radically different (including one that is now Pope) but all of them see at
> least some order in their past. It is true that there are a even larger
> number of paths that have no order whatsoever, no rhyme or reason; and at
> the end of one of those paths if there were a being looking back he would
> indeed see nothing but white noise, but there is no being there to look
> back, because although a little randomness is helpful to Evolution in
> producing intelligence, random mutation is only half the story, the other
> half is nonrandom naturalselection. So if looking back I saw nothing but
> white noise I would not be around to look back.
> *Now John you look like having a perfect ID for intelligence. I still
> struggle with the word. (Inter-lego? - more than the obvious meaning?) and
> I deny 'randomness' - making "cooked grits" out of the world. It can
> appear as the outcome of the 'still' hidden. Evolution is the application
> of the 'givens' within the existing circumstances, some survive, others may
> not even show up in the snapshots science is taking occasionally. (Existing
> and circumstance in the wide sense of 'given' by the infinite complexity).
> *
>
*It was a joy to read your ideas. I am a fan of Bruno, in spite of some
questions I pose sometimes. *
*Bests regards - John Mikes*
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>
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