On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:



On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:

    On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:

    Hi ACW,

        Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!

    On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
    Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or
    religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with
    this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone
    would take COMP as an assumption:

    - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level,
    a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you
    were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would
    be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't
    that a strong theological assumption?
    [SPK]
        Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of
    "stuff" with another such that the functionality (that allows
    for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing
    equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing
    interesting to point out about this is that this substitution
    can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff,
    like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not
    require a continuous physical process of transformation in the
    sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff
    at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the
    usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really?
        What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a
    hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that
    the "stuff" of the material world is more about properties that
    remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less
    and less about anything like "primitive" substances. So in a
    sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide
    assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me
    that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and
    invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical
    structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not
    arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a
    theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time
    and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not
    primitive.

    So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true,
    it has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that
    the shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia.
    Comp explains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to
    RA, or to the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness,
    including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp
    is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic
    alone. Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We
    have already the symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum
    indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning. But this is just for
    illustrating the consistency: the UDA conclusion is that no
    matter what, the appearance of matter cannot use any
    supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum
    up the UD by "comp is not completable". It is the Bell-von Neuman
    answer to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made
    conceptually complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the
    comp solution of the mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you
    add to the SWE will reintroduce the measurement problem in
    quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are conceptually complete,
    but of epistemologically highly incomplete and uncompletable.

    Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to
    define it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible
    given that your primitive is the word "existence" which is not
    defined, nor even a theory.

    Hi Bruno,

        You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a
    problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing
    from an internal perspective since we have to have invariance over
    many different internal perspectives and these can vary over speed
    and complexity. This is illustrated by the discussion of how
    "stuff" can vary while preserving the functionality. The 'theory'
    of existence follows naturally from neutral monism, you just need
    spend the effort to understand it.
        Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief
    that "COMP is true" or "COMP is false". In order to have a
    coherent notion of a bet, both "COMP is True" and "COMP is false"
    have to exist side by side as equivalently possible.

[JK]
Yet ""COMP is true" AND "COMP is false"" is necessarily false.
Hi Joseph,

I agree, they are false as a proposition iff they are given in a single proposition or evaluated as such, as your usage of " bracketing shows. This is one of the problems that I see in the COMP based theory and why one has to have something else in addition to propositions. This 'something else', I propose, is physical matter or a quantum logic as underlying structure. This latter possibility works because of the non-distributive nature of its logic but it requires additional structure to derive the Born postulate <http://www.google.com/#hl=en&cp=14&gs_id=7&xhr=t&q=Born+postulate&pf=p&sclient=psy-ab&site=&source=hp&pbx=1&oq=Born+postulate&aq=0&aqi=g1g-v1&aql=&gs_sm=&gs_upl=&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.,cf.osb&fp=f2900e4a30b61916&biw=1120&bih=612>.

    If we consider that they only can have this "side by side
    equivalence" in the mind, then we obtain the situation that their
    truth value is dependent on the choice,

[JK]
How? Just because you bet on something doesn't make it a correct bet. Just because you hold two contradictory propositions to have equal credence, doesn't make them both correct. I don't see where this is coming from.
[SPK]
One must have at least two different (orthogonal?) alternatives and a selection mechanism that can operate on all of them for a betting scheme to be possible.

    but that would contradict COMP since built into it is the
    postulate that truth is independent of belief. We have to look at
    COMP from the point of view of many minds and not just one, but so
    far you have stoically resisted doing this. Why?



    OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism
    or that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do
    know that I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique
    that might help me learn.

    Comp like QM does not admit supplementary axioms, or variables,
    to reinstall a physical realism.

        This makes no sense to me. QM disallows for any particular
    realism in the sense of property definiteness prior to
    observation. We do not need to go through all of the
    no-hidden-variable theorems again, I hope! In fact, the logic of
    QM is proven to not be faithfully capture in any one form of
    Boolean representation because it is only representable as an
    Orthocomplete Lattice. An OL is similar but not surjective to an
    infinite number of Boolean Algebras and there does not exist a way
    to pick out one of them in an a priori way. There is also the
    isomorphism between any dualization of a finite vector space and
    between Hilbert spaces of the same # of dimension that shows this
    same property.
        OTOH, we can use the SSA idea to pick out a Boolean algebra by
    identifying some sub-lattice of the OL, but this only works if we
    have many observers, each with a set of local observables so that
    the collection acts like the questioners in a Surprise 20
    Questions game.



    I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences
    and a belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons:
     a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that
    consciousness is utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a
    principle of functional / organizational invariance. Most of
    our sense data tends to point that such a principle makes
    sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not correspond to
    brain states and p. zombies.

        Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical
    parallelism.

    But there is no psycho-physical parallelism. The metaphysical
    physical *is* an illusion, naïve or not. The physical itself is
    arithmetical truth see from the observable point of view
    (suggested to be handled by the logics of observation Bp & Dt (&
    p), at the G and G* levels).

        But cannot you see that this claim that "there is no
    psycho-physical parallelism" completely undermines the entire
    result? An illusion cannot act as a coherent substrate upon which
    representations can be implemented. So in effect you are denying
    the existence of the computer monitor with which you are reading
    this email, and the whiteboards upon which you write your symbolic
    systems of equations and your eyes that read this and everything
    else that acts as a relatively stable substrate upon which one
    arithmetic truth can be compared to another.

[JK]
The UDA only shows that they cannot be ontologically primitive, or "fundamental".

[SPK]
I agree, but that restriction is not eliminative. What you need to understand is that what ever the UDA is defined to be, for it to be more than just a theoretical construct, it has to be able to be generated or implemented somehow, otherwise it is much like a concept that cannot be communicated or known. Would it even be a concept?


Consider an (unrealistically long) dream wherein the dreamer observes several violations of the real-life laws of physics (wrong proton mass, broken glasses reassembling themselves, whatever.). He then reasonably concludes that he is dreaming. In other words he reduces his experience in the dream to a "more fundamental" physical reality wherein he is asleep, his brain is in state X, and so on. He is therefore denying the primitiveness of his dream -- it is, in your terminology, an illusion.
[SPK]
This situation assumes that the content of the dream can be known to contain violations, e.g. that there is some other set of experiences which are a standard of correctness against which the content of the dream can deviate. If the Dreamer never experiences another world except for that "physics violating" version it would never know and would accept it as "real", in fact it would have no reason to consider that it might be "unreal".


[JK]
It seems to me that by your reasoning, the idea that the dreamer is dreaming undermines the result itself, so that no one can ever legitimately say "I am dreaming". If I see a cup of coffee getting hotter on a cold day, or have conversations with long-dead relatives, I cannot say that I am dreaming, because if I am dreaming then there is no reason to take my reasoning seriously. (A lot of lucid dreamers would beg to differ!)

Is this a misrepresentation of your view? It is a somewhat subtle issue.
[SPK]

No, you are making a good point. My comment in response is that such a situation requires the ability to distinguish alternatives as well as the possibility of "being in" or "finding oneself in" alternatives. Comp covers this with the cut and paste idea and shows how 1p indeterminism works. My only difficulty with COMP is the eliminatist interpretation of it. One has to have real alternative states that co-exist at the level level even if they support propositions that are mutually contradictory.



        The physical cannot be just the arithmetic truth for such is
    singular, it has to be at least the comparison between a pair of
    arithmetic truths and for this to be possible there has to be a
    relatively stable substrate. There is no escape from this necessity.

[JK]
How do you know this?

[SPK]

OK, lets reason our way through this. How exactly does one Arithmetic Truth act upon another such that there is a difference between a pair of non-interacting ATs and a pair of interacting ATs. To be consistent, we cannot project the ATs into and onto entities that have the per-assumed possibility of interaction or not, we have to take them as primitive. Does this construction even make sense? No! If we force it then we find ourselves, as evaluators of those ATs, in a quandary much like Descartes with his version of dualism. How does the mental and material interact? I claim, with Vaughn Pratt, that they do not interact at all! A better question, asked by Pratt, is how can a pair of minds or propositions interact?





    My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualism
    holds. A dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead
    of "separate substances", it is proposed that the logical and
    the physical are two distinct aspect of reality that follow on
    equal yet anti-parallel tracks. As Vaughan Pratt explains in his
    papers, the logical processes and the physical processes have
    dynamics that have arrows that point in opposite directions.
    Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category theory
    diagram of this duality:

    ---- > X -----> Y ----->
             |           |
    <----- A <------B <-----

    I am OK with this. This is already derivable from the many
    dualisms contained in the octalist machines points of view,
    notably between "intelligible" (Bp) and (matter intelligible Bp &
    Dt). It does reverse the arrow in a way akin to Pratt. It is not
    a parallelism, or anti-parallelism, though, for the 1p and 3p are
    not symmetrical. Then the qualia, and the first person plural
    quanta, are given by the machine's semantics for the logic obeyed
    by Bp & Dt & p.

        The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote
    up an informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to
    comprehend it from just your discussion of the hypostases.

[JK]
I agree, this would be very helpful. I wouldn't mind if it got a little technical, either.
[SPK]
I am hopeful that Bruno will see the benefit in writing this description up.

Onward!

Stephen

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