On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 9:24 AM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:

> On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight <joseph.9...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming
> > consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system.
> Not
> > even a little.
> Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection
> that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie-graph
> setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of
> physics-mechanism is actually accepted.  Clearly, we now have to
> regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a
> deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is
> currently related.  But what are we now to make of the original
> proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an
> actual conscious state?  After all, we don't regard them as
> "primitively physical" objects any longer, so we can't now apply the
> reductio arguments in quite the same way, can we?

They're part of the
> general computational state of affairs, like everything else.  Is it
> that they instantiate the "wrong" sort of computation for
> consciousness, because their physical behaviour is the result of
> "accidentally" contrived relations?  IOW, they're not really UM's in
> any relevant sense.   But then wouldn't the same argument for
> contrivance hold in the original case, and undermine the reductio?
> I'm puzzled.

That makes two of us. You may recall the lengthy post I made a couple of
months ago questioning the validity of the MGA. I now accept its validity
but still find myself pondering how *weird *it is.

I'm going to think about your post a little more before I respond

> David

Joseph Knight

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to