On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 9:24 AM, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming > COMP, > > consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system. > Not > > even a little. > > Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection > that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie-graph > setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of > physics-mechanism is actually accepted. Clearly, we now have to > regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a > deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is > currently related. But what are we now to make of the original > proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an > actual conscious state? After all, we don't regard them as > "primitively physical" objects any longer, so we can't now apply the > reductio arguments in quite the same way, can we? They're part of the > general computational state of affairs, like everything else. Is it > that they instantiate the "wrong" sort of computation for > consciousness, because their physical behaviour is the result of > "accidentally" contrived relations? IOW, they're not really UM's in > any relevant sense. But then wouldn't the same argument for > contrivance hold in the original case, and undermine the reductio? > > I'm puzzled. > That makes two of us. You may recall the lengthy post I made a couple of months ago questioning the validity of the MGA. I now accept its validity but still find myself pondering how *weird *it is. I'm going to think about your post a little more before I respond completely. > > David > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
