David, Selection was even earlier proposed by Leibniz in his Monadology philosophy along with many other principles about half of which have been confirmed by scientific theory and experimentation. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/leibniz.htm Richard David Ruquist
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 9:20 PM, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > > You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious > > experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if > > conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to > create a > > process that is aware of being in both Washington and Moscow at the same > > time. Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W. Or > The > > Borg of Star Trek. Of course that experience would be strange and we > would > > tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness." So then the > question > > becomes what do you mean by not experiencing duplication? Is it a mere > > tautology based on how you define 'consciousness'? > > Surely it's just a necessary prerequisite for accepting the > possibility of either MWI or comp? IOW, if one rejects, on whatever > grounds, that a unique subjective perspective could be consistent with > the objective existence of multiple copies (as I think is the case > with Kent) then one is forced also to reject both MWI and comp. Given > such a view, neither theory could be a viable explanation for one's > lived experience of observing "one universe at a time". > > AFAICS, the more exotic examples you give above, e.g. a distributed > process, or a Borg-type group-mind, present no difficulties beyond > that for "ordinary" consciousness. Again, either one accepts that > duplication of these states of affairs would be compatible, mutatis > mutandis, with the corresponding "single universe" perspective > (however exotic) or not. > > Given the above, what makes it difficult to make sense of John's > objections to Bruno's argument is precisely that he accepts the > possibility of multiple copies in a comp or MWI scenario, whilst > ignoring the necessity of recovering a singular perspective. But the > latter step is a prerequisite, in any scenario, for reproducing the > empirically uncertain state of affairs. Without it, the "probability" > of every outcome - as John has continually reiterated - can only ever > be 100%! > > "Selection", even if only implicit, is an ineliminable feature of any > theory seeking to explain the empirical facts. Kent's proposal is a > process that eliminates all branches but one, albeit on a somewhat > different basis than Copenhagen. Similarly, the heuristic I suggested > in an earlier post entails "selection", but in a non-destructive > manner. BTW, I had long retained a dim recollection of a similar > selection metaphor involving "pigeon holes" from my youthful SF > reading, which I recently re-discovered to be Fred Hoyle's 1960's > novella "October the First is Too Late". I also found that John > Gribbin refers to this very notion in his recent Multiverse book > (apparently he was a student of Hoyle's), relating it to the ideas of > Deutsch and Barbour. This reinforced my suspicion that they do rely > implicitly on such a selection principle, though AFAICS neither of > them acknowledge it explicitly. > > David > > > On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >> > >> On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote: > >> > >>> On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you > are > >>>> using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the > >>>> indeterminacy about the first person experience displayed in the WM > >>>> duplication thought experience (UDA step 3). > >>>> > >>>> Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience, and > given > >>>> that you are the one claiming that there is no indeterminate outcome, > I will > >>>> ask to give us an algorithm predicting the result of the future > >>>> self-localization experience. > >>> > >>> > >>> The outcome is deterministic just like Everett's QM is deterministic. > >>> And it has the same problems being given a probabilistic > interpretation as > >>> EQM. If you duplicated a coin in the transporter experiment the > question, > >>> "Where will you expect to find the coin." has the same problems as > "Where do > >>> you expect to find yourself". The implication is that "self" is not a > >>> unique 'thing' (as for example a soul is assumed to be) but is process > that > >>> can be realized in different media. > >> > >> > >> I agree. But the experience is lived as unique, so we can follow > Plotinus > >> in using the term soul for the owner of the 1-view, that is, the knower. > >> From its pov, it is not duplicable, in the trivial sense that the > >> duplication is never part of his experience. > > > > > > You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious > > experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if > > conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to > create a > > process that is aware of being in both Washington and Moscow at the same > > time. Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W. Or > The > > Borg of Star Trek. Of course that experience would be strange and we > would > > tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness." So then the > question > > becomes what do you mean by not experiencing duplication? Is it a mere > > tautology based on how you define 'consciousness'? > > > > > >> He would not know if we did not give him the protocol. > >> mathematically, this is related to the fact that no machine can know > which > >> machine she is, already seen clearly by Post and (re)intuited by > Benacerraf, > >> and "intuited" by the machine itself, accepting the Theaetetus' > definition > >> of knowledge. > >> > >> I am not sure the problem of probability is identical in QM and COMP. In > >> QM, Everett showed that the P = A^2 principle does not depend on the > choice > >> of the base, > > > > > > I don't think that's correct. 'A' is the amplitude of the projection on > > certain basis determined by what is measured. Yes the Born rule can be > > applied whatever basis is chosen, but the projection produces different > A's. > > > > > >> so that A can be considered as measuring the relative proportion of > >> possible accessible relative realities. This does not work with finite > >> multiverse, but it works with infinite multiverse, > > > > > > But infinite multiple worlds create a measure problem. That's one of > Adrian > > Kent's points. > > > > > > > >> and Gleason theorem justifies the unicity of the measure, > > > > > > I'm not sure what you mean by that? > > > > > > > >> for sufficiently complex physical reality (meaning the Hilbert space > have > >> to be of dimension bigger than 2. So in my opinion, the Born rule is > already > >> explained. > >> > >> With COMP, as I argue, we have to justify the wave itself (assuming QM > is > >> correct) from the relative number relations and personal points of view > (as > >> done in AUDA, for the logic of "measure one"). > > > > > > Yes, that would be a signal accomplishment. > > > > Brent > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > [email protected]. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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