David,
Selection was even earlier proposed by Leibniz in his Monadology philosophy
along with many other principles about half of which have been confirmed by
scientific theory and experimentation.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/leibniz.htm
Richard David Ruquist

On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 9:20 PM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:

> On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> > You don't know that.  It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
> > experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does.  But if
> > conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to
> create a
> > process that is aware of being in both Washington and Moscow at the same
> > time.  Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W.   Or
> The
> > Borg of Star Trek.  Of course that experience would be strange and we
> would
> > tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness."  So then the
> question
> > becomes what do you mean by not experiencing duplication?  Is it a mere
> > tautology based on how you define 'consciousness'?
>
> Surely it's just a necessary prerequisite for accepting the
> possibility of either MWI or comp?  IOW, if one rejects, on whatever
> grounds, that a unique subjective perspective could be consistent with
> the objective existence of multiple copies (as I think is the case
> with Kent) then one is forced also to reject both MWI and comp.  Given
> such a view, neither theory could be a viable explanation for one's
> lived experience of observing "one universe at a time".
>
> AFAICS, the more exotic examples you give above, e.g. a distributed
> process, or a Borg-type group-mind, present no difficulties beyond
> that for "ordinary" consciousness.  Again, either one accepts that
> duplication of these states of affairs would be compatible, mutatis
> mutandis, with the corresponding "single universe" perspective
> (however exotic) or not.
>
> Given the above, what makes it difficult to make sense of John's
> objections to Bruno's argument is precisely that he accepts the
> possibility of multiple copies in a comp or MWI scenario, whilst
> ignoring the necessity of recovering a singular perspective.  But the
> latter step is a prerequisite, in any scenario, for reproducing the
> empirically uncertain state of affairs.  Without it, the "probability"
> of every outcome - as John has continually reiterated - can only ever
> be 100%!
>
> "Selection", even if only implicit, is an ineliminable feature of any
> theory seeking to explain the empirical facts.  Kent's proposal is a
> process that eliminates all branches but one, albeit on a somewhat
> different basis than Copenhagen.  Similarly, the heuristic I suggested
> in an earlier post entails "selection", but in a non-destructive
> manner.  BTW, I had long retained a dim recollection of a similar
> selection metaphor involving "pigeon holes" from my youthful SF
> reading, which I recently re-discovered to be Fred Hoyle's 1960's
> novella "October the First is Too Late".  I also found that John
> Gribbin refers to this very notion in his recent Multiverse book
> (apparently he was a student of Hoyle's), relating it to the ideas of
> Deutsch and Barbour.  This reinforced my suspicion that they do rely
> implicitly on such a selection principle, though AFAICS neither of
> them acknowledge it explicitly.
>
> David
>
> > On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
> >>
> >>> On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you
> are
> >>>> using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the
> >>>> indeterminacy about the first person experience displayed in the WM
> >>>> duplication thought experience (UDA step 3).
> >>>>
> >>>> Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience, and
> given
> >>>> that you are the one claiming that there is no indeterminate outcome,
> I will
> >>>> ask to give us an algorithm predicting the result of the future
> >>>> self-localization experience.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> The outcome is deterministic just like Everett's QM is deterministic.
> >>>  And it has the same problems being given a probabilistic
> interpretation as
> >>> EQM.  If you duplicated a coin in the transporter experiment the
> question,
> >>> "Where will you expect to find the coin." has the same problems as
> "Where do
> >>> you expect to find yourself".  The implication is that "self" is not a
> >>> unique 'thing' (as for example a soul is assumed to be) but is process
> that
> >>> can be realized in different media.
> >>
> >>
> >> I agree. But the experience is lived as unique, so we can follow
> Plotinus
> >> in using the term soul for the owner of the 1-view, that is, the knower.
> >> From its pov, it is not duplicable, in the trivial sense that the
> >> duplication is never part of his experience.
> >
> >
> > You don't know that.  It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
> > experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does.  But if
> > conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to
> create a
> > process that is aware of being in both Washington and Moscow at the same
> > time.  Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W.   Or
> The
> > Borg of Star Trek.  Of course that experience would be strange and we
> would
> > tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness."  So then the
> question
> > becomes what do you mean by not experiencing duplication?  Is it a mere
> > tautology based on how you define 'consciousness'?
> >
> >
> >> He would not know if we did not give him the protocol.
> >> mathematically, this is related to the fact that no machine can know
> which
> >> machine she is, already seen clearly by Post and (re)intuited by
> Benacerraf,
> >> and "intuited" by the machine itself, accepting the Theaetetus'
> definition
> >> of knowledge.
> >>
> >> I am not sure the problem of probability is identical in QM and COMP. In
> >> QM, Everett showed that the P = A^2 principle does not depend on the
> choice
> >> of the base,
> >
> >
> > I don't think that's correct.  'A' is the amplitude of the projection on
> > certain basis determined by what is measured.  Yes the Born rule can be
> > applied whatever basis is chosen, but the projection produces different
> A's.
> >
> >
> >> so that A can be considered as measuring the relative proportion of
> >> possible accessible relative realities. This does not work with finite
> >> multiverse, but it works with infinite multiverse,
> >
> >
> > But infinite multiple worlds create a measure problem.  That's one of
> Adrian
> > Kent's points.
> >
> >
> >
> >> and Gleason theorem justifies the unicity of the measure,
> >
> >
> > I'm not sure what you mean by that?
> >
> >
> >
> >> for sufficiently complex physical reality (meaning the Hilbert space
> have
> >> to be of dimension bigger than 2. So in my opinion, the Born rule is
> already
> >> explained.
> >>
> >> With COMP, as I argue, we have to justify the wave itself (assuming QM
> is
> >> correct) from the relative number relations and personal points of view
> (as
> >> done in AUDA, for the logic of "measure one").
> >
> >
> > Yes, that would be a signal accomplishment.
> >
> > Brent
> >
> >
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