On 30 March 2012 10:11, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote:

> David,
> Selection was even earlier proposed by Leibniz in his Monadology philosophy
> along with many other principles about half of which have been confirmed by
> scientific theory and experimentation.
> http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/leibniz.htm
> Richard David Ruquist

Thanks for reminding me of this - I hadn't read Leibniz for a long
while.  However, on a rapid re-perusal I can only discover one
instance of his referring to selection:

"53. Now as there are an infinity of possible universes in the ideas
of God, and but one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient
reason for the choice of God which determines him to select one rather
than another."

This could perhaps be interpreted as being consistent with Kent's
proposal of an objective selection "at infinity" pruning out the
superfluous branches.  But if so, it is still vulnerable to my
criticism that it fails to account for subjective localisation, or in
Leibniz's terminology, why the subjective perspective of one monad is
selected at a "given moment" rather than another.  Can you direct me
to any other reference to this in the Monadology?

David

>
>
> On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 9:20 PM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>> > You don't know that.  It's an assumption based on the idea that
>> > conscious
>> > experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does.  But if
>> > conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to
>> > create a
>> > process that is aware of being in both Washington and Moscow at the same
>> > time.  Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W.   Or
>> > The
>> > Borg of Star Trek.  Of course that experience would be strange and we
>> > would
>> > tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness."  So then the
>> > question
>> > becomes what do you mean by not experiencing duplication?  Is it a mere
>> > tautology based on how you define 'consciousness'?
>>
>> Surely it's just a necessary prerequisite for accepting the
>> possibility of either MWI or comp?  IOW, if one rejects, on whatever
>> grounds, that a unique subjective perspective could be consistent with
>> the objective existence of multiple copies (as I think is the case
>> with Kent) then one is forced also to reject both MWI and comp.  Given
>> such a view, neither theory could be a viable explanation for one's
>> lived experience of observing "one universe at a time".
>>
>> AFAICS, the more exotic examples you give above, e.g. a distributed
>> process, or a Borg-type group-mind, present no difficulties beyond
>> that for "ordinary" consciousness.  Again, either one accepts that
>> duplication of these states of affairs would be compatible, mutatis
>> mutandis, with the corresponding "single universe" perspective
>> (however exotic) or not.
>>
>> Given the above, what makes it difficult to make sense of John's
>> objections to Bruno's argument is precisely that he accepts the
>> possibility of multiple copies in a comp or MWI scenario, whilst
>> ignoring the necessity of recovering a singular perspective.  But the
>> latter step is a prerequisite, in any scenario, for reproducing the
>> empirically uncertain state of affairs.  Without it, the "probability"
>> of every outcome - as John has continually reiterated - can only ever
>> be 100%!
>>
>> "Selection", even if only implicit, is an ineliminable feature of any
>> theory seeking to explain the empirical facts.  Kent's proposal is a
>> process that eliminates all branches but one, albeit on a somewhat
>> different basis than Copenhagen.  Similarly, the heuristic I suggested
>> in an earlier post entails "selection", but in a non-destructive
>> manner.  BTW, I had long retained a dim recollection of a similar
>> selection metaphor involving "pigeon holes" from my youthful SF
>> reading, which I recently re-discovered to be Fred Hoyle's 1960's
>> novella "October the First is Too Late".  I also found that John
>> Gribbin refers to this very notion in his recent Multiverse book
>> (apparently he was a student of Hoyle's), relating it to the ideas of
>> Deutsch and Barbour.  This reinforced my suspicion that they do rely
>> implicitly on such a selection principle, though AFAICS neither of
>> them acknowledge it explicitly.
>>
>> David
>>
>> > On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you
>> >>>> are
>> >>>> using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> indeterminacy about the first person experience displayed in the WM
>> >>>> duplication thought experience (UDA step 3).
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience, and
>> >>>> given
>> >>>> that you are the one claiming that there is no indeterminate outcome,
>> >>>> I will
>> >>>> ask to give us an algorithm predicting the result of the future
>> >>>> self-localization experience.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> The outcome is deterministic just like Everett's QM is deterministic.
>> >>>  And it has the same problems being given a probabilistic
>> >>> interpretation as
>> >>> EQM.  If you duplicated a coin in the transporter experiment the
>> >>> question,
>> >>> "Where will you expect to find the coin." has the same problems as
>> >>> "Where do
>> >>> you expect to find yourself".  The implication is that "self" is not a
>> >>> unique 'thing' (as for example a soul is assumed to be) but is process
>> >>> that
>> >>> can be realized in different media.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I agree. But the experience is lived as unique, so we can follow
>> >> Plotinus
>> >> in using the term soul for the owner of the 1-view, that is, the
>> >> knower.
>> >> From its pov, it is not duplicable, in the trivial sense that the
>> >> duplication is never part of his experience.
>> >
>> >
>> > You don't know that.  It's an assumption based on the idea that
>> > conscious
>> > experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does.  But if
>> > conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to
>> > create a
>> > process that is aware of being in both Washington and Moscow at the same
>> > time.  Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W.   Or
>> > The
>> > Borg of Star Trek.  Of course that experience would be strange and we
>> > would
>> > tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness."  So then the
>> > question
>> > becomes what do you mean by not experiencing duplication?  Is it a mere
>> > tautology based on how you define 'consciousness'?
>> >
>> >
>> >> He would not know if we did not give him the protocol.
>> >> mathematically, this is related to the fact that no machine can know
>> >> which
>> >> machine she is, already seen clearly by Post and (re)intuited by
>> >> Benacerraf,
>> >> and "intuited" by the machine itself, accepting the Theaetetus'
>> >> definition
>> >> of knowledge.
>> >>
>> >> I am not sure the problem of probability is identical in QM and COMP.
>> >> In
>> >> QM, Everett showed that the P = A^2 principle does not depend on the
>> >> choice
>> >> of the base,
>> >
>> >
>> > I don't think that's correct.  'A' is the amplitude of the projection on
>> > certain basis determined by what is measured.  Yes the Born rule can be
>> > applied whatever basis is chosen, but the projection produces different
>> > A's.
>> >
>> >
>> >> so that A can be considered as measuring the relative proportion of
>> >> possible accessible relative realities. This does not work with finite
>> >> multiverse, but it works with infinite multiverse,
>> >
>> >
>> > But infinite multiple worlds create a measure problem.  That's one of
>> > Adrian
>> > Kent's points.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >> and Gleason theorem justifies the unicity of the measure,
>> >
>> >
>> > I'm not sure what you mean by that?
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >> for sufficiently complex physical reality (meaning the Hilbert space
>> >> have
>> >> to be of dimension bigger than 2. So in my opinion, the Born rule is
>> >> already
>> >> explained.
>> >>
>> >> With COMP, as I argue, we have to justify the wave itself (assuming QM
>> >> is
>> >> correct) from the relative number relations and personal points of view
>> >> (as
>> >> done in AUDA, for the logic of "measure one").
>> >
>> >
>> > Yes, that would be a signal accomplishment.
>> >
>> > Brent
>> >
>> >
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