On 29 Mar 2012, at 21:47, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", thatyou are using here, so as to convince me and others that itrefutes indeed the indeterminacy about the first personexperience displayed in the WM duplication thought experience(UDA step 3).Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience,and given that you are the one claiming that there is noindeterminate outcome, I will ask to give us an algorithmpredicting the result of the future self-localization experience.The outcome is deterministic just like Everett's QM isdeterministic. And it has the same problems being given aprobabilistic interpretation as EQM. If you duplicated a coin inthe transporter experiment the question, "Where will you expect tofind the coin." has the same problems as "Where do you expect tofind yourself". The implication is that "self" is not a unique'thing' (as for example a soul is assumed to be) but is processthat can be realized in different media.I agree. But the experience is lived as unique, so we can followPlotinus in using the term soul for the owner of the 1-view, thatis, the knower. From its pov, it is not duplicable, in the trivialsense that the duplication is never part of his experience.You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea thatconscious experience is something a certain physical body, a brain,does. But if conscious experience is a process then it is certainlypossible to create a process that is aware of being in bothWashington and Moscow at the same time.

`Or you are just a giant with one foot in W and one foot in M. But`

`that's not relevant for the issue I was talking about, where complete`

`brain are reconstituted separately in the two places.`

Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W. Or TheBorg of Star Trek. Of course that experience would be strange andwe would tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness." Sothen the question becomes what do you mean by not experiencingduplication? Is it a mere tautology based on how you define'consciousness'?

`I do not define consciousness, and for the reasoning I am using an`

`approximate notion of first person (the content of the diary which is`

`transported in the teleportation or duplication device. And yes, it`

`makes the "non experiencing of duplication", and the "non experiencing`

`of reconstitution delays" obvious. That was the goal.`

He would not know if we did not give him the protocol.mathematically, this is related to the fact that no machine canknow which machine she is, already seen clearly by Post and(re)intuited by Benacerraf, and "intuited" by the machine itself,accepting the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge.I am not sure the problem of probability is identical in QM andCOMP. In QM, Everett showed that the P = A^2 principle does notdepend on the choice of the base,I don't think that's correct. 'A' is the amplitude of theprojection on certain basis determined by what is measured. Yes theBorn rule can be applied whatever basis is chosen, but theprojection produces different A's.

No problem with this.

so that A can be considered as measuring the relative proportion ofpossible accessible relative realities. This does not work withfinite multiverse, but it works with infinite multiverse,But infinite multiple worlds create a measure problem. That's oneof Adrian Kent's points.

`In all case of multiplication, be it through comp or QM, there is a`

`measure problem. With comp, the mind-body problem is transformed into`

`a justification of the physical laws through a measure problem.`

and Gleason theorem justifies the unicity of the measure,I'm not sure what you mean by that?

<<

`Gleason’s theorem, formulated and proved by Andrew M. Gleason in`

`1957, is a state-`

`ment about measures on Hilbert spaces of dimension at least three. The`

`theorem states`

`that the only possible probability measures on such spaces are`

`measures µ of the form`

`µ(a) = Tr(ρPa ), where ρ is a positive semi-deﬁnite self-adjoint`

`operator of unit trace, and`

where Pa is a pro jection operator for pro jection onto the subspace a.

`Postulating that any orthogonal basis in some Hilbert space`

`corresponds to a measure-`

`ment and that quantum systems can be represented by such spaces, we`

`can understand`

`the pro jection operators as representing yes-no observables a1 ,`

`commuting pro jectors cor-`

`responding to yes-no questions that can be simultaneously answered (or`

`asked). Any`

`(measurable) property a of the system is then uniquely associated with`

`a subspace (which`

`could be one-dimensional i.e. a vector) of the system’s Hilbert space`

`- within this frame-`

`work, Gleason’s statement is one about the probability of obtaining a`

`given outcome when`

`making a measurement on a quantum system. The theorem is of profound`

`importance to`

`modern physics due to its strong implications for how probabilities`

`can be introduced into`

`quantum mechanics. Put another way, it is a statement about the`

`validity and uniqueness`

of the quantum probability rule. >> Quoted from a Student thesis which is rather good: http://kof.physto.se/theses/helena-master.pdf

`If I remember well, Everett uses it to "solve" the measure problem. At`

`the time of my reading I was pretty convinced that, once we assume`

`comp explicitly, Gleason theorem solves the QM measure problem. If the`

`Z1* and X1* "material hypostases" are close enough to some quantum`

`logic, then such a solution can be extended to comp.`

for sufficiently complex physical reality (meaning the Hilbertspace have to be of dimension bigger than 2. So in my opinion, theBorn rule is already explained.With COMP, as I argue, we have to justify the wave itself (assumingQM is correct) from the relative number relations and personalpoints of view (as done in AUDA, for the logic of "measure one").Yes, that would be a signal accomplishment.

`My point is a modal point. I am not interested in solving the comp`

`measure problem, only in the proof that comp makes *obligatory* to`

`reduce the mind-body problem into that measure problem on machine/`

`numbers dream. Comp is used only to reformulate the mind body problem.`

`A believer in comp can already believe that physics has been reduced`

`into machine's bio-psycho-theology (and thus in computer science, and`

`in number theory). That is done.`

`To extract physics might take 5 years or 500 years. Still, quantum`

`logic has already been extracted, which is something I did not expect`

`to live in my lifetime. But as I said, some serious optimization of`

`the Z and X logic must be provided to verify if the arithmetical`

`quantum logics coming from the mathematical 1 and 3 pov (based on the`

`self-reference logics G and G*) are close enough to apply Gleason`

`theorem or to find its arithmetical equivalent. A disproof of this`

`would lead to a refutation of comp, or to an experimental refutation`

`of comp.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.