Hi William, On Apr 2, 1:02 pm, "William R. Buckley" <bill.buck...@gmail.com> wrote: > Craig: > > Please explain a little further what you mean by *accomplished through > presentation* and in > particular, what you mean by presentation.
What I mean by that is that to make something seem like something else, it has to appear as something experienced in the first place. The color blue can't be purely a representation of optical/ neurological patterns without there being a presentation of those patterns (blue) which is different from that which is represented. If the patterns were already literally blue, there would be no need to translate them and we would see blue images in the tissues of the brain. If blue was nothing but a summary of physical patterns, any presentation would be redundant and we would use purely abstract, instinctive (unconscious) models. >From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular qualia are not inevitably associated with the conditions they usually represent for us, so it seems impossible to justify qualia on a functionalist basis. Just as a computer needs no speakers and video screen inside itself, there is no purpose for such a presentation layer within our own mechanism. Of course, even if there were a purpose, there is no hint of such a possibility from mechanism alone. If there was some reason that a bucket of rocks could benefit by some kind of collective 'experience' occurring amongst them, that's a million miles from suspecting that experience could be a conceivable possibility. Rather than 'consciousness', human beings would benefit evolutionarily much more by just being able to do something mechanically conceivable things like teleport, time travel, or breathe fire. Awareness doesn't even make sense as a possibility. Were we not experiencing it ourselves we could never anticipate any such possibility in any universe. > > Your point number 5 fits clearly within the purview of semiotics. My view really is a semiotic view, except that I think semiotics itself arises out of sense-motive experience. It has to start with a subject who can receive, interpret, and transmit signs. Signs without a subject can't be signs...can't really be anything. Craig > > wrb > > On Mon, Apr 2, 2012 at 9:14 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote: > > > > > > > > > 1. We cannot doubt that we are aware. > > > 2. Our awareness may represent realities which are independent from > > our own existence. > > > 3. Our awareness may represent ideas and fantasies which have no > > existence independent from our experience of it (and whatever > > neurological processes are behind it) > > > 4. Representation can only be accomplished through presentation. > > > 5. A word or a picture has to look like something to us in order to > > remind of us of something else. > > > 6. Saying that awareness or qualia only represents another process > > does not explain why there should be any presentation of that process > > in the first place, let alone posit a mechanism by which a physical > > process can be represented by something that does not physically > > exist. > > > 7. The problem with the mechanistic view is that it relies on the real > > existence of awareness and choice to make a case for distrusting > > awareness and choice. > > > A consequence of this logical contradiction is that when we begin from > > the assumption of mechanism and work backwards it almost invariably > > blinds us to the presentation of the work that we ourselves are doing > > in determining this deterministic opinion. We fool ourselves into > > thinking that there is no man even behind our own curtain, and mistake > > all authentic, concrete presentations for abstract, symbolic > > representations. That does not work for awareness because awareness > > itself can only be represented to something which is already aware. > > > Thus the symbol grounding problem arises when we make the mistake of > > assuming first that awareness must follow the rules of the world which > > is represented within awareness. Since the experience does not show up > > on the radar of materialism, we are forced to accept the absurdities > > of ungrounded feeling which emerges somehow without mechanism or > > explanation from generic physical changes or computations. We have to > > conflate symbol and reality - either by making reality not primitively > > real (comp) or by making symbols not really real (physics). > > > To me, the clear solution to this is not to begin from either the > > assumption of idealism or materialism but to examine the relationship > > between them. Once we notice that there is really nothing about these > > two positions which is not symmetrical, we can move on to the next > > step of examining symmetry itself. What I find is that symmetry is a > > bootstrap metaphor for metaphor. > > > Symmetry is what makes sense - literally. How it does this is > > understandable. It presents and then re-presents itself. It > > demonstrates how significance and order can be expressed through > > reflection. It is both mathematical and aesthetic but serves no > > purpose in either a comp or physical universe. It is so fundamental > > that we miss it entirely - which makes sense since we are part of the > > universe rather than objective observers of it. > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > >http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.