On 21 May 2012, at 07:31, meekerdb wrote:

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On 5/20/2012 8:15 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:Yes. Are those entities that exist from the beginning (which iswhat ontological primitivity implies...) or are they aspects of theunfolding reality?I think they are concepts we made up. But you're the one claimingthe universe (actually I think you mean the multiverse) is notcomputable and you think this is contrary to Bruno. But Bruno's UDisn't a Turing machine and what it produces is not computable, if Iunderstand him correctly.

?

`The UD is a Turing machine. I gave the algorithm in LISP (and from`

`this you can compile it into a Turing machine).`

`What it does is computable, in the 3-views, but not in the 1-view`

`(which 'contains' consciousness and matter).`

A simple pseudo code is begin For i, j, k, non negative integers Compute phi_i(j) up to k steps end The relation 'phi_i(j) = r' is purely arithmetical.

`The UD is just a cousin of the universal machine, forced to generate`

`all what it can do. It has to dovetail for not being stuck in some`

`infinite computations (which we cannot prevent in advance).`

The existence of UMs and UDs are theorem of elementary arithmetic. The UD gives the only one known effective notion of "everything".

This is debate that has been going on since Democritus andHeraclitus stepped into the Academy. Can you guess what ontologyI am championing?That is what goes into defining meaningfulness. When you definethat X is Y, you are also defining all not-X to equal not-Y, no?No. Unless your simply defining X to be identical with Y, a meresemantic renaming, then a definition is something like X:=Y|Zx.And it is not the case that ~X=~Y.OK.When you start talking about a collection then you have todefine what are its members.I'm not talking about a collection. You're the one assuming thatall 4-manifolds exist and that everything existing must becomputed BY THE SAME ALGORITHM. That's two more assumptions thanI'm willing to make.Is a universal algorithm capable of generating all possibleoutputs when feed all possible inputs?I dunno what "a universal algorithm" is. What you describe howeveris easy to write:x<-input print x.

`I think a better answer is a Universal Turing Machine, or universal`

`computable function code. It is a number u such that phi_u(x, y) =`

`phi_x(y).`

`This exist provably for all known and very different powerful enough`

`'programming language' (systems, numbers, programs, ...), and it`

`exists absolutely, with Church thesis.`

Bruno

What exactly is an algorithm in your thinking?An explicit sequence of instructions.Absent the specification or ability to specify the members of acollection, what can you say of the collection?This universe is defined ostensively.Interesting word: Ostensively."Represented or appearing as such..." It implies a subject towhom the representations or appearances have meaningful content.Who plays that role in your thinking?You do. When I write "this" you know what I mean.And are we alone in the universe? You seem to take for grantedthe existence of "others".I wouldn't say taken for granted. I have some evidence. BrentBrentWhat is the a priori constraint on the Universe? Why thisone and not some other? Is the limit of all computations not acomputation? How did this happen?No attempts to even comment on these?As Mark Twain said, "I'm pleased to be able to answer all yourquestions directly. I don't know."BrentOK... -- Onward! Stephen "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." ~ Francis Bacon --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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