On 21 May 2012, at 07:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/20/2012 8:15 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Yes. Are those entities that exist from the beginning (which is
what ontological primitivity implies...) or are they aspects of the
unfolding reality?
I think they are concepts we made up. But you're the one claiming
the universe (actually I think you mean the multiverse) is not
computable and you think this is contrary to Bruno. But Bruno's UD
isn't a Turing machine and what it produces is not computable, if I
understand him correctly.
?
The UD is a Turing machine. I gave the algorithm in LISP (and from
this you can compile it into a Turing machine).
What it does is computable, in the 3-views, but not in the 1-view
(which 'contains' consciousness and matter).
A simple pseudo code is
begin
For i, j, k, non negative integers
Compute phi_i(j) up to k steps
end
The relation 'phi_i(j) = r' is purely arithmetical.
The UD is just a cousin of the universal machine, forced to generate
all what it can do. It has to dovetail for not being stuck in some
infinite computations (which we cannot prevent in advance).
The existence of UMs and UDs are theorem of elementary arithmetic.
The UD gives the only one known effective notion of "everything".
This is debate that has been going on since Democritus and
Heraclitus stepped into the Academy. Can you guess what ontology
I am championing?
That is what goes into defining meaningfulness. When you define
that X is Y, you are also defining all not-X to equal not-Y, no?
No. Unless your simply defining X to be identical with Y, a mere
semantic renaming, then a definition is something like X:=Y|Zx.
And it is not the case that ~X=~Y.
OK.
When you start talking about a collection then you have to
define what are its members.
I'm not talking about a collection. You're the one assuming that
all 4-manifolds exist and that everything existing must be
computed BY THE SAME ALGORITHM. That's two more assumptions than
I'm willing to make.
Is a universal algorithm capable of generating all possible
outputs when feed all possible inputs?
I dunno what "a universal algorithm" is. What you describe however
is easy to write:
x<-input
print x.
I think a better answer is a Universal Turing Machine, or universal
computable function code. It is a number u such that phi_u(x, y) =
phi_x(y).
This exist provably for all known and very different powerful enough
'programming language' (systems, numbers, programs, ...), and it
exists absolutely, with Church thesis.
Bruno
What exactly is an algorithm in your thinking?
An explicit sequence of instructions.
Absent the specification or ability to specify the members of a
collection, what can you say of the collection?
This universe is defined ostensively.
Interesting word: Ostensively.
"Represented or appearing as such..." It implies a subject to
whom the representations or appearances have meaningful content.
Who plays that role in your thinking?
You do. When I write "this" you know what I mean.
And are we alone in the universe? You seem to take for granted
the existence of "others".
I wouldn't say taken for granted. I have some evidence.
Brent
Brent
What is the a priori constraint on the Universe? Why this
one and not some other? Is the limit of all computations not a
computation? How did this happen?
No attempts to even comment on these?
As Mark Twain said, "I'm pleased to be able to answer all your
questions directly. I don't know."
Brent
OK...
--
Onward!
Stephen
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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