On 20 Jun 2012, at 20:23, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 6/20/2012 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 19 Jun 2012, at 19:41, John Clark wrote:On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:>> Unlike the proton and neutron nobody has found anyexperimental evidence that the electron has a inner structure,that it is made of parts.> The primitive matter I talk about is the idea of primary matterin the Aristotle senseAristotle was a great logician but a dreadful physicist.> If I say that electron is not primitive, I don't mean it is madeof part, almost the contrary, that it is a mathematical reality,or that it is reducible to a non physical mathematical ortheological reality, an invariant in our sharable computations.I don't know what that means. What experiment would I need toperform, what would a electron need to do to prove it was"primitive".The electron cannot do that, but my pet amoeba cannot prove theyare unicellular, despite they are.It is just that if matter is primitive (not explainable from nonmaterial relation) then we have to make it infinite tosingularize consciousness.Dear Bruno,I am parsing your comments here as I want to fully and clearlyunderstand them.Do you stand by that implication, that "matter is primitive" ="not explainable from non material relation"? This implies that:"matter is not primitive" = "explainable from non materialrelation". No? I would like to better understand how the notion ofontological primitives is defined in your dictionary.

`Something is not primitive if you can derive it from something`

`simpler. Put in other word, something is not primitive if its`

`existence or its appearance can be proved in a theory which does not`

`postulate it in the basic assumption. It is emergent, in some large`

`sense.`

`Exemple: if comp is true then matter is not primitive (by UDA). Like`

`"life" is no more considered as primitive by most biologist, as it is`

`consider as being a chemically emergent reality for them.`

With comp, we just abandon the idea of singularize consciousness inbodies, and then the bodies have to be explained in term of numberrelation.Why would we have to "singularize consciousness in bodies" atall? What premise or postulate is it that consciousness is"singularized" in a body? I am assuming that "singularize" means "tomake singular" in the sense of either a singularity or a singleton.I am not sure which of the latter you are assuming.

`It is the way we experience our consciousness. We feel to be unique in`

`only one body, and universe. Of course we know better, once we assume`

`comp or even just QM (without collapse).`

It is more easy to understand that reversal at the epistemologicallevel. Physical concepts are not primitive means that we can reducethem to non physical concepts, like those coming from theoretical(mathematical) computer science. It means that physics is not thefundamental science. Exactly like we can reduce biology to physics,we can reduce physics to the study of machine dreams.At the epistemological level we are assuming that there alreadyexist conscious entities, therefore a reversal cannot be run in aconsistent manner if the reversal implies the non-existence ofconscious entities.

OK.

You are now equating "reducible" to "explainable". Is an explanationa "constructive" process in your thinking?

Not necessarily, and usually necessarily not.

>> To calculate the first 100 digits of Chaitin's constant you'dneed to feed all programs that can be expressed in 100 bits orless into a Turing Machine and see how many of them stop and howmany of then do not. Some of them will never stop but the only wayto know how many is to wait a infinite number of years and thensee how many programs are still running. So you'd need to beinfinitely patient, in other words you'd need to be dead.> Only to be sure of the decimals obtained.Well yeah, it's easy to calculate Chaitin's constant if you don'tmind getting it wrong.After BB(100) computation steps, the decimals will be correct. Iwill not know it, but they are correct.Is this correctness that occurs after the BB(100) steps capableof being "forced" to hold for the infinite case, as discussed inthis paper http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0509616? I would like to betterunderstand how you leap the gap between the finite case and theinfinite case.

? (The infinite case is no more a case of "computation").

> If I relax that constraints, then I need only to be *verypatient*. The non computable, but well defined Buzzy Beaverfunction (BB) bounds the time needed to wait. Of course it grows*very* fast. But I don't need an *infinite* time to get the 100first digits correct. Any time bigger than BB(100) will do.If we wait a googoplex to the googoplex power years some 100 bitprograms will still be running, some of them could be Busy Beaverprograms but others could just be very long finite programs. Andin the same 1962 paper where Rado introduced the idea of thebeaver he proved that a general algorithm to tell if a program isa Busy Beaver or not does not exist.That is true for all programs. There is no algorithmic way to seeif a program compute the factorial function. Again, this does notchange anything in the argument.What if a factorial is involved in the explanation ofconsciousness?

1) Nothing special about factorial. What I said is true for any program.

`2) The fact that there is no algorithm to decide if a program compute`

`some function does not ential that we cannot recognize what do some`

`program.`

`3) But this is not relevant, as comp ^prevent any chance to know for`

`sure what program run us. That is why the "yes doctor" asks for an act`

`of faith.`

It's true that if you knew the numerical value of Chaitin'sConstant then you would know that if a 100 bit program had notstopped after a Turing Machine had run n number of finiteoperations then it never will; but the trouble is you don't knowChaitin's Constant and never can, so you can never know how big nis. So even though they have been running for a googoplex to thegoogoplex power years one of those programs could stop 5 secondsfrom now.Not if I waited, by chance or whatever, a time bigger than BB(100).If a decimal change after that, then we got a computable functiongrowing more quickly than BB.You do realize that this dependence upon a number of steps in acomputational process is not equivalent to the notion of time in astrict way simply because time is not just the number of steps, itis also the transitional flow from one step to another.

In which theory?

And a Busy Beaver program grows faster than any computablefunction but to my knowledge it has not been proven that all non-computable functions grow as fast as the Busy Beaver.That would be false. There are many non computable predicate, withnon growing values.What would be the ration of computable to non-computablepredicates? Are you considering an ensemble or a space of predicates?

I was considering here all first order logical predicates;

> Lawrence Krauss in his book "A Universe From Nothing" says thatsomeday something close to that might actually be possible.> You mean? Deriving addition and multiplication from physics?No, Krauss talks about deriving physics from addition andmultiplication, or at least from logic; he talks about provingthat in the multiverse only certain fundamental laws of physicsare logically self consistent. He even talks about the distantdream of showing that "something" is consistent but "nothing" isnot.OK. Nice.Is not the proof (showing) that "something" is consistent and"nothing" is not consistent a triviality because "nothing" cannot beexactly defined such that a proof can be constructed.

It depends on the theory which is used.

> That is impossible.I think both Krauss and I would give the same response to that,maybe.> Why do you use "gibberish" to condemn free will, and not tocondemn event without cause?Because the meaning of "a event without a cause" is clear and nocircularity is involved.Cause is a fuzzy notion, and so "non causal" is even more fuzzy.I agree! This is why the entire discussion of free will isincoherent if it involves notions of cause and effect given anambiguous notion of cause.

OK.

Even the meaning of the question "what caused a event without acause?" is clear, although it is a stupid questionbecause the answer is so obvious. But the meaning of "free will"is anything but clear and circularity abounds.In computer science, circularity is not a problem. We can eliminateit with the second recursion theorem of Kleene. Free-will seems tome rather clear, except that some philosopher defend acontradictory notion of free-will. I gave my definition of c-free-will, and I don't see why we should reject it.I would like to better understand how this elimination occurs.Could you point us to a good discussion of Kleene's second recursiontheorem? Would you recommend this article http://www.math.ucla.edu/~ynm/lectures/2009csl.pdf?The wiki article defined the 2nd theorem as: "The secondrecursion theorem. If F is a total computable function then there isan index e such that <1ae7ce28ce024bddd11f90588fb3816c.png>.Here <1ae7ce28ce024bddd11f90588fb3816c.png> means that, for each n,either both <888eb19b7b9a5e48762a5df7aeb98890.png> and<855a06a79f43f1c1b63e789553f981df.png> are defined, and their valuesare equal, or else both are undefined."

I will prove it on the FOAR list.

The point here is that either a fixed point obtains or thefunctions cannot be defined (aka are non-constructable). What isinstructive to me is that fixed points have certain requirements toexist when we are thinking of them in the case of physics. Forexample, in the Brouwer fixed point theorem, we see that closure andconvexity of a set of points is required. Exactly what would playthe role of these in the computable function case?

The analogy break because we don't have to use geometry or topology.

And "why do we have free will?" is not a stupid question, its notsmart and its not stupid and even though it contains a questionmark it's not even a question, it's just a sequence of ASCIIcharacters.We agree that nc-free-will does not make sense, but you have notsucceeded in convincing me that all notion of free-will is nonsensical.I would really like to understand why it is that John Clarkinsists on this elimination attitude toward the referent of that"sequence of ASCII characters". It seems that he does not understandthe ramifications of such a postulate! IMHO, it makes anything thatclaims to be produced by his mind to be a meaningless "sequence ofASCII characters" as it clearly cannot be the result of an act of"his" will. He can have no will and thus there is not really a "his"associated with the supposed entity that is denoted by the sequenceof ASCII characters : "John Clark". There is no such thing as apossessive modifier for universes accessible by "John Clark" if weare to be consistent with claims.

`I think John has a problem with "nc-free-will", not with c-free-will,`

`which in my opinion is just will in a case of degrees of freedom, non`

`coercion, etc. It is what make responsibility and moral behavior`

`possible.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.