# Re: Autonomy?

On 01 Jul 2012, at 18:15, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> Suppose you predict "I will be in Washinton."

But if he was smart and knowledgeable of the situation (and the thought experiment would be useless if he was not) that would NOT be his prediction, instead he would make 2 predictions:

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington". 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only Moscow".

> Then the Bruno in Washington will be right and the Bruno is Moscow will say, "Oh, I was wrong."

No, after the copying Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow will both look at their identical diary entries and both will conclude "I was right". And you, the third party outside observer, will look at the behavior of both Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow and you will agree with the first person perspective of both of them that the accuracy of their predictions was indeed perfect. There will be no indeterminacy and no confusion between "1-pov" and "3-pov" and everybody will agree on what has occurred, unless of course somebody makes the illogical assumption that there can be only one Bruno Marchal

But for all persons, not just the John Clarks and Bruno Marchals, I mean, for all persons, they feel only to be one among all those persons.

You just don't do the thought experiment. You keep your view fixed in the third person view. But comp can predict the future first person view easily, and comp predicts that you, from your first person point of view, will live a unique first person experience, among

I was in Sidney and now I am in Washington

and

I was in Sidney and now I am in Moscow.

You are, by definition asked to predict which one.

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington". 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only Moscow".

cannot work for this, because "1)" and "2)" are simply incompatible from all the resulting possible future first person points of view of both "bruno marchal" (your terming). Each "bruno marchal" will see that only one of the two has been realized, and which one was the object of the question.

When the W-John Clark and the M-John Clark will look at their diaries and see the two predictions, They will understand that only one of the two prediction has been verified, from their first person point of view, and both knows which one, now. If they redo the experience, they know that the prediction bears on the future unique first person experience. Which one cannot be predicted in advance for obvious logical reason.

Just after the experience is done, they will each know for sure which one among 1) and 2) has been realized, for each of them, and they will know the existence of their doppelganger only intellectually a bit later.

In case you have not yet grasp the question, I insist that the question bears only on that future first person experience. Not on a third person description of bodies nor on a third person description of first person experiences, only on the first person experience. Comp makes this indeterminate in case of (self) multiplication.

Or give me the algorithm which will choose among 1) and 2), given that comp predicts that all first person experience will indeed experience such a selection.

And the iterated self-duplication protocols leads to white noise for almost all 2^n (n big) resulting first person points of view, justifying, in such protocol the P = 1/2.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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