On 30 Jun 2012, at 23:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:

It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.

My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon?

Yes. In principle. Assuming comp. Just find the right state of all americans at the beginning of the war, and a pretty precise description of America, and implement all this on a very powerful computer on the moon.

There is provably (assuming comp) infinitely many implementation of the American civil war in arithmetic. And that is very easy to prove. Again the hard part is to get the relative measure right. Of course in arithmetic, UDA shows that the measure exists, or has to exist, because if it does not exist, then comp has to be wrong. I don't pretend that this is obvious.



Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow?

If comp is correct, you can emulate Gettysburg where you want.




Do you see what I am getting at? Human identity is not made of only matter.

Well, if human identity is "made of matter" (what would that mean?), then comp is wrong (whatever "├╣ade of matter" means).


It is made partly of unique interactions of unique events. Even without first person fragmentation (which brain conjoined twins suggest is not a problem - "I" can be spread out beyond an individual body), there is nothing to suggest that the event specific entanglement-momentum of any system can be reproduced independently of context. If you duplicate Bruno's body, you get a newborn baby in an adult body.

This will depend on the level of duplication.



If you duplicate Gettysburg you get a bunch of confused amnesiac babies in uniforms. Each neuron has to discover its own connections for the first time, recapitulating the experience of the individuals or historic events as a whole as they struggle to cohere like a mass of fibrillating cardiac cells unable to synch.

In your materialist non-comp theory, that is conceivable. But is such primitive matter conceivable? I have no clue what that could mean. But I know it means nothing if comp is assumed to be correct.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to