On 02 Jul 2012, at 10:28, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 7/2/2012 4:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 01 Jul 2012, at 20:20, meekerdb wrote:On 7/1/2012 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart fromphysical realizations.Of course they do. Turing machine and fortran program aremathematical, arithmetical actually, object. They exist in thesame sense that the number 17 exists.Exactly, as ideas - patterns in brain processes.That would contradict the Arithmetical realism, and thus Churchthesis, comp, etc.Hi!A big carve out of the preceding thread... We need an exactdefinition of Realism!

`It is the believe that the principle of excluded middle can be apply`

`on the arithmetical sentence. In particular the proof needs ony the`

`belief that phi_i(j) converge or diverge, or that the machine i`

`applied on j stops or does not stop, and this for any i and j.`

BrentWe can implement them in physical system, but this does not makethem physical.They are abstractions.If you want. This changes nothing.There is no need of step 8, here. It is just a mathematicalfact that arithmetic emulates all programs, in the mathematicalsense of "emulate".That's a metaphorical sense.Not at all."Arithmetic" doesn't act or perform anything,Acting and performing are the metaphor here. Computation is apurely mathematical notion discovered before the building ofphysical computer. Some could even argue that the physicalreality can only approximate them.Right. They are idealizations.And with comp we have to define eventually notion like acting andperforming from the relation between numbers, and this is rathereasy to do.That doesn't follow. Comp only says that we could substitute somedifferent physical structure for part (or all) of a brain, and solong as the input/output functions were alwaysAt some level,But is this level reachable by finite means?

`Yes, in the sense that the UD will, after a finite number of`

`computation steps (in the math sense) reach the corresponding genuine`

`computational state(s).`

the same consciousness would be unchanged.OK.But how exactly would we measure this invariance of consciousness?

Like we do each time we go to the hospital, or in any life situation.

How do we deal with the parochial nature of the encodings of thediaries that the various observers write such that we have somethinglike a 3p account of the experience? What I write in my diary mightbe in a code that only I might understand, so how do we compensatefor this variability of language?

`For the same reason we agree with Gödel's proof despite he wrote it in`

`german. Either use a dictionary or ask an interpreter. In this present`

`case, we can ask to the candidate to write W, if he self-localizes`

`himself in Washington, after the duplication/differentiation, and M`

`if not.`

So comp allows that we may still need a physical realization ofthe functionality.In which case physical inactive object, with respect to aparticular computation, must be physically active. That is acontradiction. Cf step 8.In the case of a Mach–Zehnder interferometer we see that whatappears to be physically purely passive and inactive arms can anddoes play a real and causal part such that its removal makes adifference.

`But if you simulate that with a Turing machine, you see that the arms`

`does play a role, you have just a multiverse. Then we do the step 8 on`

`that deeper simulation.`

That this can be described by relations between numbers does notentail that it is replaceable by the abstraction.Indeed, and that is why there is a step 8.But Step 8 makes a leap too far. It mistakes the relativeindependence of computations for complete separation from physicalsystems.

`That is the result of step 8. To make the reasoning invalid, it is`

`enough to tell us that the result is surprising.`

What is difficult is to get the right measure on thecomputations, not to define action and performance.I am explaining what is a computation on the FOAR list, but youcan find it also in any textbook on theoretical computer science.No notion of physics are involved at all in the definition.But those definitions are concerned with abstracting away thephysical,If you want.We do!since the physical realization can be different for(approximately) the same function.You are confusing a computation with its implementation in aphysical reality. Computations have been discovered in themathematical reality, before we implemented them in the physicalreality. They exist independently of us, once you agree that 17 isprime is true independently of us. And "17 is prime independentlyof us" is obligatory to explain what Church thesis is, so we assumethat implicitly when saying "yes" to the doctor.There simply is not such thing as a computation if we remove itsimplicated connection to the possibility of actual physicalimplementation.

That is simply false.

To remove the possibility is to disconnect it completely from theability to be communicated.

`This is simply false, unless you postulate matter and non-comp. It is`

`just obvious, and trivial, that our communications do occur in`

`arithmetic.`

`They might not have the right measure, and if you prove that, then,`

`thanks to UDA, we will be able to say that you have refuted comp. But`

`that work does not exist yet.`

Purely abstract statements by your definition cannot cause anychange in a physical system

With comp, they can, from the perspective of the observers.

nor be correlated with any particular configuration of brain states,thus they are perpetually beyond our ability to apprehend them.

`Comp dopes correlate consciousness with computation, so this is simply`

`false at the start.`

It is no different than abstracting apples and oranges as fruit sothat we can add one apple to one orange and get two fruit. Itdoesn't make apples and oranges the same thing.Sure. But it makes both of them being incarnation of fruit, showingthat fruit can exist even without apple or without orange.Nope, sorry. That simply doesn't work. Categories cannot be definedfrom the inside that do not have non-labelable members. To claimotherwise is to refute your entire result. How can you communicateits significance if you cannot write it down?

I can write it down. I just use time and matter for that.

`I don't see the problem, given that comp explain how abstract number`

`discover matter and can use it to communicate.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.