On 02 Jul 2012, at 23:09, Jason Resch wrote:

To summarize our conversation up to this point:BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairsand people and numbers,JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just reallycomplex ones with a large information content. This is thenecessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws aremathematical.BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguisha description from the thing described.JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If nodistinction can ever be made (by observers within a mathematicaluniverse and observers within a physical universe) then there is nodistinction. You are using "physical" as an honorific, but it addsno information.BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair",rather than a "mathematical chair"?BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair. I don't know what at'mathematical chair' is. Can you point out how it is different froma chair?I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematicallaws, then observers can make no distinction between whether theyexist in a platonically existing mathematical object, or a physicaluniverse. If you agree with this, then there is no fundamentalontological difference between chairs, people, and numbers, that Ican see.

`Comp allows a big flexibility for the initial basic reality. If we`

`choose the natural numbers, then people and chair must be explained`

`from them, and usually will not be numbers.`

Facing the question: is the universe a mathematical object, or aphysical one, we must evaluate the two candidate theories as wewould any other.

`With comp, the "universe" is neither primitively physical, nor`

`primitive mathematical. It is a mental object, or a theological`

`object. It exist as an object of thought in the mind of believing`

`machines (relative numbers).`

Does one theory explain more, does one make fewer assumptions, etc.

That is the right attitude.

The existence of the physical universe does not explain theexistence of mathematical objects, but the converse is true.

Yes. And not only with comp, but with most of his natural weakening.

If we have to explain the existence of both: mathematical objects,and the physical universe, the simpler theory is that mathematicalobjects exist, as it also explains the appearance of the physicalworld. If one accepts mathematical realism, then postulate thephysical world as some other kind of thing, in addition to itsmathematical incarnation, is pure redundancy.

OK.

`I think that the idea of a primitive universe is a dogma. Of course it`

`is only a superfluous (redundant with comp) hypothesis.`

`Now the idea that the physical universe is "only" a mathematical`

`object among others is false too. It is a mental phenomenon as lived`

`by internal creature and provably made non mathematical from their`

`points of view. The relation between mind and matter, but also between`

`physics and the mathematical reality are more subtle than a simple`

`mathematicalist shift. The physical reality "needs" the consciousness`

`of *all* (universal, LĂ¶bian) machines to exist in some sense, even if`

`locally, large part of that physical reality will be independent of`

`the local conscious creatures embedded in it. Physics is really the`

`result of an epitemological process, which exists by the nature of the`

`arithmetical relations.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.