Citeren meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>:

On 7/2/2012 6:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 5:35 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 7/2/2012 2:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote: To summarize our conversation up to this point:BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables andchairs and peopleand numbers,JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, justreally complex oneswith a large information content. This is the necessaryconclusion of anyonewho believes physical laws are mathematical.BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannotdistinguish adescription from the thing described.JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If nodistinction can everbe made (by observers within a mathematical universe andobservers within aphysical universe) then there is no distinction. You areusing "physical" as anhonorific, but it adds no information. BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physicalchair", rather thana "mathematical chair"?BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair. I don't know what at'mathematical chair'is. Can you point out how it is different from a chair?I think we both agree that if the universe followsmathematical laws, thenobservers can make no distinction between whether they existin a platonicallyexisting mathematical object, or a physical universe. Ifyou agree with this,then there is no fundamental ontological difference betweenchairs, people, andnumbers, that I can see.No. The mathematical laws of physics (e.g. the standard model)leave initialconditions undetermined, Which is equivalent to saying everysolution to the Schrodinger equation is true.It's true that they are solutions. It doesn't follow that they exist.they assume inherent randomness (symmetry breaking), No where inthe math of quantum mechanics is there anything that suggestcollapse of the wave function.Except that's the only way to get a definite result. Otherwise yourinstruments say, "Well it was probably + and probably -."A strict interpretation of the the math leaves only MWI (oralternatively, as Ron Garett points out zero-universeshttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc ).How did you decide the Born rule wasn't math and wasn't part of QM?The randomness is explained directly by first person indeterminacyin a reality containing all possibilities.Maybe. But it's not clear that it explains the Born rule.they don't specify why they are the laws of physics instead ofsome others. Many physicists hope that they will one day find areason that our laws of physics are unique, some justification whythe one they find themselves in is the only one that can be, butthis seeming to be a pipe dream. Many physicists dislike anthropicreasoning, perhaps because it spoils their dream of finding a TOE,but disliking something shouldn't carry any weight in assessing atheory's validity.I could say the same about the Born rule and disliking that somethings happen and some don't.So the ontological difference is that some things exist and somedon't. Thisdistinction doesn't exist in Platonia: exist=having a consistentdescription. Inphysics exist=a member of the ontology of the fundamental model. What's wrong with Platonia being a fundamental model?No predictive power: everything exists, everything happens.

`The way conventional physics avoids that is by making ad-hoc`

`assumptions and by imposing ad hoc boundaries that according to the`

`physical model itself don't exist. E.g. it is very hard to escape the`

`Boltzmann brain problem in most complete models of the universe. So,`

`the predictive power of physics is achieved by imposing additional`

`unphysical ad hoc rules.`

`Of course, with these additional ammendments, physics is still very`

`successful. To me this suggests that we shouldn't dismiss any attmepts`

`to make a "Platonia model" work, just because you would need to impose`

`some additional ad-hoc rules for doing computations, that don't fit in`

`well within the Plationia philosophy. It could be that such additional`

`rules could be explained later.`

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