Citeren meekerdb <>:

On 7/2/2012 6:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 5:35 PM, meekerdb < <>> wrote:

    On 7/2/2012 2:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

        To summarize our conversation up to this point:

BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and people
        and numbers,
JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex ones with a large information content. This is the necessary conclusion of anyone
        who believes physical laws are mathematical.
BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
        description from the thing described.
JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction can ever be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and observers within a physical universe) then there is no distinction. You are using "physical" as an
        honorific, but it adds no information.
        BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair", rather than
        a "mathematical chair"?
BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair. I don't know what at 'mathematical chair'
        is. Can you point out how it is different from a chair?

I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematical laws, then observers can make no distinction between whether they exist in a platonically existing mathematical object, or a physical universe. If you agree with this, then there is no fundamental ontological difference between chairs, people, and
        numbers, that I can see.

No. The mathematical laws of physics (e.g. the standard model) leave initial conditions undetermined, Which is equivalent to saying every solution to the Schrodinger equation is true.

It's true that they are solutions.  It doesn't follow that they exist.

they assume inherent randomness (symmetry breaking), No where in the math of quantum mechanics is there anything that suggest collapse of the wave function.

Except that's the only way to get a definite result. Otherwise your instruments say, "Well it was probably + and probably -."

A strict interpretation of the the math leaves only MWI (or alternatively, as Ron Garett points out zero-universes ).

How did you decide the Born rule wasn't math and wasn't part of QM?

The randomness is explained directly by first person indeterminacy in a reality containing all possibilities.

Maybe. But it's not clear that it explains the Born rule.

they don't specify why they are the laws of physics instead of some others. Many physicists hope that they will one day find a reason that our laws of physics are unique, some justification why the one they find themselves in is the only one that can be, but this seeming to be a pipe dream. Many physicists dislike anthropic reasoning, perhaps because it spoils their dream of finding a TOE, but disliking something shouldn't carry any weight in assessing a theory's validity.

I could say the same about the Born rule and disliking that some things happen and some don't.

So the ontological difference is that some things exist and some don't. This distinction doesn't exist in Platonia: exist=having a consistent description. In
    physics exist=a member of the ontology of the fundamental model.

What's wrong with Platonia being a fundamental model?

No predictive power: everything exists, everything happens.

The way conventional physics avoids that is by making ad-hoc assumptions and by imposing ad hoc boundaries that according to the physical model itself don't exist. E.g. it is very hard to escape the Boltzmann brain problem in most complete models of the universe. So, the predictive power of physics is achieved by imposing additional unphysical ad hoc rules.

Of course, with these additional ammendments, physics is still very successful. To me this suggests that we shouldn't dismiss any attmepts to make a "Platonia model" work, just because you would need to impose some additional ad-hoc rules for doing computations, that don't fit in well within the Plationia philosophy. It could be that such additional rules could be explained later.


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