On 03 Jul 2012, at 18:02, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> Suppose I send the same identical Email to both you and to Craig
at the same identical time, you look at your copy and think " when
John hit the send button on his computer he could not have
predicted that I would get this copy of the Email and not the one
Craig got,
> It is the same. Leading to same experience, except one is
(predictably) lived by me, and the other one 'experience, not mail)
is lived by Craig.
I'm saying your experience would be EXACTLY the same if you had
received Craig's Email and he had received yours because they are
identical and interchangeable. I'm also saying that if you
duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal
to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then there
would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience.
No problem with that.
> I don't see any indeterminacy here.
It's precisely the same situation with your duplicating thought
experiment, they don't differentiate until there is a difference
between them, just as the word suggests; so if there is any
indeterminacy it is entirely a function of the unpredictable nature
of large cities and tells us nothing about the nature of personal
identity.
I can duplicate you in two closed little rooms. In step 6 you are
duplicated on a chip. The unpredictable nature of the place where the
reconstitution are done is irrelevant, except to be stable again, but
this is in the default hypothesis, yes we suppose there is no tsuanami
or asteroids demolishing W or M in the experience.
> > so it's a example of indeterminacy and all sorts of profound
conclusions can be drawn from that fact". What makes this ridiculous
is that the 2 Emails are identical and thus completely
interchangeable. In the same way the man sent to Washington and the
man sent to Moscow are also identical and thus completely
interchangeable,
> Before their differentiate, and the question is ask about the
result of the differentiation.
The result of the differentiation is that you might see the White
House tomorrow and you might see the Kremlin, and if Everett is right
Better not to introduce physics, for the reasoning proposed does not
assume any physical theory. It assumes only a physical reality being
at least capable of supporting a Turing machine, but it does not
identify it with such a machine.
you WILL see the White House tomorrow and you WILL see the Kremlin.
With some probabilities, depending in great part of what I decide to
do. But Everett is not relevant at this stage of the reasoning.
I can't be more specific about that, not because of something to do
with you but because of the indeterminacy inherent in the entire
physical universe that makes it impossible to make perfect
predictions. Nature might throw the White House at you next and it
might throw the Kremlin. And all this is not exactly breaking news,
its not some new discovery of yours, we've known about it for nearly
90 years.
?
The question is do you agree with it or not. If you agree then what
about step 4?
>> and they will remain that way until the environments of
Washington and Moscow, being different, change the two so they are
different and no longer interchangeable. So "first person
indeterminacy" is just the result of the unpredictable nature of
what goes on in Washington and Moscow.
> Nothing in W and M, relevant in the duplication experience, is
unpredictable in W and M.
I don't know what that means. You seem to be saying that the
activities in Washington and Moscow are predictable but that can't
be right.
Enough to take coffee and write the result of the experience in the
diary.
You wrote "1)" and "2)", and the copies agrees that this what trivial
and non precise, because they know that they each got only "1)" or
only "2)", and now they understand that the question was bearing on
exactly that, so they get the step 3, and move to step 4.
> You did not write any prediction (on the 1-pox, as asked) in the
diary. You wrote the two outcomes,
Two different things happened,
In the 3-view. Not from the 1-view, as you can know by interviewing
the resulting people.
you interacted with Washington and you interacted with Moscow so of
course I wrote about 2 outcomes, if I had not done so you would
complain that my prediction was incomplete and you would have been
right.
You did not made a prediction. You made a list of the outcome, without
much other precision.
After the experience, for the two people, only one outcome has been
realized. The question was bearing on that outcome. Not on a 3-view on
the situation.
You don't implicate yourself enough in the thought experience. You
seem unable to put yourself at the place of one of the copies.
> > I am in Washington and feel like I'm in Washington and only in
Washington and that is just what I predicted would happen. If that's
not a "1-view" what is?
> No. It was two 1-views.
I have no idea what a "two 1-views" is (are?)
It refers to your prediction which give the two 1-view outcome. You
tell me that it is an 1-view, but if you agree that 1 + 1 = 2, your
prediction contains a description of two 1-views. Not one.
but regardless of what it is apparently a feeling of being in
Washington and only in Washington is just not good enough to be a "1-
view".
Of course it is an 1-view. But your prediction contains the two
(incompatible from 1-pov) 1-pov.
So I repeat my original question, what is?
> I can predict the winning lotery ticket. It is enough to write
1) ticket 000000
2) ticket 000001
3) ticket 000002
...
1000000) ticket 999999.
Wow. You are quite clairvoyant!
I don't know about clairvoyant but if every one of those lottery
tickets turned out to be correct then my prediction was a good one.
Let us use a quantum lottery. So the choice is made by a reading of a
1/sqrt(2^n) superposition choice. With you reasoning you have to say
that if I play that game I have to expect winning with a probability P
= 1?
> Try to use the diaries with respect to the question asked
My difficulty is not finding an answer but figuring out what the
question is.
With comp you know in advance that in the duplication experience, your
1-pov will remain unique, so you know that you will feel to be in one
of the city, not in both. You have to evaluate that indeterminacy, or
at least to recognize it so that you can progress in the reasoning.
Your 1-pov will be "I am in W" or "I am in M". It will not be "I am in
both W and M".
No matter what diary entry I come up with you keep saying it would
not disprove your theory because of blah blah point of view blah
blah, so I want you to tell me exactly what diary entry WOULD
disprove your theory?
I will feel to be in W. Confirmed by the guy in W, but disproved by
the guy in M. Not good enough!
I will feel to be in Vienna. Disproved by both.
I will feel to be in W and M". Disproved by both.
I will feel to be in W and I will feel to be in M. Disproved by both.
I will die. Disproved by both.
I will feel to be in W or I will feel to be in M. Confirmed by both.
I will feel to be in W with a probability 1/2. Confirmed by most in
the iteration experiences.
The 1-indeterminacy is not a theory, it is a theorem in the theory
comp. No program nor machine can predict its future in the protocol of
self-duplication. It is about a triviality, but then it has
consequences.
If you can't do that then it's not a theory and it's not a proof,
its just blather.
You don't get it. If you have a theory capable of predicting where I
will find myself after a duplication, just give me the algorithm. Your
preceding attempt was a description of the indeterminacy domain, not a
prediction of my future 1-pov.
> You said it yourself. The one in W is only in Washington.
Yes.
> How can he be satisfied with having written "1)" and "2)" in the
diary?
Because there are now 2 John K Clarks and because 1+1= 2 from any
point of view.
Going out of the reconstitution box, he does not know that, and even
when he know that, intellectually in a third person way, his 1-pov
remains {personal memory of 1, intellectual knowledge of 2))}, never
memory of 1) + 2), so your prediction failed. Your algorithm did not
predict the {memory on 1} for the W-guy.
It is hard to follow you. You seem to agree that, from the 1-pov, the
1-pov is and remains unique in those experiences, and you seem to miss
that it makes the 1-pov necessarily selected from {W, M} in,
*obviously*, a non predictable way.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
