On 05 Jul 2012, at 20:40, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 July 2012 18:05, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the
relative first person perspective, from what is an entirely
Hoyle wan't necessarily assuming comp (and nor do I when talking in
this way). But the point which I have consistently tried to put to
you is more basic. This is that "the relative indeterminacy of the
relative first person perspective" already, by that very
formulation, assumes without justification (albeit rather
inexplicitly) some specific relative localisation within what is,
more properly considered, an indifferent ensemble (e.g. UD* or
alternatively some cosmological SWE).
This is ambiguous. There is a know localization, as I feel to be here
and now, but that feeling is distributed on the whole of the UD*, and
is a priori something no local. So the localization is given by the
first person view, like the fact that the one reconstituted in M knows
that he is that one. The 3-localization does not need to be assumed as
it follows from arithmetic.
Hoyle's way of thinking makes the indeterminate localisation of
experience explicit and absolute at the outset:
But this is exactly what I can hardly interpret in comp. It looks like
ASSA, which I have explained when I enter in this list as being non
sensical when we assume comp. Even without comp, I am not sure it can
make sense. What do you mean by "localization" exactly. With comp,
physical localization is an emerging pattern, and computational
localization in the UD, is defined by arithmetical relations.
he just imagines, in effect, what would it be "like" if the ensemble
of all possible occasions of sentience were "unrolled"
stochastically in a sort of eternal recurrence. This gives,
effectively, a relative-frequency interpretation of the probability
of any particular occasion being presently "given".
In which structure is that relative-frequency defined, and to whom
does it apply? How can we verify it?
But then such stochastic process will interfere with the outcomes of
duplication, and transportation, at least to make sense. But then it
might be in conflict with computationalism.
I don't see why you think so. The experiences associated with each
duplication or transportation outcome are assumed to be present in
the deterministic substrate in due measure, and hence to occur in
the associated stream of consciousness in due course. That there is
always some given occasion of experience is consequent on an
absolute first-personal indeteminism;
I fail to see why this would be needed, or even what it could mean, to
relativisation to an episode of a particular personal history is
then dependent on whatever deterministic substrate is associated
with the given occasion. "Relative amnesia" (or selective memory)
effectively compartmentalises first-personal histories from each
other and is consequently transparent to "reconstitution delay".
The above considerations seem so basic to our disagreement that
rather than comment further on your other points, I will await your
response to this. It is of course perfectly possible (not to say
likely) that I am missing something basic here, so I am trying to be
as explicit as possible.
I don't think you are enough explicit.
Let me know what, if anything, is still unclear.
I don't see how to define the absolute first person indeterminacy in
the comp context. I am also suspicious in front of any assumed
indeterminacy. That is my major critics of the collapse of the wave
packet, and Everett confirmed, for me at least, that we don't need it.
But even for probability in general: it is always relative to the
context where we do a random experiment, and I fail to make sense of
it in some absolute context, for context is a relative notion. Unless
you agree that it is the first person indeterminacy of the universal
machine, but here two, the machine can become any of us, but not in
one step, in many steps, so that it is not just the comp-
indeterminacy, but more its transitive closure on the histories/
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