On 05 Jul 2012, at 20:40, David Nyman wrote:

On 5 July 2012 18:05, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic background.

Hoyle wan't necessarily assuming comp (and nor do I when talking in this way). But the point which I have consistently tried to put to you is more basic. This is that "the relative indeterminacy of the relative first person perspective" already, by that very formulation, assumes without justification (albeit rather inexplicitly) some specific relative localisation within what is, more properly considered, an indifferent ensemble (e.g. UD* or alternatively some cosmological SWE).

This is ambiguous. There is a know localization, as I feel to be here and now, but that feeling is distributed on the whole of the UD*, and is a priori something no local. So the localization is given by the first person view, like the fact that the one reconstituted in M knows that he is that one. The 3-localization does not need to be assumed as it follows from arithmetic.

Hoyle's way of thinking makes the indeterminate localisation of experience explicit and absolute at the outset:

But this is exactly what I can hardly interpret in comp. It looks like ASSA, which I have explained when I enter in this list as being non sensical when we assume comp. Even without comp, I am not sure it can make sense. What do you mean by "localization" exactly. With comp, physical localization is an emerging pattern, and computational localization in the UD, is defined by arithmetical relations.

he just imagines, in effect, what would it be "like" if the ensemble of all possible occasions of sentience were "unrolled" stochastically in a sort of eternal recurrence. This gives, effectively, a relative-frequency interpretation of the probability of any particular occasion being presently "given".

In which structure is that relative-frequency defined, and to whom does it apply? How can we verify it?

But then such stochastic process will interfere with the outcomes of duplication, and transportation, at least to make sense. But then it might be in conflict with computationalism.

I don't see why you think so. The experiences associated with each duplication or transportation outcome are assumed to be present in the deterministic substrate in due measure, and hence to occur in the associated stream of consciousness in due course. That there is always some given occasion of experience is consequent on an absolute first-personal indeteminism;

I fail to see why this would be needed, or even what it could mean, to be honest.

relativisation to an episode of a particular personal history is then dependent on whatever deterministic substrate is associated with the given occasion. "Relative amnesia" (or selective memory) effectively compartmentalises first-personal histories from each other and is consequently transparent to "reconstitution delay".

The above considerations seem so basic to our disagreement that rather than comment further on your other points, I will await your response to this. It is of course perfectly possible (not to say likely) that I am missing something basic here, so I am trying to be as explicit as possible.

I don't think you are enough explicit.

Let me know what, if anything, is still unclear.

I don't see how to define the absolute first person indeterminacy in the comp context. I am also suspicious in front of any assumed indeterminacy. That is my major critics of the collapse of the wave packet, and Everett confirmed, for me at least, that we don't need it. But even for probability in general: it is always relative to the context where we do a random experiment, and I fail to make sense of it in some absolute context, for context is a relative notion. Unless you agree that it is the first person indeterminacy of the universal machine, but here two, the machine can become any of us, but not in one step, in many steps, so that it is not just the comp- indeterminacy, but more its transitive closure on the histories/ computations.



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