On 05 Jul 2012, at 15:47, David Nyman wrote:

On 5 July 2012 08:25, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

The proof if by absurdo. Suppose there is an algorithm, or even just a God capable of predicting the specific outcome among "1)" and "2)". Suppose it is "1)", then the guy in Moscow refutes it, and comp invites us to listen to him. If it is "2), then the guy in washington refutes it, and comp invites us to listen to him. Indeterminacy has not been assumed: it results from the trivial fact that I am copied in the same state in two different place so that I can't predict which differentation will occur from my first person perspective.

This is where it may be more explicit - and hence clearer - to express the logic in terms of Hoyle's heuristic, in my view. To remind you, a unique first person locus is first assumed,

Is that different from the unique first person that we have to attach to any universal machine?





all experiential content then being the consequence of a unique stochastic multiplexing of the entire class of sentient moments, from this singular perspective.

This seems like adding an ASSA on top of all RSSA. I fail to see the simplification, but if it helps you why not. Do you think we can make an experimental test showing a role to such an ASSA?



The "objective" substrate, on which sentience may be supposed to supervene, is assumed to be deterministic, as is the experiential multiplex, whose role is to make explicit a means of conceiving an entire class as a serialisation. But this latter conceptualisation allows us to bring an explicit indeterminism into the picture, against what appears as an otherwise entirely deterministic background.

But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic background.




An explicit stochastic multiplexing of moments mandates that all occasions of sentience must take their place in due course and in due measure, relativised to whatever "personal histories" may be recoverable from the internal logic of the deterministic substrate.

But then such stochastic process will interfere with the outcomes of duplication, and transportation, at least to make sense. But then it might be in conflict with computationalism.




There are several useful aspects of this way of thinking, I believe. Firstly, it takes seriously the singularity of first- personal location.

I try to assume the less, and it seems to me that for UDA this is explained by the fact that machine have singular self-referential memories. Then AUDA confirms this singular aspect with the use of the classical theory of knowledge.


Secondly, it makes explicit a generalised first-personal indeterminacy as a fundamental characteristic of experience.

I fail to see how this is needed, nor even if it makes thing simpler. It is already hard for most to understand an indeterminacy whose existence follows from deduction, so another one imposed on the top of it might seem making the picture even more complex.


Thirdly, and importantly, it prises apart two distinct aspects of temporal experience: "replaces" and "logically prior or next". Stochastic multiplexing of moments mediates the former aspect: this moment - the moment "as given" - replaces all others in experience. It is only in the context of the moment as given that logico- temporal ordering becomes relativised to a particular personal history, as mediated by the deterministic substrate.. Thus Bruno's, John's or David's occasions of experience become relativised to their particular reference (or relevance) class through, in effect, the selective memory of a more generalised stochastic "process".

You might have a correct intuition, and I can intuit something, but all what I do, is to derive the consequence of surviving with probability one in case of technically successful brain transplant. What is the relation between the new stochastic process and the global (on arithmetic) comp one.

Perhaps the stochastic process you describe is the same as the comp one, applied to the virgin universal machine, more exactly to its first person pov. "Total ammesy" would lead any one to that state. But we don't have to assume it. Universal numbers exists, and their domain of indeterminacy contains all possible experiences, except that the probability of going amnesic and getting my personal memory back might be a statistically rare event (I dunno, some experience reports can be amazing on this point).




In this way, each of us can speak meaningfully of "my next expected moment", or "my prior history" by exclusive reference to the memory state defined within a given "spatio-temporal" location.

But machines/numbers can talk of their next expected moment without invoking any stochastic process. Stochasticness appears because their relative consciousness is related to the infinities of computations existing in arithmetic.




It is curious at first to apply this heuristic to the UDA and similar scenarios, though ultimately simplifying, in my view. Firstly we must put aside any "fundamental" notion of past and future except as a logical implication from the perspective of a momentary localisation within a stochastic experiential multiplex.

It looks like the global first person indeterminacy of the universal machine, in front of the (arithmetical or physical)) UD.



We must however continue to take personal history seriously - and not only "our own" - because any other attitude would be bad faith. From this perspective we see that John's description of the objective situation after copying is perfectly reasonable and true of the deterministic substrate, and indeed the class of all sentient moments considered as a whole.

Locally. With that protocol. Yes. It is the 3-view on the 1-views.


It ceases, however, to make any sense at all in the context of the present heuristic, in which first-personal experience is explicitly recovered from a unique perspective ...

It seems to me that this happens, by definition, of the first person experience, even when just approximated by the personal memory, or the knower.

... by the mutual replacement of singular givens.

I am not sure if I understand. Is that not what is guarantied by comp: belonging to (at least one) computation, then the singularity is brought by the fact that the machine identify herself with its local mental accessible self-knowledge, with personal diaries. And the physics emerges from its ignorance on the computations below its local substitution level, or local universal bearer.




This heuristic provides a view of the first-person as a singular stream of consciousness in which all personal episodes emerge in due course, in due measure and in due relation.

What I try to convey is that if computationalism is correct, the laws of physics emerge from a statistics on (indexical view on) the computations. The goal consists in making comp testable, and the meta- goal is to illustrate that we can do theology following the usual standard of rigor. (which amount to say we know about nothing but can try making hypothesis and reasoning).

At first sight the status of your supplementary stochastic hypothesis is unclear to me, with respect to the comp theory. I feel I miss something to understand the motivation of your heuristic/supplementary hypothesis. What you provide above seems to me already explained, at least assuming the derivation of physics works fine before deciding that comp is plausible. Here, Gödel, QM and the MW seems already to conspire for the confirmation of the weirder aspect of comp: that our consciousness is not related to a singular computation, but to infinity of computations going through our state.

I am not sure I can make sense of an absolute probability on *all* moments. In fact a "moment" is already an indexically first person defined notion, so I fail to see what it could mean "in the absolute". I am afraid you have to do some work to make this more precise, especially in relation with the machines (relative numbers).

Keep in mind that I am a logician, and I like to assume the less, for making the conclusions available in the greatest possible classes of interpretations. Adding a supplementary assumption can help to provide models (interpretations) in which we can make more sense. You might need to justify the relative consistency of your hypothesis with respect to comp, though.

I remember you are motivated by the question "why me?", but as I told you before, I think that question is nonsensical, in the sense that we can explain why all löbian machine will rightfully ask the same question, in some genuine way. From inside eventually the question becomes "who's me?", which comp explains admits both one very singular unnameable answer + an infinity of different answers, which (hopefully) can cohere in relatively sharable dreams (the "multiverse(s)").

Try to make more precise what I, and the universal machine, might be still missing, if we are. If you propose a different interpretation of comp, you might also elaborate.

Not sure it can help John, but I wish being wrong on this.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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