On 7/24/2012 7:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 23-juil.-12, à 20:30, Stephen P. King a écrit :On 7/23/2012 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:If this is relevant for UDA, you should show to me. You start froman assumption of some primitive physical reality.Dear Bruno,Could you please explain to me why it is that you make this claimin spite of repeated explanation that show the contrary?Because despite you repeat that physics is not primary, you argue thatsomething is invalid in UDA by mentioning physical interactions, andby referring to papers which assumes physicalism (implicitly orexplicitly). As I said you contradict yourself.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Dear Bruno,

`It would be a contradiction if I where not qualifying the`

`definition of "physical interactions". Have you noticed that I mention`

`that I am putting the physical at the same level as the numbers, not by`

`making the physical primitive but instead by making the numbers (the`

`immaterial aspect as per your designation) occur (within my approach) at`

`the same level. Neither numbers nor physical objects are primitive. Let`

`me re-post something I wrote yesterday that you may have missed:`

On 7/22/2012 2:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Many (as implied by the word plural<http://www.google.com/#hl=en&gs_nf=1&pq=domain%20range%20map&cp=10&gs_id=l&xhr=t&q=plural+definition&pf=p&sclient=psy-ab&oq=plural+def&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=d0885a1bd80304c5&biw=1680&bih=894>)_is not just a number_. A plurality of 1p is a mapping function fromsome domain to some co-domain (or range), no? If there is nodistinction between the domain and co-domain, what kind of map is it?Maybe it is an automorphism<http://www.google.com/#hl=en&sclient=psy-ab&q=automorphism+definition&oq=automorphism+definition&gs_l=serp.1.0.0j0i5i30.43772.43772.2.44960.1.1.0.0.0.0.63.63.1.1.0...0.0...1c.vfE317HvrJQ&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=d0885a1bd80304c5&biw=1680&bih=894>,but it is not something that allows us to extract a plurality overwhich variation can occur. You are talking as if the variation<http://www.google.com/#hl=en&gs_nf=1&gs_mss=automorphism%20definition&pq=automorphism%20definition&cp=10&gs_id=1d&xhr=t&q=variation+definition&pf=p&sclient=psy-ab&oq=variation+definition&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=d0885a1bd80304c5&biw=1680&bih=894>was present but not allowing the means for that variation to occur!The use of the word "plurality" is thus meaningless as you are usingit: "first person plural view of physical reality".You must show first how it is that the plurality obtains withoutthe use of a space if you are going to make claims that there is nospace and yet plurality (of 1p) is possible. In the explanation thatyou give there is discussion of Moscow, Helsinki and Washington. Theseare locations that exists and have meaning in a wider context. Atleast there is assumed to be a set of possible locations and that theset is not a singleton (such as {0}) nor does it collapse into asingleton.

and On 7/22/2012 2:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

[SPK] If the computer is defined as a closed system then solipsism automatically follows. [BM]It is not define as a close system. that is even why it is natural(but conceptually wrong) to put the infinite tape in the definitionof the universal machine. But the universal numbers are open in a lotof sense. Now, even a closed computer, with a finite non extensiblememory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeating solipsimlocally, if its memory is enough big.[SPK]Ah! Exactly! "...even a closed computer, with a finite nonextensible memory, can emulate a plurality of observers, defeatingsolipsim locally, if its memory is enough big." YES! Defeating_/*solipsism locally*/_. That is exactly what I am trying to discusswith you, that is what the verbosity about "local measures" is tryingto convey. The "memory" is a resource, it is the computer's version ofspace. It is where the plurality is necessary.Let us recap the idea so far: A Computer, defined abstractly, is aclosed system. It must be closed if it has a fixed point identity (alaKleene theorems) , but this closure causes it to be solipsist. Itcannot name anything or have knowledge of anything that is not withinthe span of its being. How do we solve this problem? We first have toaccept the problem. Like the alcoholic that wants rehabilitation, wemust accept that we are - as observers - solipsists, but there is achance that we are not doomed to this misery. If the memory of thecomputer is "big enough" then there is a non-zero chance that thememory of a separate and different computer has a state of its memorythat is identical. This allows for a partial bisimilarity to existbetween the two computers.My idea is that if there is sufficient bisimilarity between adisjoint pair of closed computational systems and if there is a smoothtransformation that allows homomorphisms<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphism> of arbitrary states withina memory, then the appearance of plurality of computational observersis possible. The Stone duality then implies that if a homomorphismbetween a pair of Boolean algebras exists then there is atransformation between a pair of Stone spaces that exists. If physicscan be defined in terms of Stone spaces and abstract computations interms of Boolean algebras then the mind-body problem is solved. Thereis no need to "reduce" the mind-body problem to a body or a mindproblem (in the singular sense). There is a reduction to a Minds(plural) or Bodies (plural) problem, and this is the interactionproblem that I am trying to explain. If you would only read thatarticle on the Concurrency Problem in Wiki, this might have been aneasier journey.

`The key is that I am considering the body problem (as you define it`

`in your discussion of UDA) to be the dual of the mind problem for`

`materialism. Perhaps the only problem in our mutual understanding is`

`vocabulary and definitions of words. What we are considering is very`

`subtle and hard (almost impossible!) to define exactly. I need to be`

`more patient in my explanations.`

`Do you understand the key isomorphism that is being postulated to`

`"connect" the physical with the mental aspects? It is the identification`

`of a physical object with its best possible computational simulation. It`

`for this reason that I insist that we cannot disconnect the mental world`

`of mathematics (including any form of number or arithmetic - including`

`{N, +, *} - from the physical world of objects. There must be at least`

`one physical system that can implement a given computation for that`

`computation to qualify for universality. Of course universality demands`

`that the computation can operate on any functionally equivalent system,`

`so there is an invariance with respect to function, but the equivalence`

`class "pivots" on the necessity that it can actually be run on a`

`physical system. Otherwise computations (as per the abstract theory of`

`Universal Turing Machines) would have nothing at all to do with physical`

`computers and be a purely mental exercise of fantasy.`

-- Onward! Stephen "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.