Dear Roger,
I only see one glaring gap in your explanation here: the chain of
non-interaction leads all the way up to the supremum where God is
essentially and effectively (not)interacting with itself. Is this not
the very definition of Solipsism? How is the problem of solipsism not
even infinitely more acute for God? God has no peers, so it naturally
implies that the ordinary problem of solipsism - what does one human
solipsist say to another? - is a mute point, but somewhere and somehow
the appearance of plurality of entities must appear in order for us to
explain appearences. This is the very same question that I keep asking
Bruno and he seems to not understand the question: How does a plurality
of minds emerge from the One such that they have an appearance of
interactions without falling into the morass of allowing for everythign
and thus, ultimately, explaining nothing?
It seems to me that Leibniz was working out the Everything vs.
Nothing problem of existence from a different point of view with the
monadology.
On 8/24/2012 7:55 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
True, materials don't actually interact in Idealism, but the Supreme
intelligence
insures that the same result happens. In other words, you can't tell
the difference.
So at least in one place Leibniz says, "True, they don't actually
interact,
because ideas as substances cannot interact, but there's no harm in
saying
that they do."
Roger Clough, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
8/24/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
*From:* Stephen P. King <mailto:[email protected]>
*Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:[email protected]>
*Time:* 2012-08-23, 16:39:18
*Subject:* Re: Male Proof and female acceptance of proof
On 8/23/2012 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Then AUDA translates everything in UDA in terms of numbers and
> sequences of numbers, making the "body problem" into a problem of
> arithmetic. It is literally an infinite interview with the
universal
> machine, made finite thanks to the modal logic above, and thanks to
> the Solovay arithmetical completeness theorem.
>
> You cannot both claim that there is a flaw, and at the same time
> invoke your dyslexia to justify you don't do the technical work to
> present it.
Dear Bruno,
It is the body problem that is your problem. There is no
solution
for it in strict immaterialism. Immaterials cannot interact, they
have
nothing with which to "touch" each other. All they can do is
imagine the
possibility in the sense of a representation of the logical
operation of
"imagining the possibility of X" (a string of recursively enumerable
coding the computational simulation of X).
This would be fine and you do a wonderful job of dressing
this up
in your work, but the body problem is just another name for the
concurrency problem. It is the scarcity of physical resources that
forces solutions to be found and this is exactly what Pratt shows
us how
to work out. Mutual consistency restrictions is the dual to resource
availability!
My dyslexia prevents me from writing long strings of symbolic
logical codes, but I can write English (and some Spanish) well
enough to
communicate with you and I can read and comprehend complex texts very
well. ;-)
By the way, I only asked from a verbal -> written English
version
of your symbols strings, not a condensed explanation of it. I do
appreciate what you wrote, but it was not what I was asking for.
G is
[](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q)
[]p -> [][]p
[]([]p -> p) -> []p
with the rules A, A->B / B and A / []A
S4Grz is
[](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q)
[]p -> [][]p
[]([](p -> []p) -> p) -> p
with the rules A, A->B / B and A / []A
These symbols have verbal words associated with them, no? If you
where to read of these sentences aloud. What English sounds would
come
out of your mouth? Could those words be transcribed here for the
readers
of the Everything List? What word corresponds, for instance, to
"->" ?
Implies?
--
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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