Hi Stephen P. King

Leibniz did not have an overall theory of the universe such
as seems to be wanted here. The monadology is not an overall
theory of the universe, instead it is moreorless like a living
ecology, where the parts (monads) compete and collaborate with each
other through the supremem monad (the CPU) which in effect carries
out all of the needs, states, desires, abilities, expectations, etc.   

So Leibniz's ToE is a sociology.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-20, 11:51:24
Subject: Re: The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the"best 
possible" solution.

On 8/20/2012 6:54 AM, Roger wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King 

The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the "best possible" solution. 

Hi Roger,

    But the "best possible" can only be defined infinitely (and thus impossible 
to know) or finitely in a error-prone or approximate way. 

And contain absolute as well as contingent truths.

    I agree.

Thus there must be some sort of mereology involved in the modalities.

    Yes. The actuals are mutually consistent aspects or modes of the 
possibilities. The key is the frame of reference of the observer. There is no 
finitely knowable 3p, there is is only finitely approximative 1p. Thus we 
choose a point of view tat allows for measurement/observation that can be 
converted into communicable representations. This is the canonical form!

Maybe a new type of copula insuring this situation to hold ?

    Copula? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copula ? Please elaborate...

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-20, 01:02:41
Subject: Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense

On 8/19/2012 6:03 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/19/2012 2:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
On 8/19/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/19/2012 12:51 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
I understand that 2+2 = 4.
I still cannot explain how and why I understand "2+2 = 4".
"2+2=4" is easy.
"I understand 2+2=4" is quasi infinitely more complex.

Dear Bruno,

    As I see it, the quasi-infiitely more complex aspect of "I understand that 
2+2=4" follows, at least, from the requirement that many entities capable of 
making such statements can point to examples of 2+2=4 and communicate about 
such statements with each other however far away in space and time they are 
from each other. We can ignore the fact that there is a collection of entities 
to whom the statement "I understand that 2+2=4" has a meaning. You need to get 
a grip on the nature of meaningfulness. Searle has tried to do this with his 
Chinese Room idea but failed to communicate the concept. :_(

Maybe Bruno will introduce a new modality to his logic Up="Understands p".  :-)


Hi Brent,

    That would be wonderful if possible. AFAIK, understanding is contingent on 
demonstrability, e.g. I understand p if and only if I can demonstrate that p 
implies q and q is not trivial and q is true in the same context as p. I think 
that Bruno's idea of "interviewing a machine" is a form of demonstration as I 
am trying to define it here. In my thesis, demonstrability requires that the 
model to be demonstrated is actually implemented in at least one possible 
physical world (i.e. satisfies thermodynamic laws and Shannon information 
theory) otherwise it could be used to implement a Maxwell Demon.

    BTW, it was an analysis of Maxwell's Demon that lead me to my current 
ideas, that abstract computation requires that at least one physical system 
actually can implement it. This is not ultrafinitism since I am allowing for an 
uncountable infinity of physical worlds, but almost none of them are accessible 
to each other (there exist event horizons, etc.). 
    Consider the case where a computation X is generating an exact simulation 
of the behavior of molecules in a two compartment tank with a valve and there 
exists a computer Y that can use the output of X to control the valve. We can 
easily see that X could be a subroutine of Y. If the control of Y leads to an 
exact partition of the fast (hot) and slow (cold) molecules and this difference 
can be used to run Y then some might argue that we would have a computation for 
free situation. The problem is that for the hot/cold difference to be exploited 
to do work the entire apparatus would have to be coupled to a heat reservoir 
that would absorb the waste energy generated by the work.  Heat Reservoirs are 
interesting beasts....

If your computer simulation is acting as Maxwell's demon then you don't need a 
heat reservoir. 

 Hi Brent,

    Good point. I stand corrected! But did my remark about understanding make 
any sense to you? I am trying to work out the implication of the idea of 
Boolean algebras as entities capable of evolving and interacting as it is a key 
postulate of the idea that I am researching. The Maxwell Demon is just a nice 
and handy toy model of this idea, IMHO. Could the Maxwell Computational Demon 
"understand" what it is doing? We could add the capacity to have a self-model 
as a subroutine and thus a way to gauge its actual efficiency against a 
theoretical standard as a way to implement a "choice" mechanism... See 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehno85yI-sA for a discussion of this 
self-modeling idea.

The demon makes one tank hot an the other cold so a heat engine runs on the 

    Yes, the demon would act in a cycle: Compute the simulation to operate the 
valve to segregate the hot from cold and then use the heat engine to charge a 
battery, discharging the difference in temperatures. Can this run forever? No, 
given real world things like friction and the wearing out of parts, but in the 
idea case it might seem to be able to run for ever. 

Unfortunately this is impossible because such a simulation would require 
defining the initial state of the particle's position and momentum in the two 
tanks.  This is not available for free.  To determine it by measurement takes 
at least as much free energy as can be recovered after implementing Maxwell's 

    The idea case would shift the initial position/momentum question into a 
synchronization question: how is a measurement different from the "inverse" of 
a simulation? I do not have any good words to express my thought here... Let's 
see where the discussion takes us.

for more on this.

But if you're doing a calculation once on a given machine it's not necessary to 
erase the result.  In Feynman's paper on quantum computing he note this gets 
around Landauer's limit.  So long as the evolution of the computation is 
unitary no energy need be dissipated.  So I don't see how the result is 
relevant to Bruno's UD.

    The reversibility argument only works if there is sufficient black memory 
to work with such that erasure never is necessary. This is just trading off the 
recource of energy for the resource of a read/write medium. Given the wearing 
out of parts situation, could this be dealt with so that it is not a problem 
for the idea case aka no friction, no loss of heat to an external world...

See also http://www.csupomona.edu/~hsleff/MD-power-time.pdf for a nice 

    I am trying to met Bruno half-way in his COMP idea... I just can't let go 
of the apparent necessity of actual physical implementation, even given that I 
really like his immaterialist hypothesis. It is too much like Leibniz' PEH and 
its reliance on the logically impossible. How is Bruno's idea not a proverbial 
floating castle in the sky?





"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." 
~ Francis Bacon

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