On 8/20/2012 6:54 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the "best possible" solution.

Hi Roger,

But the "best possible" can only be defined infinitely (and thus impossible to know) or finitely in a error-prone or approximate way.

And contain absolute as well as contingent truths.

    I agree.

Thus there must be some sort of mereology involved in the modalities.

Yes. The actuals are mutually consistent aspects or modes of the possibilities. The key is the frame of reference of the observer. There is no finitely knowable 3p, there is is only finitely approximative 1p. Thus we choose a point of view tat allows for measurement/observation that can be converted into communicable representations. This is the canonical form!

Maybe a new type of copula insuring this situation to hold ?

    Copula? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copula ? Please elaborate...

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

    ----- Receiving the following content -----
    *From:* Stephen P. King <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>
    *Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
    *Time:* 2012-08-20, 01:02:41
    *Subject:* Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense

    On 8/19/2012 6:03 PM, meekerdb wrote:
    On 8/19/2012 2:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
    On 8/19/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
    On 8/19/2012 12:51 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
    I understand that 2+2 = 4.
    I still cannot explain how and why I understand "2+2 = 4".
    "2+2=4" is easy.
    "I understand 2+2=4" is quasi infinitely more complex.

    Dear Bruno,

        As I see it, the quasi-infiitely more complex aspect of "I
    understand that 2+2=4" follows, at least, from the requirement
    that many entities capable of making such statements can point
    to examples of 2+2=4 and communicate about such statements
    with each other however far away in space and time they are
    from each other. We can ignore the fact that there is a
    collection of entities to whom the statement "I understand
    that 2+2=4" has a meaning. You need to get a grip on the
    nature of meaningfulness. Searle has tried to do this with his
    Chinese Room idea but failed to communicate the concept. :_(

    Maybe Bruno will introduce a new modality to his logic
    Up="Understands p".  :-)


    Hi Brent,

        That would be wonderful if possible. AFAIK, understanding is
    contingent on demonstrability, e.g. I understand p if and only
    if I can demonstrate that p implies q and q is not trivial and q
    is true in the same context as p. I think that Bruno's idea of
    "interviewing a machine" is a form of demonstration as I am
    trying to define it here. In my thesis, demonstrability requires
    that the model to be demonstrated is actually implemented in at
    least one possible physical world (i.e. satisfies thermodynamic
    laws and Shannon information theory) otherwise it could be used
    to implement a Maxwell Demon.

        BTW, it was an analysis of Maxwell's Demon that lead me to
    my current ideas, that abstract computation requires that at
    least one physical system actually can implement it. This is not
    ultrafinitism since I am allowing for an uncountable infinity of
    physical worlds, but almost none of them are accessible to each
    other (there exist event horizons, etc.).
        Consider the case where a computation X is generating an
    exact simulation of the behavior of molecules in a two
    compartment tank with a valve and there exists a computer Y that
    can use the output of X to control the valve. We can easily see
    that X could be a subroutine of Y. If the control of Y leads to
    an exact partition of the fast (hot) and slow (cold) molecules
    and this difference can be used to run Y then some might argue
    that we would have a computation for free situation. The problem
    is that for the hot/cold difference to be exploited to do work
    the entire apparatus would have to be coupled to a heat
    reservoir that would absorb the waste energy generated by the
    work.  Heat Reservoirs are interesting beasts....

    If your computer simulation is acting as Maxwell's demon then you
    don't need a heat reservoir.

     Hi Brent,

        Good point. I stand corrected! But did my remark about
    understanding make any sense to you? I am trying to work out the
    implication of the idea of Boolean algebras as entities capable of
    evolving and interacting as it is a key postulate of the idea that
    I am researching. The Maxwell Demon is just a nice and handy toy
    model of this idea, IMHO. Could the Maxwell Computational Demon
    "understand" what it is doing? We could add the capacity to have a
    self-model as a subroutine and thus a way to gauge its actual
    efficiency against a theoretical standard as a way to implement a
    "choice" mechanism... See
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehno85yI-sA for a discussion of
    this self-modeling idea.

    The demon makes one tank hot an the other cold so a heat engine
    runs on the difference.

        Yes, the demon would act in a cycle: Compute the simulation to
    operate the valve to segregate the hot from cold and then use the
    heat engine to charge a battery, discharging the difference in
    temperatures. Can this run forever? No, given real world things
    like friction and the wearing out of parts, but in the idea case
    it might seem to be able to run for ever.

    Unfortunately this is impossible because such a simulation would
    require defining the initial state of the particle's position and
    momentum in the two tanks.  This is not available for free. To
    determine it by measurement takes at least as much free energy as
    can be recovered after implementing Maxwell's demon.

        The idea case would shift the initial position/momentum
    question into a synchronization question: how is a measurement
    different from the "inverse" of a simulation? I do not have any
    good words to express my thought here... Let's see where the
    discussion takes us.

    for more on this.

    But if you're doing a calculation once on a given machine it's
    not necessary to erase the result.  In Feynman's paper on quantum
    computing he note this gets around Landauer's limit.  So long as
    the evolution of the computation is unitary no energy need be
    dissipated.  So I don't see how the result is relevant to Bruno's UD.

        The reversibility argument only works if there is sufficient
    black memory to work with such that erasure never is necessary.
    This is just trading off the recource of energy for the resource
    of a read/write medium. Given the wearing out of parts situation,
    could this be dealt with so that it is not a problem for the idea
    case aka no friction, no loss of heat to an external world...

    See also http://www.csupomona.edu/~hsleff/MD-power-time.pdf
    <http://www.csupomona.edu/%7Ehsleff/MD-power-time.pdf> for a nice

        I am trying to met Bruno half-way in his COMP idea... I just
    can't let go of the apparent necessity of actual physical
    implementation, even given that I really like his immaterialist
    hypothesis. It is too much like Leibniz' PEH and its reliance on
    the logically impossible. How is Bruno's idea not a proverbial
    floating castle in the sky?





"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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