On 8/20/2012 6:54 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the "best possible"
But the "best possible" can only be defined infinitely (and thus
impossible to know) or finitely in a error-prone or approximate way.
And contain absolute as well as contingent truths.
Thus there must be some sort of mereology involved in the modalities.
Yes. The actuals are mutually consistent aspects or modes of the
possibilities. The key is the frame of reference of the observer. There
is no finitely knowable 3p, there is is only finitely approximative 1p.
Thus we choose a point of view tat allows for measurement/observation
that can be converted into communicable representations. This is the
Maybe a new type of copula insuring this situation to hold ?
Copula? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copula ? Please elaborate...
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
*From:* Stephen P. King <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>
*Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:email@example.com>
*Time:* 2012-08-20, 01:02:41
*Subject:* Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense
On 8/19/2012 6:03 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/19/2012 2:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/19/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/19/2012 12:51 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I understand that 2+2 = 4.
I still cannot explain how and why I understand "2+2 = 4".
"2+2=4" is easy.
"I understand 2+2=4" is quasi infinitely more complex.
As I see it, the quasi-infiitely more complex aspect of "I
understand that 2+2=4" follows, at least, from the requirement
that many entities capable of making such statements can point
to examples of 2+2=4 and communicate about such statements
with each other however far away in space and time they are
from each other. We can ignore the fact that there is a
collection of entities to whom the statement "I understand
that 2+2=4" has a meaning. You need to get a grip on the
nature of meaningfulness. Searle has tried to do this with his
Chinese Room idea but failed to communicate the concept. :_(
Maybe Bruno will introduce a new modality to his logic
Up="Understands p". :-)
That would be wonderful if possible. AFAIK, understanding is
contingent on demonstrability, e.g. I understand p if and only
if I can demonstrate that p implies q and q is not trivial and q
is true in the same context as p. I think that Bruno's idea of
"interviewing a machine" is a form of demonstration as I am
trying to define it here. In my thesis, demonstrability requires
that the model to be demonstrated is actually implemented in at
least one possible physical world (i.e. satisfies thermodynamic
laws and Shannon information theory) otherwise it could be used
to implement a Maxwell Demon.
BTW, it was an analysis of Maxwell's Demon that lead me to
my current ideas, that abstract computation requires that at
least one physical system actually can implement it. This is not
ultrafinitism since I am allowing for an uncountable infinity of
physical worlds, but almost none of them are accessible to each
other (there exist event horizons, etc.).
Consider the case where a computation X is generating an
exact simulation of the behavior of molecules in a two
compartment tank with a valve and there exists a computer Y that
can use the output of X to control the valve. We can easily see
that X could be a subroutine of Y. If the control of Y leads to
an exact partition of the fast (hot) and slow (cold) molecules
and this difference can be used to run Y then some might argue
that we would have a computation for free situation. The problem
is that for the hot/cold difference to be exploited to do work
the entire apparatus would have to be coupled to a heat
reservoir that would absorb the waste energy generated by the
work. Heat Reservoirs are interesting beasts....
If your computer simulation is acting as Maxwell's demon then you
don't need a heat reservoir.
Good point. I stand corrected! But did my remark about
understanding make any sense to you? I am trying to work out the
implication of the idea of Boolean algebras as entities capable of
evolving and interacting as it is a key postulate of the idea that
I am researching. The Maxwell Demon is just a nice and handy toy
model of this idea, IMHO. Could the Maxwell Computational Demon
"understand" what it is doing? We could add the capacity to have a
self-model as a subroutine and thus a way to gauge its actual
efficiency against a theoretical standard as a way to implement a
"choice" mechanism... See
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehno85yI-sA for a discussion of
this self-modeling idea.
The demon makes one tank hot an the other cold so a heat engine
runs on the difference.
Yes, the demon would act in a cycle: Compute the simulation to
operate the valve to segregate the hot from cold and then use the
heat engine to charge a battery, discharging the difference in
temperatures. Can this run forever? No, given real world things
like friction and the wearing out of parts, but in the idea case
it might seem to be able to run for ever.
Unfortunately this is impossible because such a simulation would
require defining the initial state of the particle's position and
momentum in the two tanks. This is not available for free. To
determine it by measurement takes at least as much free energy as
can be recovered after implementing Maxwell's demon.
The idea case would shift the initial position/momentum
question into a synchronization question: how is a measurement
different from the "inverse" of a simulation? I do not have any
good words to express my thought here... Let's see where the
discussion takes us.
for more on this.
But if you're doing a calculation once on a given machine it's
not necessary to erase the result. In Feynman's paper on quantum
computing he note this gets around Landauer's limit. So long as
the evolution of the computation is unitary no energy need be
dissipated. So I don't see how the result is relevant to Bruno's UD.
The reversibility argument only works if there is sufficient
black memory to work with such that erasure never is necessary.
This is just trading off the recource of energy for the resource
of a read/write medium. Given the wearing out of parts situation,
could this be dealt with so that it is not a problem for the idea
case aka no friction, no loss of heat to an external world...
See also http://www.csupomona.edu/~hsleff/MD-power-time.pdf
<http://www.csupomona.edu/%7Ehsleff/MD-power-time.pdf> for a nice
I am trying to met Bruno half-way in his COMP idea... I just
can't let go of the apparent necessity of actual physical
implementation, even given that I really like his immaterialist
hypothesis. It is too much like Leibniz' PEH and its reliance on
the logically impossible. How is Bruno's idea not a proverbial
floating castle in the sky?
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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