On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original.But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses theinduction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for thesake ofthe emulation without any inner conviction.I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to meyou havejust stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue PeanoArithmetic, becauseRAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in caseswere PAdoes a proof that RA can't do).Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA hassucceeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize thatthe RA level was enough.Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter),just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einsteinthrough my making of that process, but I can have a genuineconversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he hassurvived, or that he survives through that process.Dear Bruno,Please explain this statement! How is there an "Einstein" theperson that will know anything in that case? How is such an entitycapable of "knowing" anything that can be communicated? Surely youare not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! Idon't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must comeclean about this!What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, acomputer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0. Or I miss whatyou are asking.

Dear Bruno,

`The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple minds.`

`SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single mind and, at`

`most, a plurality of references to that one mind.`

That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and sowe can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in somerelativeway, if we are using the result in the right way).Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute thelower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quitedifferent.Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitutionlevels?There is a highest substituion level, above which you might stillsurvive, but with some changes in your first person experience (thatyou can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels arecorrect, I would say, by definition.

OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world...

If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if Isimulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I willautomatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and you willnot see the difference (except for the price of the computer andmemory, and other non relevant things like that). OK?

`Yes, but that is not my question. When you wrote "I don't become`

`Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine`

`conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has`

`survived, or that he survives through that process" these seems to be`

`the implications that the mind of Einstein and the mind of Bruno are not`

`one and the same mind, at least in the sense that you can be come him`

`merely by reading a book just changing your name.`

It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture ofan applein general (still less an actual apple), even though in manycontext we canindeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an applebecausewe don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talkaboutapples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture tomakesense of it.Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on acomputer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totallydifferent computer, you can see that I will be able to continue thesame game with the same chess program, despite the computer istotally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Samewith comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism appliesto that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I amwilling to have some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of aphysical implementation,In which modal logic?

`None so far that I know of. This is the problem that I see. We`

`completely ignore the ubiquitous even to the point of believing that it`

`doesn't exit at all!`

what is universal is that not a particular physical system isrequired for the chess program.With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Theirdoing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programsand computers.I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactions betweenseparate minds implies seperation of implementations and this onlyhappens in the physical realm.No, this is not correct. You fail to appreciate that allimplementations and interactions are already emulated in arithmetic,as shown by Gödel (in other terms, and implicity in 1931), and madeclear since.

`That is not my point. Any and all implementations and interactions`

`must be "emulated in arithmetic" for the symbols of arithmetic to have`

`meaningful content. I am asking a semiotics question. Is there a`

`referent to which arithmetic refers to?`

Actually, since matiyasevich, we know that we can eliminite the "A"("for all") quantifier from the logic, and that a unique degree fourdiophantine polynomial can already do the job.

`All of which assumes that such can be communicated. But how does it`

`get communicated? I am asking you to consider what is being taken from`

`granted, that ideas, concepts, representations are communicated and`

`asking you how that occurs - even as a toy model explanation.`

Therefore the physical realm cannot be dismissed!Nothing real need to be dismissed. But once an argument show that itcannot be postulated, the "non-dismissing" takes the form of areduction of it to something else.

`This is not a reduction issue. The symbols string that you are`

`reading now does not refer to the computer monitor that you are reading`

`it on, or does it?`

Bruno Marchal wrote:With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute.OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider ittrue,necessarily.That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. Idoubt it less than the "yes doctor" part of comp, to be specific.How is Deutsch's version different?It is not a different version, it is a completely different thesis. Itassume a physical reality (primitive or not), and his thesis is thatthere is a physical universal emulator capable of emulating allphysical processes. In the comp theory, this is an open problem.

`Yes, of course it is! I claim that it is an open problem for comp`

`because it assumes that it (physical reality) can be deleted from the`

`discussion.`

CT assumes only arithmetic or equivalent, and postulates the existenceof a universal programming language. Actually it postulates thatlambda calculus is universal with respect of the ability to definecomputable functions. Since then lambda calculus has been shownequivalent with Turing machine, algol programs, game-of-life, veryelementary arithmetic, diophantine equations, etc. So the origian CTis equivalent withAll computable function can be computed by a fortran program All computable function can be computed by a algol program All computable function can be computed by a game-of-life patternAll computable function can be computed by a four degree polynomialdiophantine equationAll computable function can be computed by a current computer etc. CT does not involve physics at all, contrary to Deutsch' thesis.

`I think that you are simply failing to understand Deutsch' idea.`

`one does not need to assume physical reality if one can merely assume`

`that some kind of communication can occur. My claim is that interaction`

`defines the equivalent to a physical reality; it is the plenum of`

`commonalities on which we communicate. I am trying to get you to see`

`this such that you might see the easy solution to comp's open problem.`

I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a questionof whatlevel we think about computation.This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level(unlike comp).I don't understand either.Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations,not withrespect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion ofcomputations through other computations. Because here instantiationanddescription of the computation matter - IIIIIIIII+II=IIIIIIIIIIIand 9+2=11describe the same computation, yet they are different for practicalpurposes(because of a different instantiation) and are not even the samecomputationif we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what isactuallygoing on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their emulation).Comp just bet that there is a level below which any functionnallycorrect substitution will preserve my consciousness. It might bethat such a level does not exist, in which case I am an actuallyinfinite being, and comp is false. That is possible, but out of thescope of my study.Bruno, this is exactly my argument against step 8; it failsexactly at the infinite case.The infinite case is exactly non-comp, which, as I just said in thequote, is not the theory I am working on.

`That is a nice Attaque au Fer! This is exactly why I make the claim`

`that your result is omega-inconsistent.`

COMP is omega inconsistent.That statement has been made by J. Lucas, and refuted since. The errorcomes from a confusion between"[](ExP(x))", and "Ex[](P(x))"That is "I know it exists a number x having the property P true on x"and "it exists a number x such that I know P is true on x".But I have no clue why you say that comp is omega inconsistent in thepresent setting.

`Its meaningfulness vanishes when the medium which allows`

`communication is removed. How can it be communicated? This is not an`

`issue of consistency, it is something else. I would like to see more of`

`J. Lucas' statement and the refutation.`

BrunoBruno Marchal wrote:It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulateeinstein(cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able to converse with Einstein.Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all(due topossible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will writea postabout this later), that is still not necessarily the case.It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation.And Idon't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein.No doubt for the first person sense, that's true, even with comp.You might clarify a bit more your point.I am interested in benjayk answer too.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

-- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.