On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,contextandambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulationdoesnot mean that the emulation can substitute the original.But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason triespointing on.A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulateexactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for exampleRobinsonarithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves theconsistency ofRobinson Arithmetic.But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic canproveits own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PAuses theinduction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for thesake ofthe emulation without any inner conviction.I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems tome you havejust stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue PeanoArithmetic, becauseRAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (incases were PAdoes a proof that RA can't do).Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA hassucceeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realizethat the RA level was enough.Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter),just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't becomeEinstein through my making of that process, but I can have agenuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know thathe has survived, or that he survives through that process.Dear Bruno,Please explain this statement! How is there an "Einstein" theperson that will know anything in that case? How is such an entitycapable of "knowing" anything that can be communicated? Surely youare not considering a consistently solipsistic version ofEinstein! I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, butyou must come clean about this!What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, acomputer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0. Or I misswhat you are asking.Dear Bruno,The question that I am asking is how you deal with multipleminds. SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a singlemind and, at most, a plurality of references to that one mind.

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`After a WM duplication there is already two minds. The first person`

`plural handled the many minds.`

That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and sowe can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in somerelativeway, if we are using the result in the right way).Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute thelower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quitedifferent.Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitutionlevels?There is a highest substituion level, above which you might stillsurvive, but with some changes in your first person experience(that you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, alllevels are correct, I would say, by definition.OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world...

`Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound`

`in arithmetic.`

If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if Isimulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I willautomatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and youwill not see the difference (except for the price of the computerand memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK?Yes, but that is not my question. When you wrote "I don't becomeEinstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuineconversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he hassurvived, or that he survives through that process" these seems tobe the implications that the mind of Einstein and the mind of Brunoare not one and the same mind, at least in the sense that you can become him merely by reading a book just changing your name.

Yes. comp has no problem with many minds.

It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a pictureof an applein general (still less an actual apple), even though in manycontext we canindeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of anapple becausewe don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that wetalk aboutapples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a pictureto makesense of it.Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on acomputer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totallydifferent computer, you can see that I will be able to continuethe same game with the same chess program, despite the computeris totally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly.Same with comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalismapplies to that level and below, but not above (unless of courseif I am willing to have some change in my consciousness, likeamnesia, etc.).But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of aphysical implementation,In which modal logic?None so far that I know of. This is the problem that I see. Wecompletely ignore the ubiquitous even to the point of believing thatit doesn't exit at all!

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what is universal is that not a particular physical system isrequired for the chess program.With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs.Their doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition ofprograms and computers.I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactionsbetween separate minds implies seperation of implementations andthis only happens in the physical realm.No, this is not correct. You fail to appreciate that allimplementations and interactions are already emulated inarithmetic, as shown by Gödel (in other terms, and implicity in1931), and made clear since.That is not my point. Any and all implementations andinteractions must be "emulated in arithmetic" for the symbols ofarithmetic to have meaningful content. I am asking a semioticsquestion. Is there a referent to which arithmetic refers to?

? (the model of arithmetics?)

Actually, since matiyasevich, we know that we can eliminite the"A" ("for all") quantifier from the logic, and that a unique degreefour diophantine polynomial can already do the job.All of which assumes that such can be communicated.

`Why? Even if Matiyasevic found this on a desert islands his result`

`would be true. Even if he did not found it, and was never`

`communicated, it still would be true, or you defend an arithmetical`

`idealism incompatible with comp.`

But how does it get communicated? I am asking you to consider whatis being taken from granted, that ideas, concepts, representationsare communicated and asking you how that occurs - even as a toymodel explanation.

`It happens when a collection of universal machines are supported by`

`some common universal machine. That happens all the "time" in`

`arithmetic.`

Therefore the physical realm cannot be dismissed!Nothing real need to be dismissed. But once an argument show thatit cannot be postulated, the "non-dismissing" takes the form of areduction of it to something else.This is not a reduction issue. The symbols string that you arereading now does not refer to the computer monitor that you arereading it on, or does it?

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Bruno Marchal wrote:With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and alluniversalmachine computes the same functions, and can compute them inthe samemanner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute.OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't considerit true,necessarily.That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. Idoubt it less than the "yes doctor" part of comp, to be specific.How is Deutsch's version different?It is not a different version, it is a completely different thesis.It assume a physical reality (primitive or not), and his thesis isthat there is a physical universal emulator capable of emulatingall physical processes. In the comp theory, this is an open problem.Yes, of course it is! I claim that it is an open problem for compbecause it assumes that it (physical reality) can be deleted fromthe discussion.

`I say the exact contrary. If comp is true then the primitive physical`

`reality is deleted from the ontology, and we have to explain the`

`physical reality appearance from the ontology we keep, like numbers or`

`combinators, etc.`

CT assumes only arithmetic or equivalent, and postulates theexistence of a universal programming language. Actually itpostulates that lambda calculus is universal with respect of theability to define computable functions. Since then lambda calculushas been shown equivalent with Turing machine, algol programs, game-of-life, very elementary arithmetic, diophantine equations, etc. Sothe origian CT is equivalent withAll computable function can be computed by a fortran program All computable function can be computed by a algol program All computable function can be computed by a game-of-life patternAll computable function can be computed by a four degree polynomialdiophantine equationAll computable function can be computed by a current computer etc. CT does not involve physics at all, contrary to Deutsch' thesis.I think that you are simply failing to understand Deutsch' idea.one does not need to assume physical reality if one can merelyassume that some kind of communication can occur. My claim is thatinteraction defines the equivalent to a physical reality;

it is the plenum of commonalities on which we communicate. I amtrying to get you to see this such that you might see the easysolution to comp's open problem.

Then do it, please.

I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just aquestion of whatlevel we think about computation.This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on anylevel (unlike comp).I don't understand either.Also, computation is just absolute relative to othercomputations, not withrespect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion ofcomputations through other computations. Because hereinstantiation anddescription of the computation matter - IIIIIIIII+II=IIIIIIIIIIIand 9+2=11describe the same computation, yet they are different forpractical purposes(because of a different instantiation) and are not even the samecomputationif we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what isactuallygoing on (so the computations take instantiation into account intheiremulation).Comp just bet that there is a level below which any functionnallycorrect substitution will preserve my consciousness. It might bethat such a level does not exist, in which case I am an actuallyinfinite being, and comp is false. That is possible, but out ofthe scope of my study.Bruno, this is exactly my argument against step 8; it failsexactly at the infinite case.The infinite case is exactly non-comp, which, as I just said in thequote, is not the theory I am working on.That is a nice Attaque au Fer! This is exactly why I make theclaim that your result is omega-inconsistent.

You made another claim. I have no clue with a result being omega-inconsistent.

COMP is omega inconsistent.That statement has been made by J. Lucas, and refuted since. Theerror comes from a confusion between"[](ExP(x))", and "Ex[](P(x))"That is "I know it exists a number x having the property P true onx" and "it exists a number x such that I know P is true on x".But I have no clue why you say that comp is omega inconsistent inthe present setting.Its meaningfulness vanishes when the medium which allowscommunication is removed. How can it be communicated? This is not anissue of consistency, it is something else. I would like to see moreof J. Lucas' statement and the refutation.

`There is a full chapter on this in "conscience and mécanisme", and`

`thousand of papers in the literature.`

Again, none of this address the issue of the flaw in UDA. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.