On 8/27/2012 10:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote:On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,contextandambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulationdoesnot mean that the emulation can substitute the original.But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason triespointing on.A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinsonarithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves theconsistency ofRobinson Arithmetic.But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic canproveits own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PAuses theinduction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for thesake ofthe emulation without any inner conviction.I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to meyou havejust stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue PeanoArithmetic, becauseRAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in caseswere PAdoes a proof that RA can't do).Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA hassucceeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realizethat the RA level was enough.Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter),just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einsteinthrough my making of that process, but I can have a genuineconversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he hassurvived, or that he survives through that process.Dear Bruno,Please explain this statement! How is there an "Einstein" theperson that will know anything in that case? How is such an entitycapable of "knowing" anything that can be communicated? Surely youare not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein!I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you mustcome clean about this!What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, acomputer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0. Or I misswhat you are asking.Dear Bruno,The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple minds.SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single mind and,at most, a plurality of references to that one mind.?After a WM duplication there is already two minds. The first personplural handled the many minds.

Dear Bruno,

`I am trying to get you to explain to us in detail how the copy and`

`paste operation of a body (as described in your papers) generates copies`

`of minds that are not identical to each other. BTW, there is a very nice`

`Google Book of Smorynski's article on self-reference here`

`<http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=wwXfHT5ka_8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=logic+of+arithmetical+self-reference&ots=51rs_0l3Ml&sig=UhcErZpSm4KTECVdkfLfwMF1LBk#v=onepage&q=logic%20of%20arithmetical%20self-reference&f=false>`

`.`

That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and sowe can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in somerelativeway, if we are using the result in the right way).Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute thelower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quitedifferent.Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitutionlevels?There is a highest substituion level, above which you might stillsurvive, but with some changes in your first person experience (thatyou can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levelsare correct, I would say, by definition.OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world...Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they aboundin arithmetic.

`This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all`

`copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one`

`and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a`

`necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but this would`

`contradict comp. I have a solution to this! Use the relativization that`

`we can get by relativizing the Tennenbaum theorem! Each mind is`

`associated with a unique constant that it cannot see, as it is its`

`Kleene fixed point. That way we can have a true plurality of unique and`

`distinct minds.`

`Somewhat surprisingly, it was the poker game`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_man%27s_bluff_%28poker%29> of "blind`

`man's bluff" and the book by Smullyan "/What Is the Name of This Book?`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0139550623>" /that`

`gave me the idea. It occurred to me that if consciousness is some thing`

`strictly internal (subjective, first person only), maybe there was`

`something that was the conjugate or complementary to that that would be`

`"external" or objective. The relation between G and G* seems to have`

`this same flavor. I am still unsure the details of this, but I hope that`

`you can see at least a vague outline of the idea that I am trying to`

`explain.`

If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if Isimulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I willautomatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and youwill not see the difference (except for the price of the computerand memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK?Yes, but that is not my question. When you wrote "I don't becomeEinstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuineconversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he hassurvived, or that he survives through that process" these seems to bethe implications that the mind of Einstein and the mind of Bruno arenot one and the same mind, at least in the sense that you can be comehim merely by reading a book just changing your name.Yes. comp has no problem with many minds.

`Really!? It does not have a problem per se because it makes all of`

`the minds that it might consider to be only one particular equivalence`

`class: the one that can be imagined by one mind. This is to be expected`

`from a consistent solipsistic mind.`

It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture ofan applein general (still less an actual apple), even though in manycontext we canindeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of anapple becausewe don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that wetalk aboutapples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a pictureto makesense of it.Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on acomputer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totallydifferent computer, you can see that I will be able to continuethe same game with the same chess program, despite the computer istotally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Samewith comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism appliesto that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I amwilling to have some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of aphysical implementation,In which modal logic?None so far that I know of. This is the problem that I see. Wecompletely ignore the ubiquitous even to the point of believing thatit doesn't exit at all!?

`"No other minds exist except for versions of my mind". This is the`

`consistent thought of a solipsist machine. Please understand that I am`

`not arguing against this situation, I am arguing that it forces certain`

`thing to be true and necessary. A solipsistic logical system can be`

`perfectly self-aware and yet cannot interact with anything other than`

`itself, by definition. For it, nothing exists that is not it, therefore`

`it simply cannot "see" the other minds problem.`

`My claim is that this solipsism condition is perfectly fine, true`

`and consistent, but only at the level of the primitives, at the Divine`

`Level. If we which to find a connection from it to the physical level we`

`have to "break it" otherwise it is incapable of making any contact with`

`the level of this discussion happening here and now.`

what is universal is that not a particular physical system isrequired for the chess program.With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs.Their doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition ofprograms and computers.I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactionsbetween separate minds implies seperation of implementations andthis only happens in the physical realm.No, this is not correct. You fail to appreciate that allimplementations and interactions are already emulated in arithmetic,as shown by Gödel (in other terms, and implicity in 1931), and madeclear since.That is not my point. Any and all implementations and interactionsmust be "emulated in arithmetic" for the symbols of arithmetic tohave meaningful content. I am asking a semiotics question. Is there areferent to which arithmetic refers to?? (the model of arithmetics?)

`One that uses a relativization using a variation on Robinson's`

`nonstandard model. But I need your help to find the proper formal`

`language to express the idea.`

Actually, since matiyasevich, we know that we can eliminite the "A"("for all") quantifier from the logic, and that a unique degree fourdiophantine polynomial can already do the job.All of which assumes that such can be communicated.Why? Even if Matiyasevic found this on a desert islands his resultwould be true. Even if he did not found it, and was nevercommunicated, it still would be true, or you defend an arithmeticalidealism incompatible with comp.

`You are completely missing the point here! Even a desert island or`

`in some cave deep in the earth, it is not just a human that could be a`

`witness to the truth. I/t is the mere possibility of communicability/.`

`The sand on that beach is a sufficient witness of truth. But /if you`

`remove the possibility of the merely possible witness, then you cause`

`the degeneracy (and eventual vanishing) of the very thing that you hold`

`so dear: the truth value/. The mistake in MGA is the ignorance of this`

`fact. I think that it is a conflation of the actual with the possible...`

`We see the exact same thing with quantum phenomena, if there is`

`even a possibility of detection of position information then the`

`momentum information will vanish to the limit of the uncertainty`

`principle. You have been living in a classical world too long and think`

`and have assumption consistent with such. I am trying very hard to be`

`consistent with facts: we live in a quantum universe, a universe where`

`the mere possibility of interaction counts as a term in the results.`

But how does it get communicated? I am asking you to consider what isbeing taken from granted, that ideas, concepts, representations arecommunicated and asking you how that occurs - even as a toy modelexplanation.It happens when a collection of universal machines are supported bysome common universal machine. That happens all the "time" in arithmetic.

`What exactly distinguishes them from each other? Is it an`

`absolute? Universality , as you define it, prohibits absolute`

`distinctions! Have you not read the articles on the non-uniqueness of`

`Godel numberings?I doubt that! So why can not you see the point here? I`

`suspect that you have some idea that there is an absolute ultimate`

`computation at infinity that can, like G* is a witness of G, witness all`

`truths of sigma_1 sentences. But what I am trying to show you is that`

`this cannot happen! Recursive enumerable function have to be finite.... NO?`

Therefore the physical realm cannot be dismissed!Nothing real need to be dismissed. But once an argument show that itcannot be postulated, the "non-dismissing" takes the form of areduction of it to something else.This is not a reduction issue. The symbols string that you arereading now does not refer to the computer monitor that you arereading it on, or does it??

`You make me cry with that answer. Please, read it out loud so that`

`you hear your own voice saying the words:`

`"*/The symbols string that I am reading now does not refer to the`

`computer monitor that I are reading it on/*."`

And ponder the question that it implies. Is it a true or a false statement?

Bruno Marchal wrote:With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and alluniversalmachine computes the same functions, and can compute them in thesamemanner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute.OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't considerit true,necessarily.That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. Idoubt it less than the "yes doctor" part of comp, to be specific.How is Deutsch's version different?It is not a different version, it is a completely different thesis.It assume a physical reality (primitive or not), and his thesis isthat there is a physical universal emulator capable of emulating allphysical processes. In the comp theory, this is an open problem.Yes, of course it is! I claim that it is an open problem for compbecause it assumes that it (physical reality) can be deleted from thediscussion.I say the exact contrary. If comp is true then the primitive physicalreality is deleted from the ontology, and we have to explain thephysical reality appearance from the ontology we keep, like numbers orcombinators, etc.

`What is with this obsession with physical primitivity? You have`

`demolished the idea, so why do you cling to it like a mistress that you`

`never wish to leave?`

CT assumes only arithmetic or equivalent, and postulates theexistence of a universal programming language. Actually itpostulates that lambda calculus is universal with respect of theability to define computable functions. Since then lambda calculushas been shown equivalent with Turing machine, algol programs,game-of-life, very elementary arithmetic, diophantine equations,etc. So the origian CT is equivalent withAll computable function can be computed by a fortran program All computable function can be computed by a algol program All computable function can be computed by a game-of-life patternAll computable function can be computed by a four degree polynomialdiophantine equationAll computable function can be computed by a current computer etc. CT does not involve physics at all, contrary to Deutsch' thesis.I think that you are simply failing to understand Deutsch' idea.one does not need to assume physical reality if one can merely assumethat some kind of communication can occur. My claim is thatinteraction defines the equivalent to a physical reality;it is the plenum of commonalities on which we communicate. I amtrying to get you to see this such that you might see the easysolution to comp's open problem.Then do it, please.

I am trying here, now.

I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a questionof whatlevel we think about computation.This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on anylevel (unlike comp).I don't understand either.Also, computation is just absolute relative to othercomputations, not withrespect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion ofcomputations through other computations. Because hereinstantiation anddescription of the computation matter - IIIIIIIII+II=IIIIIIIIIIIand 9+2=11describe the same computation, yet they are different forpractical purposes(because of a different instantiation) and are not even the samecomputationif we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what isactuallygoing on (so the computations take instantiation into account intheiremulation).Comp just bet that there is a level below which any functionnallycorrect substitution will preserve my consciousness. It might bethat such a level does not exist, in which case I am an actuallyinfinite being, and comp is false. That is possible, but out ofthe scope of my study.Bruno, this is exactly my argument against step 8; it failsexactly at the infinite case.The infinite case is exactly non-comp, which, as I just said in thequote, is not the theory I am working on.That is a nice Attaque au Fer! This is exactly why I make theclaim that your result is omega-inconsistent.You made another claim. I have no clue with a result being omega-inconsistent.

`What does omega-inconsistency mean, with regard to a theory? You`

`learned this in your courses. You know exactly what it means.`

COMP is omega inconsistent.That statement has been made by J. Lucas, and refuted since. Theerror comes from a confusion between"[](ExP(x))", and "Ex[](P(x))"That is "I know it exists a number x having the property P true onx" and "it exists a number x such that I know P is true on x".But I have no clue why you say that comp is omega inconsistent inthe present setting.Its meaningfulness vanishes when the medium which allowscommunication is removed. How can it be communicated? This is not anissue of consistency, it is something else. I would like to see moreof J. Lucas' statement and the refutation.There is a full chapter on this in "conscience and mécanisme", andthousand of papers in the literature.

Alas I can not read and understand French. :_(

Again, none of this address the issue of the flaw in UDA.

You refuse to look through the telescope.

`"My dear Kepler, I wish that we might laugh at the remarkable stupidity`

`of the common herd.`

`What do you have to say about the principal philosophers of this academy`

`who are filled with`

`the stubbornness of an asp and do not want to look at either the`

`planets, the moon or the`

`telescope, even though I have freely and deliberately offered them the`

`opportunity a thousand`

`times? Truly, just as the asp stops its ears, so do these philosophers`

`shut their eyes to the light of truth."`

~Galileo Galilei

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

-- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.