On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:

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Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original.But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses theinduction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the sakeofthe emulation without any inner conviction.I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to meyou havejust stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic,becauseRAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in caseswere PAdoes a proof that RA can't do).

`Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has`

`succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that`

`the RA level was enough.`

`Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just`

`by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through`

`my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with`

`Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he`

`survives through that process.`

That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and sowe can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in somerelativeway, if we are using the result in the right way).

`Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,`

`pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the`

`lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite`

`different.`

It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of anapplein general (still less an actual apple), even though in many contextwe canindeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an applebecausewe don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talkaboutapples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture tomakesense of it.

`Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer,`

`and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different`

`computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game`

`with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally`

`different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp.`

`Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level`

`and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have`

`some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).`

`With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their`

`doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and`

`computers.`

Bruno Marchal wrote:With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute.OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider ittrue,necessarily.

`That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. I doubt`

`it less than the "yes doctor" part of comp, to be specific.`

I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question ofwhatlevel we think about computation.

`This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level`

`(unlike comp).`

Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations,not withrespect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion ofcomputations through other computations. Because here instantiationanddescription of the computation matter - IIIIIIIII+II=IIIIIIIIIII and9+2=11describe the same computation, yet they are different for practicalpurposes(because of a different instantiation) and are not even the samecomputationif we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what isactuallygoing on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their emulation).

`Comp just bet that there is a level below which any functionnally`

`correct substitution will preserve my consciousness. It might be that`

`such a level does not exist, in which case I am an actually infinite`

`being, and comp is false. That is possible, but out of the scope of my`

`study.`

Bruno Marchal wrote:It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulateeinstein(cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able to converse with Einstein.Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all(due topossible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will writea postabout this later), that is still not necessarily the case.It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation.And Idon't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein.

`No doubt for the first person sense, that's true, even with comp. You`

`might clarify a bit more your point.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.