On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original.But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction.I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me youhavejust stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic,becauseRAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in caseswere PAdoes a proof that RA can't do).Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA hassucceeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize thatthe RA level was enough.Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), justby manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein throughmy making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation withEinstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that hesurvives through that process.

Dear Bruno,

`Please explain this statement! How is there an "Einstein" the`

`person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity`

`capable of "knowing" anything that can be communicated? Surely you are`

`not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! I don't`

`have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must come clean`

`about this!`

That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way).Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute thelower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quitedifferent.

Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution levels?

It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of anapplein general (still less an actual apple), even though in many contextwe canindeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an applebecausewe don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it.Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer,and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally differentcomputer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same gamewith the same chess program, despite the computer is totallydifferent. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp.Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that leveland below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to havesome change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).

`But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of a`

`physical implementation, what is universal is that not a particular`

`physical system is required for the chess program.`

With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Theirdoing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs andcomputers.

`I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactions between`

`separate minds implies seperation of implementations and this only`

`happens in the physical realm. Therefore the physical realm cannot be`

`dismissed!`

Bruno Marchal wrote:With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute.OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it true, necessarily.That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. I doubtit less than the "yes doctor" part of comp, to be specific.

How is Deutsch's version different?

I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question ofwhatlevel we think about computation.This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level(unlike comp).

I don't understand either.

Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations,not withrespect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of computations through other computations. Because here instantiation anddescription of the computation matter - IIIIIIIII+II=IIIIIIIIIII and9+2=11describe the same computation, yet they are different for practicalpurposes(because of a different instantiation) and are not even the samecomputationif we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what is actually going on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their emulation).Comp just bet that there is a level below which any functionnallycorrect substitution will preserve my consciousness. It might be thatsuch a level does not exist, in which case I am an actually infinitebeing, and comp is false. That is possible, but out of the scope of mystudy.

`Bruno, this is exactly my argument against step 8; it fails exactly`

`at the infinite case. COMP is omega inconsistent.`

Bruno Marchal wrote:It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate einstein (cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able to converse with Einstein.Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all (due topossible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will write apostabout this later), that is still not necessarily the case.It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation.And Idon't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein.No doubt for the first person sense, that's true, even with comp. Youmight clarify a bit more your point.

I am interested in benjayk answer too.

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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