That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a existence a non-zero measure.
Terren On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the >> potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological >> status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with >> regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all >> computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows >> that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an >> infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some >> arbitrary "current" state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I >> can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from "the >> infinite computations going through my state". Otherwise, I think the >> physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the >> particulars of how the UD unfolds. >> >> Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same >> ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I >> think if it was a "lesser" infinity, so that the probability of my >> state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my >> interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence >> is actually zero. Which is a contradiction. > > > You may be right. I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we > might as well think of it's computations as completed. > > I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't > exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still > exists. > > Brent > > >> >> Terren >> >> On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb<[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential >>> infinities. >>> Of course that also implies that "you" are never complete, since at any >>> given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations >>> that >>> will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating "you". >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>> It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of >>>> computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the >>>> ordinality of the infinities involved. >>>> >>>> Terren >>>> >>>>> Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite >>>>> computations. >>>>> So >>>>> at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is >>>>> very >>>>> small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> [email protected]. >>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
